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Abstract
Test eort prioritization is a powerful technique that enables the tester to eec-
tively utilize the test resources by streamlining the test eort. The distribution of
test eort is important to test organization. We address prioritization-based test-
ing strategies in order to do the best possible job with limited test resources. Our
proposed techniques give benet to the tester, when applied in the case of loom-
ing deadlines and limited resources. Some parts of a system are more critical and
sensitive to bugs than others, and thus should be tested thoroughly. The rationale
behind this thesis is to estimate the criticality of various parts within a system and
prioritize the parts for testing according to their estimated criticality. We propose
several prioritization techniques at dierent phases of Software Development Life
Cycle (SDLC). Dierent chapters of the thesis aim at setting test priority based on
various factors of the system. The purpose is to identify and focus on the critical
and strategic areas and detect the important defects as early as possible, before the
product release. Focusing on the critical and strategic areas helps to improve the
reliability of the system within the available resources.
We present code-based and architecture-based techniques to prioritize the testing
tasks. In these techniques, we analyze the criticality of a component within a system
using a combination of its internal and external factors. We have conducted a set
of experiments on the case studies and observed that the proposed techniques are
ecient and address the challenge of prioritization.
We propose a novel idea of calculating the inuence of a component, where in-
uence refers to the contribution or usage of the component at every execution step.
This inuence value serves as a metric in test eort prioritization. We rst calculate
the inuence through static analysis of the source code and then, rene our work
by calculating it through dynamic analysis. We have experimentally proved that
decreasing the reliability of an element with high inuence value drastically increases
the failure rate of the system, which is not true in case of an element with low inu-
ence value. We estimate the criticality of a component within a system by considering
its both internal and external factors such as inuence value, average execution time,
structural complexity, severity and business value. We prioritize the components
for testing according to their estimated criticality. We have compared our approach
with a related approach, in which the components were prioritized on the basis of
their structural complexity only. From the experimental results, we observed that
our approach helps to reduce the failure rate at the operational environment. The
consequence of the observed failures were also low compared to the related approach.
Priority should be established by order of importance or urgency. As the importance
of a component may vary at dierent points of the testing phase, we propose a multi
cycle-based test eort prioritization approach, in which we assign dierent priorities
to the same component at dierent test cycles.
Test eort prioritization at the initial phase of SDLC has a greater impact than
that made at a later phase. As the analysis and design stage is critical compared to
other stages, detecting and correcting errors at this stage is less costly compared to
later stages of SDLC. Designing metrics at this stage help the test manager in decision
making for allocating resources. We propose a technique to estimate the criticality of
a use case at the design level. The criticality is computed on the basis of complexity
and business value. We evaluated the complexity of a use case analytically through a
set of data collected at the design level. We experimentally observed that assigning
test eort to various use cases according to their estimated criticality improves the
reliability of a system under test.
Test eort prioritization based on risk is a powerful technique for streamlining
the test eort. The tester can exploit the relationship between risk and testing
eort. We proposed a technique to estimate the risk associated with various states
at the component level and risk associated with use case scenarios at the system
level. The estimated risks are used for enhancing the resource allocation decision.
An intermediate graph called Inter-Component State-Dependence graph (ISDG) is
introduced for getting the complexity for a state of a component, which is used for
risk estimation. We empirically evaluated the estimated risks. We assigned test
priority to the components / scenarios within a system according to their estimated
risks. We performed an experimental comparative analysis and observed that the
testing team guided by our technique achieved high test eciency compared to a
related approach.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Testing is the process of exercising a program with the intent of detecting bugs. The
basic aim is to increase the condence in the developed software. Testing enhances
the software quality in terms of the total number of test runs, bugs revealed and the
percentage of code coverage. Verication, validation and defect nding are the major
tasks under software testing.
In software testing literature, four terms are commonly used. These are (i) failure
(ii) error (iii) fault (iv) defect. Though, they have related meaning, they dier at
some points. An error made by a programmer results in a defect (fault or bug) in
the program. The execution of a defect may cause one or more failures. As per
the IEEE standard, failure is the inability of a system or a component to perform
its required functions within the specied requirements. A failure in a system is
observed by the user externally. There are two main goals in software testing: (i)
to achieve the adequate quality in which the objective is to search the bugs within
a software (ii) to assess the existing quality of the system in which the objective
is to assess the reliability of a software system. Based on the testing strategy, the
software testing approaches are classied into two types such as code based testing
and usage based testing. The aim of code based testing is to execute each and every
statement in a program at least once, during the test [2, 3]. It attempts to cover
each reachable elements in the software, within the available test budget. In the
code based testing methodologies such as statement, branch and path coverage, each
aspect of a program is treated with equal importance [2]. The main aim is to nd
as many bugs as possible. Usage based testing focuses on detecting bugs that are
responsible for frequent failures of the system. Unlike the code based testing, the
tester of usage based testing does not require any prior knowledge of the program.
In code based testing, the aim is to execute each statement and conditional branch
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of the program to detect bugs, whereas in usage based testing, the aim is to detect
the bugs in the frequently executed parts of the source code, at the early phase of
testing.
Testing is an action of sampling. As it is expensive and also some times impossible
to perform systematic testing with an adequate test suite due to an innite state
space, the tester needs to take a decision about what to test and what not to test,
what to test more and what to test less and also in what order to test. The testing
team follows prioritization-based testing techniques to solve this problem.
Prioritization-based Testing
The tester prioritizes the testing process with the hope to get the best possible
chance to reveal the worst fault. At any instance of testing point, the tester feels
that the tests that have been conducted are important than the tests that have
not yet been conducted. Testing time is not certain. There is a chance of delay
in all other activities before test execution or there is a pressure from market to
release the product before scheduled time. The aim of prioritization-based testing
is to ensure that the testing resources have been spent cost-eectively, whenever
the testing process is terminated. Software industries conduct prioritization-based
testing with a number of goals. For example:
 Detecting more bugs at the early phase of testing, when a regression test is
conducted using the same test suite.
 Improving the code coverage within the available test resources.
 Improving the reliability of a system within the available test resources.
 Increasing the likelihood of detecting more bugs in the modied parts of the
source code.
 Increasing the rate of detecting critical bugs at the early phase of testing pro-
cess.
Test case prioritization and test case selection approaches have been discussed
in software testing literature. A number of researchers [4{8] have considered several
criteria for test case prioritization and test case selection. Some of the criteria are (i)
coverage of statements, (ii) coverage of statements not yet covered (iii) coverage of
2
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functions (iv) coverage of functions not yet covered (v) potential for fault exposing
(vi) probability of fault existence/exposure, adjusted to previous coverage etc.
All the existing techniques on test case prioritization and test case selection are
purely code-based and require the information on previous usage of the system.
Hence, these techniques are mainly used at the post-implementation phase and used
only for regression testing. Among the objectives of test case prioritization, the most
important one is to maximize the rate of fault detection. The aim is to detect the
faults from the important parts of the source code at the early phase of the test-
ing process. Other objectives include the ability to detect important faults and the
ability to reveal faults associated with specic code changes or to achieve the target
coverage or reliability level as early as possible.
The distribution of test eorts is important to test organization. In this thesis,
prioritizition refers to test eort prioritization in which components1/scenarios are
prioritized for testing according to their inuence on the overall reliability of the
system or severity of failures. Test eort prioritization is a research area under pre-
testing eort i.e. before the generation of test cases. The software industry is really
interested to save money on testing. As test resources are limited, a proper analysis is
needed to decide how much test eort should be given to individual elements, within
a system. The test manager should estimate the criticality associated with individual
elements in order to decide which parts of the system should be tested thoroughly,
within the available test budget. For estimating criticality, the test manager should
consider various internal and external factors of a component such as complexity,
dependability, severity and the business importance within the system.
1.1 Motivation
An ecient prioritization method can drastically reduce the inecient eort and help
to eectively utilize the test resources. Though, a great eort have been given on
prioritization-based testing [4,9{11], the proposed methods are not so much eective
in reducing the failure rate of a system and improving the user's perception on the
reliability of a system. Limitations of some prioritization-based testing methods and
reason for their low productivity are described below.
The techniques used for code prioritization [11, 12] only nd the percentage of
1A component refers either to a single item: an object, a class, or a procedure or to a complex
item: a package of classes or procedures.
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code coverage at the testing phase in a practical system. It cannot nd the elements
which have high impact on the overall reliability of the system. Testing methods
based on operational prole [9, 13] alone did not consider the white-box approach
for test eort prioritization. Though some researchers [14, 15] have considered the
white-box approach along with operational prole, but they did not consider the data
dependencies among components within a system.
Test eort prioritization at the early stage of development cycle makes the testing
process eective. Several researchers [16{19] have proposed test eort estimation
methods at the early phase, but to the best of our knowledge, no one has proposed
a quantitative estimation of complexity for a use case. As, the complexity of a use
case is a major input for test eort estimation and prioritization, there is a need to
perform analytical complexity assessment at the architectural level, with little or no
involvement of subjective measures from domain experts. Keeping these in view, we
propose some approaches that attempt to overcome many of the limitations of the
existing approaches highlighted above. Now, we discuss the motivations behind our
research work.
 A bug in a critical element may cause frequent failures or severe failures of the
system. The criticality of an element can be identied through the analysis of
source code and the operational prole of the system.
 Some researchers [1, 20, 21] have observed that the return on investment on
testing is increased through a Value based software testing method, where the
business value that come from customer and market is considered as a testing
factor. Similarly, there are some components which are executed rarely but
a bug in that may cause catastrophic failures. To make the criticality com-
putation process accurate and eective, the external factors of a component
such as business value and severity associated with the failure modes should be
considered along with its internal factors.
 It is possible to achieve a high quality software product in aordable cost. For
this, software testing should be incorporated early into the software develop-
ment process. It is desirable to identify the critical elements at the architectural
level for an eective test resource distribution.
 Risk assessment at the early stage helps to achieve a high level of condence
in a software system. A software system is generally state based. A system
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behaves dierently to the same event, when it is in dierent states. The state of
a system at any time is the composition of the states of the various interacting
components (objects) within the system at that time. Hence, we are motivated
by the need to develop a methodology to estimate the risk for a state of a
component within a scenario and use it to estimate the risk for the scenario
and for the system.
With this motivation, we concentrate upon identifying critical elements both at
the implementation and architectural level. In the next section, we identify the major
objectives of the thesis.
1.2 Objective
Our aim is to estimate the criticality of an element at various phases of software
development life cycle by considering various internal and external factors of the
element. To address this broad objective, we identify the following goals based on
the motivations outlined in the previous section.
 To develop various metrics through static and dynamic analysis of source code
and identify the sensible elements within a system.
 To expose the critical elements within a system that have a high inuence on
the overall reliability of the system or a bug in that component is responsible
for severe failures of the system.
 To set dierent test objectives at dierent instances of testing phase.
 To get the complexity of a high level function at the early phase of development
life cycle based on some quantitative metrics that are analytical in nature rather
than subjective measures from domain experts and distribute the test eorts
accordingly for an eective testing.
 To estimate the risk for a state of a component within a scenario and use it
to compute the risk for the scenario. To generate a list of components within
a scenario and a list of scenarios within the whole system ranked by their
estimated risks, so that test eort can be distributed accordingly for an eective
testing.
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1.3 Overview
In order to save time and cost in the Software Development Life Cycle (SDLC), there
is a requirement of an eective decision-making for allocating resources to various
parts of the software system. In this thesis, we explore some test eort prioritization
issues at various phases of software development life cycle. We propose a set of
techniques to prioritize the components/use case scenarios for testing at the code
level and also, at the design level. At the code level, the potential of a program
element to cause failures is measured with the metric Inuence Metric. Based on
a graph-based representation, the eected part of classes are determined. Within
a system, we consider the internal and external factors such as the class inuence,
average execution time, structural complexity, severity and business value for ranking
of the importance of a class for testing. We propose a novel approach for reliability
improvement that involves the analysis of the dynamic inuence and severity of
various components within a software system.
A software product can be lunched in due time with sucient testing, if a test plan
is prepared early. As the analysis and design stage is critical compared to other stages
of SDLC, detecting and correcting errors at this stage is less costly than later stages.
We aim to leverage the architectural complexity and business importance information
to assign test priority to use cases. We rst analyze the factors that have an eect on
the complexity of a use case and then, give a framework to compute test priority. The
stakeholders and developers feel that the measurement of the quality of a software
system through risk is more signicant than other factors such as expected number
of residual bugs or failure rate etc. Risk assessment framework takes into account
the arguments about the benets as well as the hazards2 associated with a system.
It helps to take a valuable decision on investment at an early stage. We propose a
technique to estimate the reliability-based risk at the design level. Reliability-based
risk is estimated based on two factors (i) the probability of the failure of the software
product within the operational environment and (ii) the adversity of that failure.
We propose a technique to assess the risk of a component at various states within a
system, which is used as the basis for establishing the test priority.
A set of experiments are conducted to compare our test eort prioritization tech-
niques to dierent solutions. Through the experimental results, we observed that our
2A hazard is an accident waiting to happen. It is due to faults or failures which occur in a
particular context.
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proposed techniques guide the tester to expose the critical elements that are getting
less attention in terms of testing. In addition to that, our approaches also help to
improve the reliability of the system within the available test resources.
1.4 Focus and Contribution of the Thesis
Specically, the thesis makes the following contributions:
 We propose a framework to compute the criticality of a component within a
system and prioritize the components for testing according to their estimated
criticality. For this, we introduce a new metric called Inuence Metric using
forward slicing technique to compute the inuence value of a component to-
wards system failures. It is based on static analysis of the program. We have
experimentally proved that decreasing the reliability of a component with high
criticality drastically increases the failure rate of the system, whereas it is not
true in case of a component with low criticality. In this work, we have not
considered the impact of external factors while doing prioritization.
 Though, the inuence value of a component aects the reliability of a system,
this factor alone is not sucient to estimate the criticality of the component.
The reliability calculation only counts the number of failures observed after the
testing phase. It does not consider the impact of those failures on the system.
The impacts of dierent failures are dierent. Some are minor whereas, some
are major. Similarly, each high level function does not provide equal benet
to the customer. For criticality estimation, we extend our previous work by
adding some internal and external factors such as the average execution time,
structural complexity, and severity of failures in the component as well as the
component's perceived business value. We have conducted a set of experiments
and observed that our approach is eective in guiding test eort as it is linked
to both external measure of defect severity and business value, and internal
measure of frequency and complexity. Through the experimental results, we
observed that our approach helps to improve the reliability of a system within
the available test resources. In addition to that, our approach also helps to
reduce the post-release failures that have a negative impact on the system.
In both the approaches, we have prioritized the program elements based on
static analysis of the source code. We have not considered the dynamic aspects.
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In our next work, we prioritize the program elements based on dynamic analysis
of source code.
 In our previous work, we have assigned dierent priority values to dierent
components, but the priority values remained constant throughout the testing
phase. As priority is established by order of importance, a component does
not get equal priority throughout the testing phase. We propose a multi cycle-
based test eort prioritization technique, in which the priority values of various
components change between two test cycles within a system under test. In
the rst test cycle, we estimate the criticality of a component and assign test
priority to the component based on its criticality. Unlike the previous work,
we estimate the criticality based on dynamic Inuence Metric. In a static
inuence metric, only the information regarding how many other classes request
services from a given class is obtained, but in dynamic inuence metric, the
information regarding how often these requests are executed within a scenario
is obtained. In the second test cycle, we assign test priority to a component
based on its failure rate in the previous test cycle. We include a Value-based
testing approach in the third test cycle. The eectiveness of our proposed
testing approach has been validated by applying it to three moderate sized
case studies.
The proposed techniques can be used by testers in software industry for priori-
tizing the test eorts, where the source codes are available. Since in many cases,
the source code may not be available, in our next work, we develop a technique
for prioritization of elements at the design level. The technique can be used
by tester in software industry, where source code are not available and/or test
planing is required much early in the SDLC.
 Planning at high level enhances the decision on resource allocation. Estimating
the criticality of an architectural element and performing test eort prioritiza-
tion based on criticality at high level helps both the system analyst and the test
manager in planing suitable provision for the critical elements. If the critical
elements will be detected at the early phase of SDLC then, it will be useful in
allotting resources in afterward development phase. Keeping this in mind, we
propose a technique to rank the use cases within a system for testing based on
their internal criteria- architectural complexity and external criteria- business
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value. We rst, analyze the factors that have an eect on the complexity of a
use case and then, give a framework to compute test priority. The complexity
of a use case is computed analytically through a collection of data at the archi-
tectural level with little or no involvement of subjective measures from domain
experts. In our approach, a high-ranked use case may be more fault-prone or
it may add value to the organization. Hence, the failure of a high-ranked use
case may create a great loss to the organization.
In all the above work, we have not considered the risk associated with a system.
In real practice, risks are associated with every system. Resolving risks at the
analysis and design level will improve the quality of the system, within the
available resources. In our next work, we develop an approach at the design
level for prioritization of elements for testing, considering the risk associated
with a system.
 Test eort prioritization based on risk is a powerful technique for streamlining
the test eort and delivering the software product with right quality level in
limited resources. The tester feels that he is doing the best possible job with the
limited resources by exploiting the relationship between risk and testing eort.
Risk assessment at an early stage helps to achieve a high level of condence
in the system. We propose an analytical approach for risk assessment of a
software system at the design stage. First, we propose a method to estimate
the risk for various states of a component within a scenario and then, estimate
the risk for the whole scenario. In our previous work, we have assessed the
severity at the code level, but in this work, we assess the severity at the design
level. We estimate the risk of the overall system based on two inputs: scenarios
risks and Interaction Overview Diagram (IOD) of the system. Our risk analysis
approach ranks the components/scenarios within a system for testing according
to their estimated risks. We performed an experimental comparative analysis
and observed that the testing team guided by our risk assessment approach
achieves high test eciency compared to a related approach.
The relationships among the contribution is shown in Figure 1.1. As shown in the
gure, the contribution on test eort prioritization is broadly divided into two parts.
The rst part deals with the analysis of the source code and the second part deals
with the analysis of the design model.
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Figure 1.1: Outline of the thesis
Our proposed prioritization techniques can be used in software industries for an-
alyzing and identifying the important components / scenarios of a software system.
Based on the results of the analysis, appropriate test eort can be allocated to dier-
ent components of the system and the quality of the software can be improved within
the available test resources. The proposed severity analysis used for prioritization,
will help detect the important errors at the early phase of testing, thus reducing
the total test eort. Our risk based testing approach can be used in safety critical
systems such as Pace Maker, Nuclear power plant, Air trac control system etc., for
identifying the risks associated with various components / scenarios and the whole
system and allocating the test eort accordingly.
1.5 Organization of the Thesis
The rest of this thesis is organized into chapters as follows.
1. Chapter 2 discusses the background concepts used in the thesis.
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2. Chapter 3 provides a brief review of the related work relevant to our contribu-
tion.
3. Chapter 4 presents a novel approach to get the inuence of a component to-
wards system failures. We propose a metric, called Inuence Metric, through
static analysis of source code and use it as a factor for prioritizing program
elements at the code level.
4. Chapter 5 presents a novel approach to prioritize classes according to their
potential to cause failures and severity of those failures. This is a very important
and interesting problem for software testing. This chapter extends the work in
Chapter 4 by adding some contributing factors- structural complexity, severity
and business value- for test eort prioritization.
5. Chapter 6 presents a multi cycle-based test eort prioritization approach to
improve the reliability of a system within the available test resources, through
the dynamic analysis of source code.
6. Chapter 7 presents an approach to estimate the test eort based on the priori-
tization of use cases in the design level of software development life cycle. Our
approach quanties a method for estimating the test eort of a software system
based on use cases. It provides experimental results that appear to substantiate
the method.
7. Chapter 8 presents a risk estimation approach of software system at the ar-
chitectural level. The main idea consists in using UML sequence and state
diagrams, in order to calculate an overall risk factor associated to a selected
architecture.
8. Chapter 9 concludes the thesis with a summary of our contributions. We also
briey discuss the possible future extensions to our work.
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Background
This chapter provides a general idea of the background used in the rest of the thesis.
For the sake of conciseness, we do not discuss a detailed description of the back-
ground theory. We just highlight the basic concepts and denitions by providing a
short introduction. The basic concepts and denitions are used in subsequent chap-
ters of this thesis. Section 2.1 gives an introduction to software testing. Section 2.2
presents the concept of McCabes cyclomatic complexity. Section 2.3 presents the
concept of Halstead complexity metrics. Section 2.4 contains the basic concept of
program slicing which will be used later in our Inuence Metric computation algo-
rithms. Section 2.5 provides the intermediate program representation that is used
for extracting slices of a program. Section 2.6 gives an overview of Unied Modeling
Language (UML) and its advantages. Section 2.7 gives introduction of a metric called
Chidamber & Kemerer Suite of Metrics (CK metrics) to analyze the complexity of
an object-oriented program. Section 2.8 gives an introduction to Value based testing
technique. Section 2.9 presents the basic concepts on Operational Prole of a system
which is used in various testing approaches for achieving and assessing the reliability
of a system. Section 2.10 briey discusses the concepts of risk-based testing. Section
2.11 summarizes this chapter.
2.1 Object-Oriented Technology and Software Test-
ing
It is widely accepted that the object-oriented (O-O) paradigm will signicantly in-
crease the software reusability, extendibility, inter-operability, and reliability. This is
also true for high assurance systems engineering, provided that the systems are tested
adequately. Object-oriented software testing (OOST) [22] is an important software
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quality assurance activity to ensure that the benets of object-oriented (O-O) pro-
gramming will be realized. Below, we discuss dierent levels of testing associated
with object-oriented programs.
1. Intra-method testing: Tests designed for individual methods. This is equivalent
to unit testing of conventional programs.
2. Inter-method testing: Tests are constructed for pairs of method within the same
class. In other words, tests are designed to test interactions of the methods.
3. Intra-class testing: Tests are constructed for a single entire class, usually as
sequences of calls to methods within the class.
4. Inter-class testing: It is meant to test a number of classes at the same time. It
is equivalent to integration testing.
The rst three variations are of unit and module testing type, whereas inter-class test-
ing is a type of integration testing. The overall strategy for object-oriented software
testing is identical to the one applied for conventional software testing but diers
in the approach it uses. We begin testing in small and work towards testing in the
large. As classes are integrated into an object-oriented architecture, the system as a
whole is tested to ensure that errors in requirements are uncovered.
2.2 McCabes Cyclomatic Complexity
Cyclomatic Complexity (v(G)) [23] is a measure of the complexity of a module's
decision structure. It is the number of linearly independent paths and therefore, the
(a) A program (b) CFG
Figure 2.1: A program with its CFG
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minimum number of paths that should be tested. If the structure of source code is
complex, it is hard to understand, to change and to reuse. The cyclometic complexity
measures the number of linearly independent paths through the Control Flow Graph
(CFG) of the program. v(F) = e - n + 2, where F is the CFG of the program, n
the number of vertices and e the number of edges. We present a program with its
CFG in Figure 2.1. In the program, n=7, e=8. So, the cyclomatic complexity for
the program is: 8-7+2=3.
2.3 Halstead Complexity Metric
Any programming language is dened by declarative instructions denitions, exe-
cutable instructions. The operators and operands are handled within expressions.
The programs are made up of instructions, written in sequences, without taking into
account the running order. Halstead [24] makes the observation that metrics of the
software should reect the implementation or expression of algorithms in dierent
languages, but be independent of their execution on a specic platform. The metrics
proposed by Halstead are computed through the static analysis of the source code.
He estimated the programming eort. The measurable and countable properties are:
 n1 = number of unique or distinct operators appearing in the source code.
 n2 = number of unique or distinct operands appearing in that source code.
 N1 = total usage of all of the operators appearing in that source code.
 N2 = total usage of all of the operands appearing in that source code.
The number of unique operators and operands (n1 and n2) as well as the total number
of operators and operands (N1 and N2) are calculated by collecting the frequencies
of each operator and operand token of the source program. Halstead denes:
 The program length (N) is the sum of the total number of operators and
operands in the program, N = N1 +N2
 The vocabulary size (n) is the sum of the number of unique operators and
operands in the program, n = n1 + n2.
 The program volume (V) is the information contents of the program, V =
N  log2(n)
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 The diculty level or error proneness (D) of the program is proportional to the
number of unique operators in the program. D is also proportional to the ration
between the total number of operands and the number of unique operands in
the program, D = (n1=2)  (N2=n2)
2.4 Program Slice
Program slicing is a program analysis technique. It is used to extract the statements
of a program that are relevant to a given computation. A program slice consists of
the parts or components of a program that (potentially) aect the values computed
at some point of interest. Program slices are computed with respect to a slicing
criterion. For a statement s and variable v, the slice of a program P with respect
to the slicing criterion < s; v > includes only those statements of P that are needed
to capture the behavior of v at s [25]. According to Weiser [25], a program slice is a
reduced and executable program obtained from a program by removing statements,
such that the slice replicates part of the behavior of the program.
Slicing object-oriented programs presents new challenges which are not encoun-
tered in traditional program slicing [26]. To slice an object-oriented program, features
such as classes, dynamic binding, encapsulation, inheritance, message passing and
polymorphism need to be considered carefully [27]. Larson and Harrold were the rst
to consider these aspects in their work [28]. To address these object-oriented features,
they enhanced the system dependence graphs (SDG) [29] to represent object-oriented
software. After the SDG is constructed, the two phase algorithm of Horwitz et al. [29]
is used with minor medications for computing static slices. Larson and Harrold [28]
have reported only a static slicing technique for object-oriented programs, and did
not address dynamic slicing aspects. The dynamic slicing aspects have been reported
by Song et al. [30] and Xu et al. [31].
2.4.1 Categories of program slicing
Several categories of program slicing as well as methods to compute them are found
in literature. The main reason for the existence of so many categories of slicing is
the fact that dierent applications require dierent types of slices.
Static Slicing and Dynamic Slicing: Slicing can be static or dynamic. Static
slicing technique uses static analysis to derive slicing. That is, the source code of
the program is analyzed and the slices are computed for all possible input values.
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No assumptions are made about the input values. It is static in the sense that
the slice is independent of the input values to the program. Since, the predicates
may evaluate either to true or false for dierent values, conservative assumptions
have to be made, which may lead to relatively large slices. So, a static slice may
contain statements that might not be executed during an actual run of a program,
whereas dynamic slicing makes use of the information about a particular execution
of a program. The execution of a program is monitored and the dynamic slices are
computed with respect to execution history. A dynamic slice with respect to a slicing
criterion < s; v >, for a particular execution, contains only those statements that
actually aect the slicing criterion in the particular execution. Dynamic slices are
usually smaller than static slices and are more useful in interactive applications such
as program debugging and testing. A major goal of any dynamic slicing technique
is eciency since results are normally used during interactive applications such as
program debugging [32]. Eciency is an especially important concern in slicing
object-oriented programs, since the size of practical object-oriented programs is often
very large. The response time of an inecient dynamic slicer may be unacceptably
large for such programs. In all slicing techniques, the source code is rst analyzed
to produce a graph representation called an intermediate program representation.
Then the intermediate program representation is analyzed by using an algorithm to
compute the slice. So, the eciency of a slicing technique depends on how suitably
the program is represented by an intermediate representation and how much ecient
the slicing algorithm is.
Consider the C++ example program given in Figure 2.2. The static slice with
respect to the slicing criterion < 11; sum > is the set of statements f4, 5, 6, 8, 9g.
Consider a particular execution of the program with the input value i = 15. The
dynamic slice with respect to the slicing criterion < 11; sum > for the particular
execution of the program is the statement f5g.
Backward and Forward slicing: Slices can be backward or forward. A back-
ward slice contains all parts of the program that might directly or indirectly aect
the slicing criterion but, a forward slice with respect to a slicing criterion < s; v >
contains all the parts of the program that might be aected by the variables in v
used or dened at the program points. A forward slice provides the answer to the
question: \which statements will be aected by the slicing criterion?" whereas, a
backward slice provides the answer to the question: \which statements aect the
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Figure 2.2: An example program
slicing criterion?" [33].
Intra-procedural Slicing and Inter-procedural Slicing: Intra-procedural slic-
ing computes slices within a single procedure. Calls to other procedures are either not
handled at all or handled conservatively. If the program consists of more than one
procedure, inter-procedural slicing can be used to derive slices that span multiple
procedures [29]. For object-oriented programs, intra-procedural slicing is meaning
less as practical object-oriented programs contain more than one method. So, for
object-oriented programs, inter-procedural slicing is more useful.
2.4.2 Applications of program slicing
Slicing is used by both developer and tester, before the execution of the code and
during execution. The developer uses slicing tool to understand the source code and
to reduce the size of a program. Sometimes a programmer has to read a lot of code
before nding what he is actually looking for. Programmer uses the slicing tool to
improve the productivity. The tool helps the programmer in reducing the amount
of code that need to read. The tool is used by the developer for debugging. Some
variables may show unexpected values at some point in the program. To know the
exact cause of these values is dicult and also time taking. The slicing tool helps a
lot in this case. The tester uses the slicing tool for analyzing the test coverage of the
test suite [7,34]. The dynamic slice is created for each test case of a test suite and the
union of these slices are computed to get an idea of code coverage by the test suite.
Recently, Qusef et al. [35] proposed a novel approach to maintain the traceability
links between unit tests and tested classes based on dynamic slicing.
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2.5 Program Representation
Various types of program representation schemes exist which include high level source
code, pseudo-code, a set of machine instructions in a computer's memory, a ow chart
and others. The purpose of each of these representations depends upon the exact
context of use. In the context of program slicing, program representations are used
to support automation of slicing. Various representation schemes have resulted from
the search for ever more complete and ecient slicing techniques.
2.5.1 Program Dependence Graph (PDG)
The program dependence graph [36] G of a program P is the graph G = (N;E),
where each node n 2 N represents a statement of the program P . The graph contains
two kinds of directed edges: control dependence edges and data dependence edges.
A control (or data) dependence edges (m;n) indicates that n is control (or data)
dependent on m. Note that the PDG of a program P is the union of a pair of graphs:
Data dependence graph and control ow graph of P .
2.5.2 System Dependence Graph (SDG)
The PDG cannot handle procedure calls. Horwitz et al. [29] introduced the System
Dependence Graph (SDG) representation which models the main program together
with all associated procedures. The SDG is very similar to the PDG. Indeed, a PDG
of the main program is a subgraph of the SDG. In other words, for a program without
procedure calls, the PDG and SDG are identical. The technique for constructing an
SDG consists of rst constructing a PDG for every procedure, including the main
procedure, and then adding dependence edges which link the various subgraphs to-
gether.
An SDG includes several types of nodes to model procedure calls and parameter
passing:
 Call-site nodes represent the procedure call statements in the program.
 Actual-in and actual-out nodes represent the input and output parameters at
call site. They are control dependent on the call-site nodes.
 Formal-in and formal-out nodes represent the input and output parameters at
called procedure. They are control dependent on procedure's entry node.
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Control dependence edges and data dependence edges are used to link an individual
PDG in an SDG. The additional edges that are used to link a PDG are as follows:
 Call edges link the call-site nodes with the procedure entry nodes.
 Parameter-in edges link the actual-in nodes with the formal-in nodes.
 Parameter-out edges link the formal-out nodes with the actual-out nodes.
 Summary edges connects an actual-in vertex and an actual-out vertex if the
value associated with the actual-in vertex may aect the value in actual-out
vertex. It represents the transitive dependencies that arise due to procedure
calls.
2.5.3 Extended System Dependence Graph (ESDG)
ESDG models the main program with all other methods. Each class in a given pro-
gram is represented by a class dependence graph. Each method in a class dependence
graph is represented by procedure dependence graph. Each method has method entry
vertex that represent the entry in the method. The class dependence graph contains
a class entry vertex that is connected with the method entry vertex of each method in
the class by a special edge known as class member edge. To model parameter passing,
the class dependence graph associates each method entry vertex with formal-in and
formal-out vertices.
The class dependence graph uses a call vertex to represent a method call. At each
call vertex, there are actual-in and actual-out vertices to match with the formal-in
and formal-out vertices present at the entry to the called method. If the actual-in
vertices aect the actual-out vertices then summary edges are added at the call-site,
from actual-in vertices to actual-out vertices to represent the transitive dependencies.
To represent inheritance, we construct representations for each new method dened
by the derived class, and reuse the representations of all other methods that are
inherited from the base class. To represent the polymorphic method call, the ESDG
uses a polymorphic vertex. A polymorphic vertex represents the dynamic choice
among the possible destinations. The detailed procedure for constructing an ESDG
is found in [28]. Each node can be a simple statement or a call statement or a class
entry or a method entry. An example of an object-oriented program with its ESDG
is shown in Figure 2.3. Several researchers [4,37,38] have proposed dierent types of
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(a) An Object-Oriented Program (b) Its ESDG
Figure 2.3: A program with its ESDG
intermediate representation for object-oriented software. Rothermel and Harrold [4]
extended Program Dependence Graph (PDG) and proposed Class Dependence Graph
(ClDG) for use in regression testing. Larsen and Harrold [28] extended the System
Dependence Graph (SDG) by representing a class with a ClDG, and proposed Ex-
tended System Dependence Graph (ESDG) for object-oriented software. The basic
aim of designing ESDG was to get a slice of an object-oriented program on the basis
of graph reachability. Liang and Harrold [38] proposed extensions to ESDG for the
purpose of object-slicing. Malloy et al. [37] also proposed a layered representation,
the Object-Oriented Program Dependency Graph (OPDG), by adapting the basic
concepts of PDG. Out of these, we consider the ESDG by Larsen and Harrold [28]
in our work because, our main aim is to get a forward slice of a method-entry vertex
through the process of graph reachability. Throughout the thesis, we use the terms
node and vertex interchangeably.
2.6 Unied Modeling Language (UML)
Models are the intermediate artifacts between requirement specication and source
code. Models preserve the essential information from requirement specication and
are base for the nal implementation. UML has emerged as an industrial standard
for modeling software systems [39]. It is a visual modeling language that is used to
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specify, visualize, construct, and document the artifacts of a software system. UML
can be used to describe dierent aspects of a system including static, dynamic and
use case views of a system. UML supports object-oriented features at the core. It
accomplish the visualization of software at early stage of development cycle, which
helps in many ways like condence of both developer and the end user on the system,
earlier error detection through proper analysis of design and etc. UML also helps in
making the proper documentation of the software and so maintains the consistency
in between the specication and design document. UML diagrams can be divided
into two broad categories: structural and behavioral diagrams. The UML structural
diagrams are used to model the static organization of the dierent elements in the
system, whereas behavioral diagrams focus on the dynamic aspects of the system.
Our approaches use information present in three behavioral diagrams, namely use
case, sequence and state chart diagrams.
Use case diagrams represent the high level functionalities (called use cases) of
a system from the perspective of the users. It is a black-box view of the system
where the internal structure, the dynamic behavior of dierent system components,
the implementation etc. are not visible. A use case comprises dierent possible
sequence of interactions between the user and the computer. Each specic sequence
of interactions in a use case is called a scenario. Use case diagrams are mainly used
for requirement based testing and high level test design [40]. Sequence diagram
describes how a set of objects interact with each other to achieve a behavioral goal.
It captures time dependent sequences of interactions down between objects. It shows
the chronological sequence of the messages, their names and responses and their
possible arguments. State chart diagrams capture the dynamic behavior of class
instances. It describes object state transition behavior. Typically, it is used for
describing the behavior of class instances.
2.7 CK Metrics
CK metrics [41] were designed to measure the complexity of the design of object-
oriented system. CK metrics measured from the source code have been related to:
fault-proneness, productivity, rework eort, design eort and maintenance. It helps
in taking managerial decisions, such as re-designing and/or assigning extra or higher
skilled resources to develop, to test and to maintain the software. The set of metrics
are:
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1. WMC (Weighted Methods per Class): It is the sum of the complexity of the
methods of a class.
WMC = Number of Methods (NOM), when all methods complexity are consid-
ered unity. It is a predictor of how much time and eort is required to develop
and to maintain the class.
2. DIT (Depth of Inheritance Tree): The maximum length from the node to the
root of the tree. DIT with high value makes complex to predict the behaviour
of the class.
3. NOC (Number of Children): Number of immediate subclasses subordinated to
a class in the class hierarchy. NOC with high value increases the requirements
of method's testing in that class.
4. CBO (Coupling Between Objects): It is a count of the number of other classes
to which it is coupled. CBO with low value improves modularity and promote
encapsulation, indicates independence in the class and makes easier to maintain
and test a class.
5. RFC (Response for Class): It is the number of methods of the class plus the
number of methods called by any of those methods. RFC with high value makes
complex the testing and maintenance of the class.
6. LCOM (Lack of Cohesion of Methods): Measures the dissimilarity of methods
in a class via instanced variables. LCOM with high value does not promotes
encapsulation and implies classes should probably be split into two or more
subclasses.
2.8 Value-based Testing
In Value-neutral testing method, each use case is considered equally important and
hence, the test eort for a use case is linear to the factor complexity. Value-based
testing method focuses the test eort on the features (use cases) that provide a
high system value [1, 20, 21, 42]. The addition of Value (say, business value) helps
to maximize the returns on investment on the resources allocated to testing [43].
Boehm [42] had considered some case studies and found that 20% test cases cover
80% business value. He had pointed that the main reason for majority of software
crises is due to generating value-neutral test data. He pointed that Value-based
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testing provides more net value and hence, test data generator based on business
value cut the test costs in half.
For a developer, it is a dicult task to guess which high level functions are im-
portant to the customer. A customer also cannot estimate the cost and technical
diculties in implementing a specic high level function. The requirements are clas-
sied into three categories: (i) must have (ii) important to have (iii) nice but unnec-
essary. The domain experts rst collect a list of requirements, which are important
for the customer and the end-user and then, prioritize the requirements based on the
business value that come from market and customer. From a business point of view,
test eort distribution based on the return on investment will be more eective. It
is because, the failure of a scenario may cause a great loss to the stake holder and to
the organization.
The prioritizing requirements model proposed in [44] is used for getting Value
for dierent requirements. It consists of eight steps and it includes a number of
participants involved with the system such as project manager, key customer rep-
resentatives and development representatives. The Value for a use case is assessed
by considering both the benet and penalty due to the presence and absence of the
use case. The following steps show a simple method adopted in various software
industries for estimating the business value associated with high level functions [43].
1. The relative benet that each feature provides to the customer or business. It is
estimated on a scale from 1 to 9, where 1 and 9 indicates the minimum benet
and the maximum possible benet respectively. The best people to judge these
benets are the domain experts and the customer representatives.
2. The relative penalty by not including a feature is also estimated. It represents
how much the customer or business would suer, if the feature is not included
within the system. For this penalty, a scale from 1 to 9 is also used, where 1
stands for no penalty and 9 represents the highest penalty.
3. The sum of the relative benet and penalty gives the total business value called
Value. By default, benet and penalty are weighted equally. The weights for
these two factors can be changed. We have rated the benet twice as heavily
as the penalty ratings as dened in [21,42].
For example, the business values for various use cases of Automatic Teller Machine
(ATM) system are shown in Table 2.1. We consider only the use cases that are used
23
2.9 Operational Prole Background
by the customer. start-up and shut-down use cases are not considered as they are
the basic use cases to run the system.
Table 2.1: Value assignment
Relative Weights 2 1 - -
Usecase Benefit Penality Total   V alue V alue%
withdraw 8 9 25 20
deposit 7 5 19 24
transfer money 9 5 23 27
inquiry balance 9 9 27 29
SUM - - 94 100
2.9 Operational Prole
According to Musa [9], a prole is a collection of disjoint (only one can occur at a
time) alternatives with some probability assigned for each occurrence. An operational
prole simply consists of a set of operations that a system is designed to perform
along with its probabilities of occurrence. It predicts the possible use of the system
in the operational environment in a quantitative manner. It is widely used in the
eld of software reliability engineering.
An operational prole assigns probability values to various high level functions
(use cases) according to their probability of use by various users within a sys-
tem [45{47]. Suppose, we have drawn a use case diagram consisting of m types
of users and n number of use cases for a system. Each user type has been assigned
a probability of using the system. Let ui be the probability assigned to i-th user
type for accessing the system such that
Pm
i=1 ui = 1: Let qij be the probability of
requesting the functionality of j-th use case (j=1...n) by i-th type user (i=1..m) such
that
Pn
j=1 qij = 1: Then, the probability of a use case x denotes the likelihood of the
use case being executed by an average user is given by:
p(x) =
mX
j=1
uj  qjx (2.1)
We consider that the functionality of any system can be modeled through a set
of scenarios derived from use cases [40]. A use case consists of one main scenario
and a number of alternative scenarios. As per the domain knowledge, a scenario
of a use case is assigned some frequency based on its execution in the operational
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environment. Let fi(j) be the frequency of j-th scenario of i-th use case such thatPnosi
j=1 fi(j) = 1 where, nosi is the total number of scenarios of i-th use case. Then,
the probability of execution of k-th scenario of i-th use case, p(ki) is given by:
p(ki) = p(i)  fi(k) (2.2)
2.10 Risk-based Testing
In order to save time and cost in the software development life cycle, there is a
requirement of an eective decision-making for allocating resources to various high
level requirements. For this, there is a need to assess quantitatively all possible types
of risks associated with high level requirements as early as possible. Risk is the
combination of damage that occur due to failure and probability of failure in the
operational environment, as shown in Figure 2.4. Risk analysis is important for a
critical real-time application and it is basically done to assess the damage during use,
frequency of use, and to decide the probability of failure by looking at defect [48].
There are several types of risks such as reliability-based risk, availability-based risk,
acceptance-based risk, performance-based risk, cost-based risk, and schedule-based
risk. We are mainly concerned with reliability-based risk. It is the probability that
the software product will fail in the operational environment and the adversity of that
failure. Risk assessment framework takes into account arguments about benets as
Figure 2.4: Risk structure
well as hazards. It helps to take a valuable decision on investment at an early stage.
2.11 Summary
In this chapter, we have discussed the slicing concept and intermediate program rep-
resentation that will be used later in our thesis. We have discussed the estimation of
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business value with an example. We have also given an introduction of risk associated
with a system under test.
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Chapter 3
Related Work
In this chapter, we review the literature and present a brief summary of the work done
related to prioritization-based testing at both the implementation and architectural
level. The dierent approaches proposed in this direction by dierent researchers
can be broadly categorized into two types: pre-testing eort prioritization (before
the construction of test cases) and on-testing eort prioritization (at the time of
test case selection in a test suite). Pre-testing eort prioritization methods help to
prioritize the program elements for testing whereas, on-testing eort prioritization
methods prioritize the test cases within a test suite. We rst discuss the reported
work on pre-testing eort prioritization methods in Section 3.1 followed by on-testing
eort prioritization methods in Section 3.2. As our aim is to improve the reliability
of a system under test through test eort prioritization, we discuss a number of
reliability models for assessing and achieving the reliability of a software system in
Section 3.3. We propose a test eort prioritization method at the architectural level
to rank the use cases within a system for testing. For this, we discuss some early
eort estimation and prioritization methods (development eort and testing eort)
based on use cases in Section 3.4. For achieving a better reliability through testing, it
is required to estimate the reliability-based risk for various elements within a system
at the early phase and prioritize the elements according to their estimated risk. We
present a brief summary of the work done on risk assessment in Section 3.5. Finally,
we present the summary of the chapter in Section 3.6.
3.1 Pre-testing Eort
The basic aim of a pre-testing eort prioritization method is to prioritize the test
eort of an application based on its test objectives. With a prioritized test eort and
focused test architecture, test cases are created and executed. The research areas
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coming under this category are: code prioritization for improving test coverage, test
eort prioritization based on fault-proneness and usage-based testing.
3.1.1 Code prioritization
Code prioritization is a testing technique which is used for improving the code cover-
age in a coverage-based testing. Code coverage is a metric that represents how much
of the source code for an application run when the unit tests for the application are
run. It is basically used for measuring the thoroughness of software testing.
Li. [11] proposed a priority calculation method that prioritizes and highlights
the important parts of the source code based on dominator analysis, that need to
be tested rst to quickly improve the code coverage. His approach consists of two
major contributions: (i) considers the impact of calling relationship among meth-
ods/functions of complex software and takes a global view of the execution of a
program being tested (ii) relaxes the guaranteed condition of traditional dominator
analysis to be at least relationship among dominating nodes. Relaxing the guaran-
teed condition makes dominator calculation much simpler without losing its accuracy.
His approach expands this modied dominator analysis to include global impact of
code coverage, i.e. the coverage of the entire software other than just the current
function.
Before test construction, Li's method decides which line of code will be tested
rst to quickly improve code coverage. According to his approach, rst the inter-
mediate representation of the source code, known as Control Flow Graph (CFG) is
constructed. Then, a node1 of the CFG is prioritized based on measuring quantita-
tively how much lines of code are covered by testing that node. A weight is calculated
for each node considering only the coverage information. It does not take into ac-
count, for instance, the complexity or the criticality of a given part of the program.
A test case covering the highest weight node will increase the coverage faster2. There
are two kinds of code coverage such as control ow based and data ow based. Li's
work focuses on control ow coverage.
Li et al. [12] presented a methodology for code coverage-based path selection and
test data generation, based on Li's previous work [11]. They [12] proposed a path
selection technique that considers the program priority and call relationships among
1A node is either a statement or a method or a basic block in the source code
2The tester, based on his/her experience may desire to cover rst a node with a lower weight
but that has a higher complexity or criticality
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class methods to identify a set of paths through the code, which has high priority code
unit. Then, constraint analysis method is used to nd object attributes and method
parameter values for generating tests to traverse through the selected sequence of
paths. It helps to automatically generate tests to cover high priority points and
minimize the cost of unit testing.
Code coverage is a sensible and practical measure of test eectiveness [49]. It
helps the developers and vendors to indicate the condence level in the readiness of
their software but, the limitation is that it gives equal importance to the discovery
of each fault. So, no information is gained on how much it aects the reliability of
a system by detecting and eliminating a fault during the testing process, as dierent
faults have dierent contribution to the reliability of a system.
3.1.2 Fault-prone based testing
Fault-prone based testing approach identies the faulty components in a system
and test eort prioritization is done accordingly. It estimates the probability of the
presence of faults within a component, which helps to take a valuable decision on
testing. There has been signicant amount of research [50{54] in software industry
to identify the fault-prone components within a system and prioritizing the test
accordingly. Dierent authors have focused on dierent characteristics associated
with a component for counting faults.
Eaddy et al. [50] experimentally proved that concern-oriented metrics3 are more
appropriate predictors of software quality than structural complexity measures and
there is a strong relationship between scattering and defects.
Czerwonka et al. [54] discussed the application of CRANE tool set on a large scale
software product, Windows Vista, to expose the required information such as code
churn, code complexity, dependencies, pre-release bugs with the purpose to make a
decision for failure prediction, change analysis and test prioritization to minimize
risks of further problems in changed code.
Ostrand et.al. [51] proposed a novel approach to identify the faulty les at the
time of next release of an application. For prioritizing testing eorts, their approach
considers the factors that are obtained from the modication requests and the version
control system. These factors are (i) the le size (ii) le status (whether the le
was new to the system) (iii) fault status in previous release (iv) number of changes
3A concern is anything a stakeholder may want to consider as a conceptual unit, including
features, nonfunctional requirements, and design constraints.
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made. For some initial releases, the models were customized based on the above
observed factors. Based on the experimental results, the authors concluded that
their methodology can be implemented in the real world without extensive statistical
expertise or modeling eort.
Ostrand et. al [53] proposed a negative binomial regression model. The binomial
model is used to predict the expected number of faults in each le of the next release
of a system. The predictions are based on the code of the le in the current release,
and fault and modication history of the le from previous releases. Similarly, Emam
et al. [52] found that a class having high export coupling value is more fault-prone. A
complex program might contains more faults compared to a simple program [55]. As
the factor complexity is the most important defect generator, the complexity metric
is used as a parameter for testing [56,57].
We present some existing work on prediction of faulty components through design
metric. Researchers [56,58] related the structural complexity metric obtained through
CK metric suite [41] to the fault-proneness of a system. It is observed that the
estimated defect density that is computed through static analysis and the pre-release
defect density that is computed through testing are strongly correlated. Emam et
al. [52] experimentally proved that inheritance and external coupling metrics are
strongly associated with fault-proneness.
3.2 On-testing Eort
The basic job of on-testing eort is to identify the important test cases within an
existing test suite with the aim to reduce the test cost. In this section, we briey
present the work done on two sub areas: test case prioritization and test case se-
lection, which are under the main research area, on-testing eorts. A meaningful
prioritization or selection of test cases from a test suite can enhance the eectiveness
of testing, without increasing the test eort [4]. Test case selection and test case pri-
oritization are both interlinked. The basic dierence between these two techniques
is as follows.
In a test case selection technique, a subset of the test suite is selected in which, the
test coverage of the selected subset is same as the original test suite. However, in a
test case prioritization technique, the test cases of a test suite are ranked for testing
according to their estimated priority. Within a test suite, a test case with the highest
priority is executed rst and a test case with the lowest priority is executed last. Test
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case prioritization and test case selection approaches have been discussed in software
testing literature. A number of researchers [4{8] have considered several criteria for
test case prioritization and test case selection. Some of the criteria are:
1. Coverage of statements.
2. Coverage of statements not yet covered.
3. Coverage of functions.
4. Coverage of functions not yet covered.
5. Fault exposing potential.
6. Probability of fault existence/exposure, adjusted to previous coverage.
7. Relevant slices of outputs.
An empirical research work [4{6] proposed on test case prioritization in which,
statement-level and function-level coverage techniques are used for test case prioriti-
zation. The basic aim of these approaches is to improve a test suite's fault detection
rate and to reduce the cost of regression testing based on total requirement and
additional requirement coverage.
Elbaum et al. [5] proposed a metric named as Average of the Percentage of Faults
Detected (APFD). The metric is used to measure the ability of rate of fault detection
of a sequence of test cases according to a prioritization technique. They used greedy
strategy for selecting the test cases from a test suite in regression testing. In the
greedy strategy, a test case with the highest statement coverage was selected rst.
Each time, after the selection of the best test case (test case with the highest state-
ment coverage) for execution, the remaining test cases were again ordered based on
the criteria; the coverage of un-covered statements (the statements that are not yet
covered by the already executed test cases). They did not consider the statements
which were already covered by the executed test cases. Test case selection and ex-
ecution, which is iterative in nature was continued in a test suite, till the coverage
of each statement by at least one test case. Though, this scheme helps the tester
in achieving full statement coverage within a program by using as few test cases
as possible, it does not ensure in the improvement of the reliability of a software
product using a xed size test suite. The limitation with the test case prioritization
approaches is that the metric, APFD, used for prioritization, gives equal importance
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to each detected fault. In this technique, the assumption make that all detected
faults are of equal severity and all test cases have equal costs, which is not true for
a practical application.
To solve this problem, Elbaum et al. [6] extended their previous work [5] by
adding two major attributes: (i) test cost and (ii) fault severity. They adapted
their previously proposed APFD metric and proposed a new cost-cognizant metric,
APFDc. In their approach, the cost of a test case might be measured in terms of test
execution, setup and test validation. The cost of a test case might be also measured
in terms of hardware costs or the cost of hiring tester. They measured the severity of
a fault was measured in any one of the two ways: (i) the time required to locate the
fault and correct the fault (ii) the impact of failures that are caused by the faults.
Jerey and Gupta [10] also proposed a new approach for prioritization of test cases
for early detection of faults in the regression testing process. They considered the
statements of a program, which are inuencing or may inuence the output through
the consideration of relevant slicing on the output of a program.
Recently, Bryce et al. [8] proposed various criteria for prioritizing test cases.
These are (i) Parameter-value interaction coverage-based, (ii) Count-based and (iii)
Frequency-based. They applied these criteria to some stand-alone GUI and Web-
based applications and found that the fault detection rate is increasing over random
ordering of test cases.
All these discussed test case prioritization techniques are purely code-based and
require the information on previous usage of the system. These techniques are mainly
used at the post-implementation phase and used mainly for regression testing.
Test cases can also be prioritized based on the design model. Kundu et al. [59]
had proposed a technique called System Testing for Object-Oriented systems with test
case Prioritization, STOOP, to generate test cases from UML 2.0 Sequence Diagrams
for system testing. They had prioritized those test cases based on three prioritization
metrics: (i) sum of message weights (ii) average weighted path length and (iii) code
weight. Their prioritization technique is applied at the development phase and helps
to increase the condence in reliability of the system at a faster rate.
A lot of research [7, 60{62] have been done on test case selection technique for
regression testing. Harrold et al. [61] had proposed data ow testing method for
reducing test suite whereas, program slicing technique is used for reducing test suite
in [7]. Similarly, Leon et al. [60] had used information ow through both data and
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control dependency for test case selection. They had proposed two approaches such
as coverage-based and prole-distribution-based technique for this. An improved
version of test case selection technique is proposed by Jeery and Gupta [62], in
which additional coverage technique is used that adds some extra test cases which
are redundant with respect to test suite minimization criteria.
3.3 Empirical Work on Reliability Analysis
A number of reliability models [9,14,15,57,63] have been proposed for assessing and
improving the reliability of a software system over several decades. Some researchers
have considered system as a black box whereas, others have included the architecture
of the system in their analysis.
Musa [9] is recognized for his work in the eld of test suite design using Opera-
tional Prole. Operational Prole is a quantitative characterization of how a system
will be used. An operational prole is used to guide testing. If testing is terminated
and the product is shipped due to crucial schedule constraints, the tester is ensured
that the most-used operations will have received the most testing eort. According
to Musa, the reliability of a software product depends on how the product will be
used by a customer. The testing should be conducted as if the product is in the eld.
The chance of failure is high in a module with high execution probability. If a module
is executed more frequently, then the probability of activation of any residing error
in that module is high, which may cause frequent failures. Based on this idea, he
had proposed a technique to prioritize input-domains or fault-regions on the basis of
their impact on the overall reliability of the system. His proposed testing method is
for both assessing and enhancing the reliability of a system according to user's point
of view.
Testing based on operational prole is ecient and eective in revealing bugs
(compared to coverage-based testing) that inuence the reliability of a system at
the operational environment [13]. Cobb et. al [13] had experimentally proved that
in terms of Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF), operational prole based testing
improves the perceived reliability during operation 21 times greater than coverage-
based testing. They also proved that even if the operational prole is not accurate
during testing, there is a high probability that MTBF at the operation time will
be much higher than that obtained with coverage-based testing or other black box
testing approaches.
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Not only at the testing time, but also during software inspection, Usage-Based
Reading (UBR) [64] technique helps reviewers to nd quickly the faults that have
the most negative impact on the user's perception on system quality. The use cases
are prioritized based on their execution probability and handed over to the reviewers
for inspection. UBR guides the reviewers to focus the software parts that are most
important for a user. The limitation with these discussed methods is that failure
regions for a practical program was decided only considering a black-box approach.
It is a challenging job.
Reliability prediction will be more accurate, if internal structure (interaction
among components) of the system will be considered along with the operational
prole of the system. Goseva-Popstojanova et al. [65] proposed that, there are
broadly two categories of architecture-based analysis such as state-based [14, 15, 66]
and path-based [67{70]. In a state-based analysis, the probabilistic control ow graph
is mapped to a state space model and transition probability between components is
decided based on Markov property and operational prole [9]. Cheung [14] has
proposed a user-oriented software reliability model, which measures the quality of
service that a program provides to a user. His Markov reliability model uses a pro-
gram ow graph to represent the structure of the system. The ow graph structure
is obtained by analyzing the code. It uses the functional modules as the basic com-
ponents whose reliabilities can be independently measured. It uses branching and
function-calling characteristics among the modules, that are measured in the opera-
tional environment. Similar structural models have been proposed by Littlewood [15]
and Booth [71], to analyze the failure rates of a program. Lyu [66] proposed a struc-
tural model for estimating the reliability of component-based programs where the
software components are heterogeneous and the transfer of control between compo-
nents follows a discrete time Markov process. It is assumed that time spent in each
state is exponentially distributed.
In a path-based analysis, reliability of each path from singly entry node to single
exit node in a control ow graph is computed and average of path reliability is
computed for reliability estimation of whole system. Sometimes path-based analysis
gives incorrect result due to innite paths caused by loop. This problem is solved to
some extent by Krishnamurty et al. [68]. They have proposed a two phase approach.
In the rst phase, the reliability for each component was predicted based on code
coverage of that component. In the second phase the reliability for the whole system
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was obtained by integrating the reliability of components achieved in the rst phase.
They have resolved the problem of intra component dependency due to loop. Multiple
executions of the same component in a loop were collapsed into k occurrences, where
k is dened as the degree of independence(DOI). The major problem in reliability
analysis is that it is not properly measured how the fault detection and removal at
the component level inuence the reliability of whole system. They mentioned that
the reliability of a component is predicted based on code coverage of that component.
The development of a probabilistic technique for reliability analysis that is appli-
cable at the analysis and design-level is cost eective. It saves the eort at the actual
development and system integration phases. Cortellessa et.al. [69] have proposed an
early estimation of time distribution for components from UML model. Their ap-
proach on system reliability prediction is based on component and connector failure
rates. Three dierent types of UML diagrams: Use Case, Sequence and Deployment
diagrams are used for reliability analysis. For estimating the time spent in each com-
ponent, they have counted the number of times a class is busy in a scenario. Both
component failure and connector failure probabilities are considered.
Similar to this, Yacoub et al. [70] also proposed a path-based approach to get
the early reliability of a system at the analysis phase. They proposed an algorithm
named Scenario-Based Reliability Analysis (SBRA). SBRA is used to identify critical
components and critical component interfaces, and to investigate the sensitivity of
the application reliability to changes in the reliabilities of components and their
interfaces. The technique is suitable for systems whose analysis is based on valid
scenarios with timed sequence diagrams. The execution proles of these scenarios
are assumed to be available. Component Dependency Graphs (CDG) are derived
to establish a probabilistic model upon which the reliability analysis technique is
based. Time spent in each component is based on execution probability of each
scenario and execution time of the component within that scenario. It is assumed
that the reliability of each component is already given. For estimating the reliability
of an individual component, Lyu et al. [57] stated that complexity metric should be
a parameter. It helps to estimate the failure rate for initial software fault density.
The advantage of these early reliability estimation techniques [69, 70] is that it can
extract valuable components at the analysis phase.
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3.4 Early Test Eort Estimation Methods based
on Use Cases
The work on early eort estimation based on use cases was rst proposed by Karner
[19]. He dened a metric called Use Case Point (UCP) based on use cases to estimate
the eort of an application. From that day onwards, a continuous research is going
on UML based eort estimation [19,72,73]. A number of technical complexity factors
such as distributed system, response, end-user eciency, easy to install, easy to use
etc. are considered along with some environmental factors to adjust the Use Case
Point(UCP). There is a mapping from use case to test case generation. Currently,
the number of test cases for a use case is estimated based on UCP.
In the above discussed work [19, 72, 73], though the complexity of a use case is
considered as a major attribute for eort estimation both for development and test-
ing, the complexity is roughly categorized as simple, average or complex based on
the number of transactions or number of scenarios only. As the factor "complex-
ity" plays a major role in estimating the fault proneness of a system, it is directly
related to testing and development eort. Hence, the architectural details of a use
case should be analyzed for getting the complexity in a quantitative form. Another
limitation with these existing work is that these estimation techniques contain a lot
of involvement of subjective measures from domain experts and hence, the accuracy
of these approaches are doubtful.
Kim et al. [74] could be able to solve these limitations to some extent by proposing
an eort estimation approach, in which the UML model is analyzed to get the com-
plexity of a system. It collects data at the analysis stage and considers the use-case
diagram, class diagram, interaction & state diagrams. The project eort is estimated
based on UML points, where UML points are calculated through UCPs and Class
Points (CP). Inheritance, uses, realize relationships of use-case diagrams and number
of parameters, number of classes of class diagrams (To estimate CPs) are used to get
the structural complexity of a system in whole. The accuracy level of their approach
is less as it is based on a lot of subjective matters.
Robiolo and Orocosco [75] proposed an eort estimation method through use-
case diagram. In their approach, the size of a project is estimated based on two
factors: total number of use-case transactions and total number of entity objects.
Finally the eort is estimated through mean productivity value. First a use-case is
converted to a textual description and then, basic elements such as function and data
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are identied. Size of the application is estimated based on the number of module
entity objects. They have not considered the architectural details of a use-case and
could not estimate the eort required for an individual function.
Similar to the discussed UCP-based testing eort estimation method, Zhu et
al. [76] proposed a method to predict the number of test cases for the system from use
cases. They considered number of transactions, number of entity objects and some
special requirements which are not covered by transactions to estimate the number
of test cases for a use case. These eort estimation methods only considered the
estimation of high level eort. Furthermore, these testing eort estimation methods
[16, 17, 77] estimate test cases for the whole system not for each individual task
unit(use case). These are too abstract for estimation.
3.5 Risk Analysis for Testing
Amland [78] has proposed a risk-based testing for large projects. The risk factor
of a function is calculated based on probability of failure and cost of failure in the
function. The probability of failure is decided based on four parameters such as new
functionality, design quality, size and complexity. The cost of failure is decided based
on both supplier cost and customer cost. For all indicators, only three values are
used: low (1), medium (2) and high (3). The limitation of this approach is that the
complexity assessment is error-prone as it is decided in an informal way based on
subjective judgment of domain experts.
Some risk assessment methods [79, 80] have been proposed at the requirement
stage based on multiple experts knowledge. These two methods rst identify possible
mode of failures for a high-level requirement and then try to estimate the impact
of these failures on the requirement. Unlike our approach, these risk assessment
methodologies do not take any architectural level information and therefore are purely
subjective. Hence, these methods are more error-prone due to only human intensive.
Some techniques are available for reliability-based risk assessment based on for-
mal design model [81, 82]. Yacoub and Ammar [81] rst proposed a risk assessment
method at the architectural level using UML models. They have proposed heuristic
risk factor associated with a component and with a connector based on dynamic met-
rics (dynamic complexity and dynamic coupling metrics to estimate the complexity
factor of a component and a connector). Then, the risk factor of the system is as-
sessed based on two inputs: abstract intermediate representation of the system called
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Component Dependence Graph (CDG) [70] and risk factor of individual components.
Goseva-Popstojanova et al. [82] have also proposed a similar approach for risk
assessment. They have estimated the risk factor for a scenario by the help of com-
ponent and connector risk factors and Discrete Time Markov Chain (DTMC) with
a transition probability matrix P x=jpijjx, where jpijjx is the conditional probability
that the program will next execute component j, given that it has just completed
the execution of component i. They also introduced multi-failure states that repre-
sent failure modes with dierent severities. These two approaches [81,82] are purely
analytical and do not take any input from domain experts.
Appukkuty et. al [83] have proposed a risk assessment method by considering
possible failure modes of a scenario and computing the complexity of the scenario in
each failure mode. Their proposed method is for risk assessment at the requirement
level. Similar to our approach, Cortessela et al. [84] have proposed a risk assessment
method based on UML models, but their method is assessing performance-based risk,
whereas our method is assessing reliability-based risk from UML models.
Smidts et al. [85] have added safety as a characteristic for reliability estimation
and dene the software reliability is the probability that the software-based digital
system will successfully perform its intended safety function, for all conditions under
which it is expected to respond, upon demand, and with no unintended functions
that might aect system safety. They have collected various software engineering
measures at dierent stages of the software development life cycle and proposed a
number of methods to estimate the reliability for safety critical digital systems at
dierent phases of the life cycle.
3.6 Summary
We have discussed the work on code prioritization to improve the coverage-based
testing within the available test resources. We have also presented the recently
reported literature on identication of fault-prone components at the code level and
architectural level. We have discussed various reliability analysis techniques both
at the code level and architectural level. Finally, we have discussed some existing
risk analysis techniques in which the components, scenarios and use cases are ranked
relative to their estimated risks.
38
Chapter 4
Prioritizing Source Code for
Testing
A moderate size application generally consists of a number of components. The
components interact among themselves through a number of operations. It is not
always feasible to test all components and operations thoroughly within the available
test budget. Prior work has shown that often, a small number of bugs within a
system account for the majority of the reported failures; and often, most of the
bugs are found in a small portion of the source code of a system. However, exactly
identifying those parts is a big challenge.
The user's view on the reliability of a system is improved, when the occurrence
of bugs are reduced from the frequently executed parts of the software [9, 13,86,87].
According to Musa [9], removing faults from the frequently executed parts of the
source code helps the test manager to achieve high reliability with low cost. However,
the length of time a part of the source code is executed does not wholly determine
the importance of the part in the perceived reliability of the system. It is possible
that the result produced by an element1 which is executed only for a small duration is
saved and extensively used by many other elements. Sometimes, the produced result
of a rarely executed element is saved and widely used by a number of frequently
executed elements. Hence, an element on which many number of other elements are
dependent would have a high impact on the reliability of the system, even though it
is itself getting executed only for a small duration.
The degree of coupling is correlated with the criticality of a system [88]. An
element2 which provides a number of services is reusable as it is independent. An
1An element may be as small as a statement and as elaborate as a class or couple of related
classes.
2We have considered a class as an element throughout our thesis. Class and element are written
interchangeably.
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element importing services may be dicult to reuse in another context because it
depends on many other elements. Coupling is also related to change proneness [89].
An element which is providing services to many number of other elements is likely
to change, because it has to adjust to the evolving needs of the dependent elements
[88]. The same element is also reusable and changeable3. So, extra test resources
is required for the element, which is providing services to many number of elements
because, bugs in that may be infected highly.
Assuming that all elements are approximately of similar size and complexity,
the failure rate of a software product would be disproportionately inuenced by the
presence or absence of bugs in some elements. These elements either get executed
frequently than others during the normal operation of the software or the results pro-
duced by these are used extensively by a large number of other elements. Hence, we
estimate the criticality of an element on the basis of its two important characteristics
such as execution probability and inuence toward system failures. The rst one is
determined through operational prole [9] of the system and the later one by the help
of coupling [90].
We introduce a new metric called Inuence Metric for an element within a system.
It shows the number of elements in the system that are using the produced result
of the given element, directly or indirectly. Our proposed Inuence Metric provides
the detailed information at the statement level by marking the statements within a
program that are inuenced by a given element. The Inuence Metric that generates
influence value for an element is used as the measure for criticality computation.
As the analysis is performed at code level, our proposed method marks the nodes
(statements) in the source code that are dependent on a given element, directly
or indirectly. First, we propose an algorithm to compute the inuence value of a
method and then, we use it to compute the inuence value of a class. We compute
the criticality of a class on the basis of its influence value, which shows how many
nodes are dependent on it and average execution time, which shows how often these
dependencies are executed at run time. We prioritize the elements within a system
according to their estimated criticality. First, prioritizing the elements within a
system and then conducting testing, will promote ecient testing of software by
revealing important bugs at the early phase of testing.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Our proposed Inuence Metric is
3The element which is depending on a number of elements is also changeable due to change in
determinate elements.
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discussed in Section 4.1. In the section, we discuss the test priority assignment using
Inuence Metric. The experimental results are given in Section 4.2 and the chapter
summary is given in Section 4.3.
4.1 Our Approach
An object-oriented program comprised of a set of classes. A class consists of num-
ber of methods. We have proposed an algorithm named MethodInuence by using
forward slicing approach [25] to compute the inuence value of a method within a
system. Inuence value of an element shows the inuence of the element towards sys-
tem failure. We have taken the intermediate representation of the program called Ex-
tended System Dependence Graph (ESDG) [28] as an input to our algorithm, Method-
Inuence. Our algorithm is applied on each method-entry vertex v of a class. The
algorithm marks the vertices of ESDG that are dependent on v, directly or indirectly.
We get the inuence set(m) for a method that contains the set of vertices that are
using the results produced by the method m. Combination of inuence set of all rele-
vant methods of a class is the inuence set for the class. From the inuence set of the
class, we get its inuence value. This approach statically computes the inuence of
a class within a whole program. Execution of the program is not necessary. Though,
the inuence set of a class shows all possible requests to the class for service, but it is
unable to show how often these requests are executed in the operational environment.
The reliability of a system is not related to the number of existing faults in the
system under test. It is only related to the probability that a fault leads to a failure
that occurs during software execution [14]. It is because, the data input supplied
by the user decides which parts of the source code will be executed. A bug existing
in the non-executed parts will not aect the output. So, it is not sucient for a
class to know how many other classes are requesting services from that class. It
is also required to know how often these requests are executed at the run time.
For this, we are extracting the average execution time of a class within a system.
It is obtained through the operational prole of the system. Operational prole is
the probability with which dierent high-level functions (or use cases) are executed
during a typical use of a software. Once both the factors of a class within a system,
inuence value and average execution time are obtained, we compute the criticality
for the class within the system. Test Priority (TP) is assigned to a class according to
its criticality. TP of an element shows its intensity of testing requirements. Higher is
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the TP value of an element, more is the test resource required to reduce the system
failure rate.
4.1.1 Inuence of a method
First, we represent the input program by an intermediate representation called ESDG.
Then, we apply our proposed algorithm on the ESDG to compute the inuence of
a method in the program. Our algorithm counts the number of nodes marked as
inuenced by a methodm in a program from the data dependent set of that method's
formal parameter-out nodes.
The inuence value of a method m is expressed as:
influence value(m) =
#nodes inuenced in ESDG by m
Total # nodes in ESDG
(4.1)
In this section, we present our algorithm MethodInuence in pseudo code form to
compute the inuence value of a method. The notations used in our algorithm are
presented below.
visited[i]: It is a Boolean variable which is set to TRUE upon visiting node i.
influence[i]: It is a Boolean variable which is set to TRUE when node i is marked
as inuenced.
queue1: It is a queue that contains the nodes which are to be processed next.
queue2: It is a queue that contains the nodes which are to be marked as inuenced.
insertQueue: It is a function that adds nodes to a queue.
deleteQueue: It is a function that deletes nodes from a queue.
Type(n): It is a function that returns the type of node n out of all possible types in
ESDG. The algorithm maintains two queues, queue1 and queue2. queue1 maintains
the node that are to be traversed next. It contains the nodes that are in the end
of control dependence edges, data dependence edges or parameter-in edges of the
visiting node. queue2 maintains the nodes that are to be marked as inuenced. It
contains the nodes that are in the end of parameter-out edges of the visiting node.
Working of the Algorithm
To illustrate how to compute the static inuence of a method within a program, we
consider the program and its ESDG shown in Figure 2.3a and Figure 2.3b respectively.
Consider the method add of class Task in the program shown in Figure 2.3a. Now, our
proposed algorithm starts execution from the method-entry vertex 2. Our algorithm
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Algorithm 1 MethodInuence(ESDG,Vme)
Require: ESDG: Intermediate representation of the program
N : Total number of nodes in ESDG
Vme: Method-entry vertex of method Mi
1: return Inf(Mi): Inuence value of the method Mi.
2: for i  1 to N do
3: visited[i]  FALSE
4: influence[i]  FALSE
5: end for
6: Queue queue1  ;
7: Queue queue2  ;
8: insertQueue(queue1,Vme)
9: while queue1 6= ; do
10: n  deleteQueue(queue1)
11: if Type(n)==method-entry vertex then
12: Traverse only its control-edges and parameter-edges
13: else
14: if Type(n)==call vertex then
15: Traverse its adjacent nodes
16: end if
17: else
18: if Type(n)==polymorphic vertex then
19: Traverse only its polymorphic-edges
feach adjacent node of a polymorphic-edge is a method-entry vertexg
20: end if
21: else
22: Traverse only its outgoing data dependence edges and control dependence
edges.
23: end if
24: for each adjacent not-visited node w do
25: visited[w]  TRUE
26: if Type(w)==parameter-out vertex then
27: insertQueue(queue2, w)
28: else
29: insertQueue(queue1, w)
30: end if
31: end for
32: end while
33: while queue2 6= ; do
34: n  deleteQueue(queue2).
35: influence[n]  TRUE and add node n to inuence set of the input method.
36: Traverse the adjacent nodes of n through its all types of edges except the
control dependence edges
37: for each not-visited node w do
38: visited[w]  TRUE
39: insertQueue(queue2, w)
40: end for
41: end while
42: Calculate Inf(Mi) using expression (1)
43: return Inf(Mi) 43
4.1 Our Approach Prioritizing Source Code for Testing
traverses each control dependence edge from the given method-entry vertex and adds
the nodes F1 in, F2 in, 3 in queue1 and F out in queue2. Now, the algorithm
will delete the rst element F1 in from queue1 and checks all its outgoing edges
to nd any depending node not traversed. Then, it will delete F2 in and 3 from
queue1. The process is continued till queue1 becomes empty. Once, queue1 becomes
empty, our algorithm will start deletion from queue2. It deletes the node F out from
queue2, marks it as inuenced and traverse all the parameter-out edges of the node
only. Then, the algorithm adds all the not-visited nodes in queue2. Now, queue2
contains the node A out. Deleting A out and marking it as inuenced next, queue2
will contain nodes 10, A1 in and 12. In the similar way, other relevant nodes are
inserted in queue2 and deleted from it. At the end, the nodes F out, A out, A1 in,
10 and 12 are marked as inuenced. It shows the contribution of add method to the
rest of the source code.
Complexity Analysis
If N number of nodes are created in the intermediate graph ESDG for representing
the object-oriented program, at each node there can be maximum N   1 number of
edges.
So, the worst case space complexity will be N  (N   1) = O(N2).
Similarly, in the ESDG any edge is visited at most once. So, the time complexity=
O(E); where E is the total number of edges.
4.1.2 Inuence of a class
The nodes in the set influence set(c) for the class c is the union of all the sets
influence set(mi), where mi is the i-th method of class c.
influence set(c) = [ki=1influence set(mi)
where, k is the total number of methods in class c. From the inuence set, we get
inuence value by applying Equation 4.1.
4.1.3 Average execution time of a class within a system
A scenario within a system is implemented by the interaction among a set of classes.
The average execution time of a class ci, denoted as ET (ci), in the system is given
by:
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ET (ci) =
nosX
j=1
p(j)  (Time(ci)j);
where nos is the total number of scenarios in a system under test, p(j) is the prob-
ability of the execution of j-th scenario within a system and Time(ci)
j is the total
activation time of class ci within j-th scenario.
4.1.4 Computation of criticality
Test eort is assigned to a class according to its criticality. We combine both inu-
ence value and average execution time of a class to get the criticality of that class.
Criticality for a class is computed by applying the following formula.
Criticality(ci) = Influence value(ci) ET (ci) (4.2)
where, influence val(ci) is the estimated inuence of class ci towards system failures
and ET (ci) is the average execution time for class ci within a system. Test Priority
(TP) is assigned to a class according to its criticality. A class with high TP is critical
and hence, requires extra test eort.
TP for various classes of a small program is computed using Equation 4.2 and is
shown in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Test Priority Calculation
ci Influence value ET (ci) Total
TP
TP%
1 22 55 1210 22
2 12 75 900 16
3 15 38 570 11
4 45 58 2610 49
5 06 15 90 02
Sum 100 - 5380 100
4.2 Experimental Studies
We have implemented MethodInuence algorithm for the calculation of Inuence
Metric for Java programs. The intermediate graph, ESDG, used in the algorithm
is obtained using ANTLR in the ECLIPSE framework. We have considered three
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case studies- Library Management System (LMS), Super Market Automation Sys-
tem (SMA) and Automatic Teller Machine (ATM) throughout our thesis. The case
study, LMS, basically provides the facilities such as login, register, add/remove ti-
tle, add/remove book, search/issue book, return book and collect ne etc. The case
study, SMA, is implemented in a large supermarket that provides a number of services
such as nd product, specify the required quantity, specify fulllment of the product,
record customer details, take payment, conform order and print invoice and picking.
These are well explained in [2]. Our third case study, ATM, is an electronic bank-
ing outlet, which allows customers to complete basic transactions without the aid
of a branch representative or teller. This is an example of a commercial application
system.
We present a brief summary of these case studies in Table 4.2, so that the size
of each can be well understood. In Table 4.2, Object-point shown in Column 6
is estimated based on a number of factors such as how many individual screens are
displayed, how many reports are produced and how many 3GL modules are developed
in the system etc. [91, 92]. Classes shown in Column 5 represent the number of user
classes. System classes are not considered here. These case studies are neither very
small nor very large, but of moderate size. For a better understanding of the above
case studies, use case diagrams of the case studies are shown in Figure 4.1.
Table 4.2: Brief summary of our case studies
System LOCs UseCases# Scenarios# Classes# Object  points#
LMS 2486 16 56 18 153
SMA 1137 09 23 10 31
ATM 4217 12 30 22 82
We have conducted a number of experiments to examine the sensitivity of various
classes toward system failures in Section 4.2.1. We have also conducted a number
of experiments to check the eectiveness of our approach compared to an existing
approach in Section 4.2.2.
4.2.1 Sensitivity analysis
Using our criticality estimation method, we have investigated the failure rate of an
application based on the failure of individual classes with dierent criticality. We
have done it in three phases. In the rst phase, we selected the highest priority class
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(a) Use case diagram for LMS
(b) Use case diagram for SMA (c) Use case diagram for ATM
Figure 4.1: Use case diagrams of the case studies
from a case study and decreased its reliability4, while xing the reliabilities of other
classes to 1.0. To observe the failure rate of the application, we selected randomly 100
numbers of test cases (randomly selected scenarios) based on operational prole. A
4Techniques for class reliability estimation is a step wise procedure that includes fault injection,
testing and retrospective analysis. We are assuming an estimate is available, this is used as a
parameter for observing the failure rate to analyze the sensitivity of the application.
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test case is responsible for the execution of one scenario5. We continued our process
by slowly decreasing the reliability of a selected class in a step wise manner and
observed the failure rate of the system under test at each reliability point of that
class for the same set of test cases. Same process and same test cases were also
applied to a class with medium priority and the class with the lowest priority. As the
observed failure rates6 were varied for the same set of test cases, at each reliability
point of selected classes (one at a time), we could analyze the sensitivity of a class
towards system failure rate. The graphs shown in Figure 4.2 show the failure rates
of LMS, SMA and ATM case studies. We obtained the graphs by decreasing the
reliability of the highest priority class, some medium priority classes and the lowest
priority class (one at a time) of each case study, in a step wise manner. We have
considered six classes of each case study including the highest and lowest priority
class.
In Figure 4.2, it is clearly shown that, when the reliability decreases for a class
with high TP value, the system failure rate increases at a higher rate, but this is not
true for a class with low TP value.
4.2.2 Comparison with Musa's approach
We have argued that the classes with high tendency towards system failures are
not only identied by their execution time but also by their inuence values. Like
average execution time, a class with high inuence value is also responsible for a
high failure rate of the overall system. To validate our claim, we have conducted
two experiments on each case study (LMS, SMA and ATM). In the rst experiment,
Experiment 1, we checked the impact of execution time on system failure rate and in
the second experiment, Experiment 2, we checked the impact of inuence value on
system failure rate.
Experiment 1: (Extended Musa's Approach)
We have extended the existing Musa's approach [9] to class level, for sensitivity
analysis. For each case study, we have taken rst ve classes from a set of classes
arranged in descending order according to their average execution times. In this
experiment, we have ignored the inuence value of a class. Then, we applied the
same technique and the same data set to the selected ve classes as discussed in
Section 4.2.1.
5A scenario may be executed a number of times for dierent test values.
6Failure rate = number of test cases failed number of test cases executed:
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(a) LMS
(b) SMA (c) ATM
Figure 4.2: Failure rate of an application based on class reliabilities (one at
a time)
Experiment 2: (Checking the impact of newly introduced factor: inuence value)
In this experiment, our aim is to prove that a rarely executed class is also responsible
for increasing the system failure rate, if a number of classes are dependent on it,
directly or indirectly. Hence, we check the impact of inuence value of a class on
system failure rate. For conducting sensitivity analysis, we have selected ve classes
with low average execution time and high inuence value from the case studies,
LMS, SMA and ATM. We have applied the same technique and same data set as in
Experiment 1. We checked the tendency of each selected class towards the overall
failure of the application. For simplicity, we have considered only ve classes in both
the experiments.
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Result Analysis and Discussion
For LMS, SMA and ATM case studies, the failure rate of the overall system was
58% and 47% and 72% respectively in the rst experiment, Experiment 1, when the
reliability of the rst class, the class with the highest execution rate, was decreased
from 1 to 0.5. In the second experiment, we found that the system failure rate was
near about 54%, 51% and 69% for LMS, SMA and ATM case studies respectively,
when the reliability of some classes out of the selected ve classes (one at a time) was
decreased from 1 to 0.5. We found that the overall failure rate of ATM case study
was the highest in both the experiments, Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. In the
case study ATM, we found that the class Withdrawal has the highest execution rate
and also has high inuence value. So, the failure rate was increased in a high rate,
when the reliability of Withdrawal class was decreased.
From Experiment 1, we observed that the failure rate of a system was increased,
when the reliability decreased for a class with high average execution time. From
Experiment 2, we observed that a class with low average execution time but high
inuence value was also responsible for increasing the failure rate of the system. From
both the experiments, we concluded that the newly introduced factor inuence value
in our proposed method is also playing a major role in identifying the failure-prone
classes whereas, Musa [9] stated that only the frequently executed classes should
get extra test resources on the testing phase as they are more failure-prone. As our
approach considers both the factors: average execution time and inuence value, it
exposes the failure-prone classes that are exposed by Musa's approach [9]. Further,
our method identies new failure-prone classes through the newly introduced factor
inuence value that are neglected by Musa's approach due to low execution time. It
is because, some wrongly produced output by a rarely executed class may be used
by some frequently executed classes, that makes the failure rate of the system high.
4.2.3 Threats to validity of results
In order to justify the validity of the results of our experimental studies, we identied
the following list of threats :
 Biased test set design and inuencing results.
 Seeding biased errors in various classes of each case study.
 Testing only for selected failures and loosing generality of results.
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 Using testing methods which may only be suitable for some particular bugs
while may not reveal other common and frequent bugs.
Measures taken to overcome the threats
In order to overcome the above mentioned threats and validate the results for most
common and real life cases, we have taken the following corrective measures :
 We used same test set in each reliability point of a class for observing failures.
 We used same type of seeded bugs in the classes of each case study.
 We took care that the seeded bugs match with commonly occurring bugs.
 We inserted class mutation operators to seed bugs. Using mutation operators,
we can ensure that a wide variety of faults are systematically inserted in a
somewhat impartial and random fashion. While traditional mutation operators
are restricted to a unit level, class mutation operators [93] for object-oriented
programs have impact on cluster level.
 We considered the failures that provide a base to the user to decide how much
they can trust the software.
4.2.4 Limitation of our approach
It is not sucient to assign test priority to an element on the basis of its inu-
ence value and its average execution time. A single bug in a class with low test
priority value may cause catastrophic failure. As, some classes usually provide ex-
ception handling of rare but critical conditions, it is necessary to consider the severity
associated with each class by checking the eect of its failure to the system operation.
For ecient testing, the test priority computation should also include the severity
associated with the failure of a class. The limitation of our approach is that we have
not considered the severity associated with each class.
Another limitation is that though ESDG is simple for representing small and
moderate programs, but for a large real life program, ESDG may become too large
and complex to manage [26]. Obviously, the storage requirement will also be very
high. For large programs, influence value of a method may be computed by using
traditional fan-in and fan-out metrics [94] in place of ESDG. However, the advantage
of using ESDG over the traditional fan-in and fan-out method is that our proposed
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inuence metric will improve the accuracy. It is because, ESDG shows the details
regarding the statements that are really aected in the source code, when a method is
producing incorrect result. It is because, ESDG shows the dependencies at statement
level, whereas fan-in and fan-out show the higher level dependencies at function
level/module level.
4.3 Summary
We have proposed a new metric called Inuence Metric to identify the criticality
of an element in the source code. It is based on static analysis of the source code.
The average execution time of a component within a system was estimated based on
the operational prole of the system. Criticality for a component within a system
is computed on the basis of its inuence value and average execution time. Test
priority is assigned to the components according to their criticality.
We have experimentally proved that decreasing the reliability of a high priority
class drastically increases the failure rate of the application, whereas, it is not true
in case of a low priority class. So, the intensity with which each element should be
tested is proportionate to its test priority value. It helps the test manager to expose
the critical elements before test case generation that are getting less attention in
terms of testing. The limitation with our criticality estimation method is that it
does not consider any external factor. Our proposed test eort prioritization method
will be eective, if the severity associated with various failure modes of an element
could be considered. So, we aim at considering the severity in our next work.
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Chapter 5
Criticality Estimation
First, prioritizing the program elements within a system according to their criticality
and then, conducting the testing process will promote ecient testing of a software
product by revealing important bugs at the early phase of testing. In Chapter 4,
we have considered two factors of a component1 (i) inuence value and (ii) average
execution time and computed the criticality of the component within a software
system. We have experimentally proved that when the reliability decreases for a
high critical component, system failure rate increases at a higher rate whereas, this
is not true for a low critical component. Though, the failure rate of a system is
heavily inuenced by the inuence value of a component, but it is not a sucient
factor for criticality estimation. In a real life application, each failure does not carry
equal weight. Our aim is not only to improve the reliability of a system, but also to
minimize the post-release failures that have a negative impact on the user or on the
system. For this, we consider the impact of a failure within a scenario as another
factor for criticality computation. We consider two important external factors such
as the severity of failures and the business value associated with a component for
criticality computation. Severity checks the impact of failure of a component within
a system. The aim of consideration of business value is that a technical sta cannot
guess which high level functions are important to the customer and also a customer
cannot estimate the cost and technical diculties in implementing a specic high
level function. The adoption of Value-based testing [21, 42] increases the return on
investment on testing.
1In an object-oriented program, a component may be a class which is the smallest executable
unit or it may be elaborated as a collection of classes in a package. However, a component may be a
collection of many other things. For example, a mixture of some source code templates with related
documents might be called as a component. After all, everything is a class in an object-oriented
program, every component is a class too. In our approach, we take a class as a component and
write class and component interchangeably throughout the chapter.
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We compute the criticality of a component on the basis of the following factors:
1. Average execution time of a component within a system.
2. Inuence value of a component within a system.
3. Structural Complexity of a component: Response for a Class (RFC); Weighted
Methods in a Class (WMC).
4. All possible types of system failures for which the component is responsible and
the severity associated with each failure.
5. Business value associated with a component.
User's perception is an indicator on the acceptance of a system. User's view on
the reliability of a system is improved and almost cheaper, when faults which occur in
the most frequently used parts of the software are almost removed [9,13,86,87]. The
idea behind the consideration of average execution time for a class as a parameter is
that when, a class is executed for longer time, there is a high probability that any
existing errors in the class will be executed during the run. It will cause the frequent
failure of the system.
In Chapter 4, we have introduced a metric called Inuence Metric for an element,
that shows the degree of inuence of that element toward system failures.
The idea of including structural complexity is to estimate the probability of pres-
ence of faults within a component. The case studies discussed in [95] show that the
residual bugs location is strongly correlated with module size and complexity. For
evaluating the structural complexity, Chidamber and Kemerer [41] have proposed six
metrics. We found that considering all the six metrics at a time is complicated, time
consuming and also sometimes not useful for a particular purpose. At the same time,
a single metric is also not sucient for complexity estimation. At least the use of
two or three CK metrics give a proper estimation of potential problems [58]. For our
purpose, we are using two CK metrics: RFC and WMC. RFC gives an idea about
the longest sequence call of methods and WMC provides the Cyclomatic complexity
of each method implemented in a class. Our approach shows the complexity of a
class within a program. In addition to that, it also shows the likelihood of the class
to fail in the operational environment due to the consideration of the factor, average
execution time.
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There are some components which exist within a system with low complexity, but
the failure of any one of those components may have a catastrophic impact on the
system. For example, a critical code may be called in case of an emergency, which
happens infrequently but can have catastrophic impact, if an error occurs in that part.
The impact of the failure may cause severe damage to the system or a huge nancial
loss. So, for computing the criticality of a component, we consider the severity of the
damage caused by the failure of the component within a scenario. The severity factor
is dependent on the nature of the application. Hence, it is a subjective matter and
is basically assessed by domain analyst, who has the knowledge of the environment
in which the software will be used. The basic input for severity assessment is the
costs of various failure modes. Detailed procedure of severity estimation is addressed
in [96].
There is also a close relationship between testing and business value that comes
from market or from customers [43]. Each use case of a system should not be treated
with equal importance [97]. Once the business values for various use cases are decided
through the interaction with domain experts, our approach estimates the business
value for a component by checking its interaction within various use cases. Based on
the Values of use cases, a component's Value is estimated.
Once the criticality of a component is estimated through our approach, exhaustive
testing has to be carried out to minimize bugs in high critical components. The total
test eort is distributed among various components within a system according to their
criticality. The component with high criticality will get high priority for testing. As
a result, not only the post-release failures will be minimized but also, the severed
types of post-release failures will also be minimized within the available test budget.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 5.1 discusses the pro-
posed methodology for estimating the criticality of a component within a system.
The experimental studies are conducted to test the eectiveness of our approach.
The experimental results are shown in Section 5.2. The summary of the chapter is
discussed in Section 5.3.
5.1 Our Approach
Our proposed methodology on criticality computation of a component consists of the
following steps:
1. Computing the inuence value of a component within a system as discussed in
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Chapter 4.
2. Estimating the average execution time of a component by executing the test
data based on operational prole (discussed in Chapter 4).
3. Analyzing the structural complexity for a component (Section 5.1.1).
4. Analyzing the severity associated with a component through simulation runs
(Section 5.1.2).
5. Estimating the business value associated with a component (Section 5.1.3).
6. Performing criticality estimation and prioritizing the components according to
their criticality (Section 5.1.4).
5.1.1 Analyzing the structural complexity
Our aim is to nd the complexity associated with a component by analyzing the
complexity of various services provided by the component. We consider only two CK
metrics (RFC and WMC), out of six metrics proposed in [41]. It is experimentally
proved that a component with high RFC and high WMC is fault-prone [98]. Hence,
these two chosen metrics (RFC, WMC) are used as inputs to derive the complexity
of a component for our purpose. RFC contains a set of member functions directly or
indirectly called by the class, whereas WMC is checking the complexity associated
with all member functions of a class using Cyclomatic complexity.
RFC metric measures the cardinality of a set of methods that can potentially
be executed in response to a message received by an object of that class [41]. In
RFC, the basic unit is a method, which refers to the message passing concept in O-O
programming. The RFC value for a class is given by
jRSj =
MX
i=1
Ri;
where RS, M and Ri represent the response set for the class, number of methods in
the class and the set of methods called by i-th method of the class, respectively. A
class with high value of RFC indicates that the complexity of services provided by
the class is high and hence, the understandability is less. When a larger number of
methods are invoked from a class through messages, it complicates the testing and
debugging process and also it is dicult to change a class due to the potential for
a ripple eect. As testing and maintenance is complicated, the chance of getting
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bug increases. We have derived Ri using the intermediate representation, ESDG, of
the source code. Our algorithm starts traversing from each method-entry vertex of a
class and traverses only the call-edges in a forward direction and generates a set of
nodes called by each method of a class. This process is repeated for each method of
a class and nally, the sets are merged to get the response set, RS, for the class.
Luke [99] argued that there is really no way to know a software failure rate at any
given point in time because the defects have not yet been discovered. According to
his statement, the design complexity is positively linearly correlated to defect rate.
Hence, the occurrence of software defects should be estimated based on McCabe's
complexity value or Halstead's complexity measure [99]. We consider WMC metric
that gives a rough estimation of total complexity associated with a class. WMC
metric is correlated with defect rates [58]. It counts local methods and calculate the
sum of the internal complexities of all local methods in a class [41]. The internal
complexity of each method is decided through Cyclomatic Complexity. WMC value
for a class c is given by
WMC =
MX
i=1
Wi
where, M and Wi represents the number of methods in a class and Cyclometic com-
plexity of i-th method, respectively. It helps to evaluate the minimum number of test
cases needed for each method and hence, is used as a guideline by test manager to
estimate how much time and eort is required to develop and maintain a class.
We estimate the probability of faults in a class based on two parameters: RFC
and WMC. First, we assign a threshold value to each metric as dened by Rosenberg
et. al. [100]. For each parameter, we use only three weights: low (0.3), medium
(0.5) and high (1) [100]. The assignment of points to the three weights is a rough
guideline. The following threshold values are assigned to the two parameters as stated
in [100].
1. Weighted Methods per Class (WMC): / 25 preferred, / 40 acceptable .
2. Response for Class (RFC): / 40 preferred, / 50 acceptable. It has been ob-
served that very few classes with RFC over 50 exist within a system.
The complexity information for LMS and SMA case study are shown in Table
5.1 and 5.2, respectively. The classes that are within preferred (acceptable) limit are
low (medium) in complexity and the classes which exceed the acceptable limits are
high in complexity. Out of these two parameters, if one parameter is in low range
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Table 5.1: Structural Complexity of various entity classes within LMS
Class WMC RFC Complexity
Borrower 29(medium) 42(medium) medium
Title 18(low) 39(low) low
Item 29(medium) 33(low) medium
Loan 32(medium) 52(high) high
Reserve 15(low) 30(low) low
Table 5.2: Structural complexity of various entity classes within SMA
Class WMC RFC Complexity
ProductInfo 25(low) 18(low) low
Category-
Mgr
28(medium) 37(Low) medium
OrderHandler 33(medium) 58(high) high
InventryMgr 27(medium) 46(medium) medium
and the other one is in medium range, we are accepting the whole complexity of the
class is medium, the higher one between the two factors. The intent of computing
the structural complexity of a component is to show the probability of existence of
faults within the component whereas, the intent of computing the inuence value of
a component is to show that how many other components will be aected by the
faulty behavior of the component.
5.1.2 Severity analysis
Severity is a rating which is applied to the eect of a failure. It shows the serious-
ness/impact of the eects of a failure within a system. Severity of a failure within
a system decides how a bug within a component aects the whole system. We have
inserted some bugs in various components within a system and executed the system
for some duration in the operational environment. We observed that similar types of
bugs in dierent components cause failures with dierent severity. Hence, we use the
severity factor of a component as a measure to the overall quality of the product. We
consider that a component is critical, if the failure of the component causes severe
eect on the whole system. In our proposed criticality evaluation method, our aim
is to rst reveal bugs from a high critical component and then, reveal bugs from
a low critical component. If there is an urgency to release the system before time
or the testing time is shortened due to some unavoidable circumstances then, the
test manger should ensure that the bugs responsible for severe type of failures are
revealed and xed.
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Though, testing focus should be given to the parts of the code that are executed
frequently [9, 13, 63], however, there is also a need for severity analysis for better
quality of a system. Some parts of the source code are executed in case of an emer-
gency. Though these parts execute rarely, the existence of a bug with them may
cause a severe failure. For example, let us consider a component which is providing
exception handling of rare but critical conditions. In this case, the component is exe-
cuted rarely. The inuence of the component toward failure is low and the structural
complexity of the component is also low but, a bug in that component could cause
catastrophic failure. Therefore, we have included the severity of a component as an
important factor for criticality computation.
We estimate the severity of a component within a system through Failure Mode
Eect Analysis (FMEA) [101], which is a bottom-up approach. FMEA is applied to a
component to get the deciency and hidden design defects. It focuses on two points:
(i) analyze the potential failure modes of a component (how a component fails) and
(ii) determine the eect of the failure modes on the system as a whole (consequences
of failures). For a hardware component (electrical/mechanical), the failure modes are
well known, but this case is not true for a software component. Nowadays, a number
of system functions are implemented on software level and hence, there is a need to
apply FMEA methodology on software based systems for determining the severity
factor of a component. For a hardware component, the failure modes are wear and
tear of machinery, design aws and unintentional environmental phenomena. Some-
times, the component manufacturing company discloses the possible failure modes
and also the estimated frequencies of failures for their products. This is not possible
in case of a software component. For a software component, the analyst decides the
failure modes based on the design and development process. Software is not a phys-
ical entity, it is a logical construct. The analyst identies the system level hazards
both at the analysis, design and implementation phase and translates it into software
terms. Now, we discuss about FMEA for a software system.
Software Failure Mode and Eect Analysis (SFMEA)
The detailed SFMEA focuses on the classes or modules in which several error condi-
tions are checked. Table 5.3 shows various types of errors that may occur within a
software module/class at the design or coding stage.
Ozarin [102] has discussed the advantages of performing SFMEA at various levels:
59
5.1 Our Approach Criticality Estimation
Table 5.3: Possible error conditions within a class/module
Error Condition Examples
Error in computation
Wrong Algorithm The module may carry out estimations wrongly due to faulty
requirements or wrong coding of requirements.
Calculation under-
ow or overow
The algorithm may produce in a divide by zero state
Error in data
Unacceptable data The module may accept out of range or wrong input data,
no data, wrong data type or size, or premature data; produce
wrong or no output data; or both.
Input data trapped
at some value
A sensor may read zero, one, or some other value.
Bulky data rates The module may not be able to handle a vast amounts of data
or many input requests simultaneously.
Error in logic
Wrong or unpre-
dicted commands
The module may receive improper data but continue to ex-
ecute a process. It may be intended to do the proper thing
under improper situation/state.
Failed to issue a
command
The module may not call a routine under certain circum-
stance.
(i) Method-level analysis (ii) Class-level analysis (iii) Module level analysis and (iv)
Package-level analysis. According to him, SFMEA process is accurate and eective
at the Method-level, which is the lowest level analysis. The authors of [103] have
considered that a method within a software system is equivalent to a part of hardware
system in which, there is a chance of failure under certain conditions. It is because,
if a method within a class does not perform according to its pre-dened specication
then, there is a chance of failure of the whole system under some conditions.
At the time of testing, the debugger analyzes the root cause of a bug and extracts
the method within a class and specically the instruction within a method, which
one is the source of bug. If any failure occurs at the testing phase then, signicant
amount of searching is conducted to nd the exact faulty parts in the source code and
specically the search is conducted to nd the exact faulty instructions of a method.
As the source code is available in this stage, we conduct the operation level or
method level SFMEA. During the execution of a scenario, a number of objects com-
municate through message passing. The message passing mechanism is implemented
through method calls. A method within a class may or may not has formal parame-
ters and may or may not has return value. To identify the severity of a class within
a system, we have to identify the various types of failure modes within a method of a
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class and also we have to estimate the severity of each failure mode by seeding some
bugs, observing the failures and estimating the impact of failures. To estimate the
severity level of a failure mode, we take the views of domain experts.
Method level failure modes and eect analysis
A method performing important tasks is generally viewed as an agent, which has
to fulll a contract to perform its operation. There may or may not be any formal
parameter in a method and a method may or may not return any value. A method
maintains some pre-conditions and post-conditions that explicitly state the agreement
of a method for performing a task. A pre-condition is the entry condition to perform
a task and a post-condition is a condition that must be true after the completion of
the task. Similarly, a class invariant states some constraints that must be true for
its objects, at each instance of time during the life time of an object. A method's job
is divided into two parts: (i) constraint checking part and (ii) actual logic to perform
a task. We assume that there is no time constraint when, a method is performing its
task. In this chapter, we consider four failure modes of a method as dened in [103].
These are:
1. Pre-condition Violation Failure Modes (F1): There are two sub-failure modes:
(i) pre-condition is not satised but its corresponding exception is not raised,
F1:1 and (ii) pre-condition is satised but its corresponding exception is raised,
F1:2.
2. Parametric Failure Modes (F2): Any failures regarding to formal parameter
declaration within a method comes under this category. The constraints on
parameter values are checked in this failure mode. The type of a parameter
is not considered. If any parameter constraint is already stated in the pre-
condition of the method then, that failure is not included under this failure
mode. For any other parameter constraint, the response of the method is
checked. If any alarm is raised by the method in the form of exception then,
two failure modes are considered for two individual cases. (i) the constraint is
false but its corresponding exception is not raised F2:1 and (ii) the constraint
is true but its corresponding exception is raised, F2:2.
3. Method Call or Invoke Failure Modes, F3: It consists of two sub-cases.
(a) A method m1 invokes method m2 of the same class or super class then,
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there is a possibility of the following failure modes in the list of failure
modes of m1, F3:1.
i. m1 invokes m2 in the wrong order (when the invocation of m2 is
condition based), F3:1:1.
ii. m1 invokes m2 by wrong parameters (when m2 contains parameters.
We consider only parameter's value not the type), F3:1:2.
(b) A method m1 of class A invokes method m2 of class B then, there is a
possibility of the following failure modes in the list of failure modes of m1,
F3:2.
i. m1 fails to invoke m2 (because of lack of instance of object of class
B), F3:2:1.
ii. m1 invokesm2 in wrong order (when the invocation ofm2 is condition
based), F3:2:2
iii. m1 invokes m2 by wrong parameters (when m2 contains parameters.
We consider only parameter's value not the type), F3:2:3.
4. Post-condition Violation Failure Modes, (F4). It consists of the failures when
a method is unable to satisfy the post-conditions. The failure mode checks the
conditions that a method must satisfy after its execution is completed. Any
violation in the postcondition indicates an error within the method whereas,
any violation of a precondition indicates an error with the client: the client is
using the method wrongly. In this case, the method is performing the task in
invalid manner.
We rst obtain the FMEA of a component within a scenario and then, we assign
severity through FMEA and hazard analysis. Severity of a component within a
scenario shows how its failure aects the execution of the scenario. Domain experts
play a vital role in hazard analysis and estimate the severity level of a component
within a scenario. We rate the severity of a component within a scenario based on
the worst eect of the failure of providing services by the component within that
scenario.
According to [101], severity is classied as:
1. Catastrophic : A failure may cause death or total system loss.
2. Major : A failure may cause very serious eects. The system may loose func-
tionality, security concerns etc.
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3. Marginal : A failure may cause minor injury, minor property damage, minor
system damage, or delay or minor loss of production, like loosing some data.
4. Minor : Defects that can cause small or negligible consequences for the system,
e.g. displaying results in some dierent format.
We assign severity weights of 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, and 0.95 to Minor, Marginal, Major,
and Catastrophic severity classes, respectively as dened in [81, 82]. The damage
may be classied to dierent classes as mentioned above or it may be quantied into
money value, whatever the analyst feels better. For example, if a large volume data
to be sent by mail are wrong, then the cost of re-mailing will be horrible.
Tables 5.4 shows a part of SFMEA at the method level for some components
within withdraw scenario of ATM system. The column Triggered Hazard shows
the occurrence of failure when an event is triggered and some action is performed.
The column Component shows the component in which there is an occurrence of
fault. In the table, failure mode is any one failure mode out of the four failure
modes (F1, F2, F3, F4) discussed above. The column Effect shows the eect of the
failure mode on the system. Severity is any one severity out of the four severities-
Catastrophic, Major, Marginal and Minor- discussed above.
Table 5.4: SFMEA at method level for some components within the Withdraw Sce-
nario
Triggered
Hazard
Component Failure mode Eect Severity
A fault in
dispensing
cash
CashDispenser CashDispenser
is empty but
not raising any
exception
Money will be deducted
from the account immedi-
ately though the customer
is not able to withdraw
the said amount. As ev-
ery transactions are main-
tained in the Log, the ac-
count will be updated by
the banker later on.
Major
A fault in
performing
transaction
Withdrawal The object of
Withdrawal com-
ponent fails to
check the su-
ciency of cash
in the customer
account
ATM gives out more
money than it is avail-
able in the corresponding
account.
Catastrophic
A fault in
completing
transaction
Withdrawal The object of
Withdrawal com-
ponent fails to
create a new
receipt
Receipt will not be printed Minor
A fault
in read-
ing menu
choice from
the screen
Withdrawal Failed to call the
readMenuChoice
method of an ob-
ject of component
CustomerConsole
Transaction can't be per-
formed.
Marginal
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There can be a couple of severity level for a component within a scenario. For
example, the component Withdrawal has two severity levels (Minor, Marginal) as
shown in Table 5.4. We consider only the worst-case consequence of a failure as the
severity level for the component. For the component Withdrawal, we consider the
Marginal severity level within the withdraw scenario.
5.1.3 Business value estimation
For ATM, the main use cases are deposit, withdraw, inquiry balance and transfer
money. The business value (Value) for ATM is estimated in Table 2.1. We consider
only the use cases that are used by the customer. start-up and shut-down use cases
are not considered as they are the basic use cases to run the system. We use that
Values to estimate the Values of various components of ATM system. A component
often serves many dierent use cases. So, we calculate the importance of a component
on the basis of its involvement with various use cases. The proposed methodology
consists of the following steps:
1. Constructing the Component Dependence Diagram (CDD) from the source
code.
2. Extracting slices of various scenarios from the CDD and using the slices for
estimating the business value for a component.
Component Dependence Diagram
A Component Dependence Diagram (CDD) is a directed graph that is used as an
intermediate representation of a program. Each node of a CDD corresponds to a
component of the program. A component is a basic executable unit. In a procedure-
oriented program, a component can be a function whereas, it is as simple as a class
in an object-oriented program. The edges of the graph represent either control de-
pendency or data dependency among the nodes. These dependencies are represented
by directed arrows. We do not use dierent symbols to represent these two types
of dependencies since our method checks for any type of dependency. If both data
and control dependencies exist between two components, we draw only one arrow be-
tween the corresponding nodes. Figure 5.1 shows an example program and its CDD.
In the example program shown in Figure 5.1a, the statement store (d) in function f2
indicates saving of latest value of the variable d to a memory location. Similarly, the
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statement read (d) in function f3 indicates reading of the value of variable d that
was last saved by function f2.
We view a CDD as a simplied form of a System Dependence Graph (SDG) [29]
but, a CDD does not have as many types of edges as SDG [29]. Unlike SDG, a
CDD does not represent the individual statements of a program because, inclusion
of individual statements makes the graph unnecessarily complicated. In Extended
Control Flow Graph (ECFG) [104], a node refers to a method of an object-oriented
program whereas, in CDD, a node refers to a component. The aim of referring a
node of CDD to a component instead of a method in an object-oriented program is
to make the graph simple and easily understandable. We compare CDD with the
Component Dependence Graph (CDG) proposed by Yacoub et al. [70] where, nodes
refer to components. They have adapted control ow graph principle to represent
the dependency between two components and possible execution paths. Unlike our
approach, Yacoub et.al. [70] have considered only control dependency between com-
ponents. In their approach, the components are assumed to be independent. The
existence of bug in one component is not responsible for the failure of another com-
ponent. As we have considered the data dependency between two components, a bug
in one component may have an eect on other components.
main(){
int i;
i=readUserOption();
if(i== 1) f1();
else         f3();
}
f1(){
         .
         .
f2();
}
f2(){
.
.
.
store(d);
print(o1);
}
f3(){
read(d);
.
.
print(o2);
}
int d[10];
(a) An example program
main
O1
O2
f2
i
f3
f1
(b) Component Dependence Diagram of
program P
Figure 5.1: An example program with its CDD
The CDD, generated in our approach, satises all the following constraints:
 No node is isolated.
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 All use cases put together cover all nodes.
 No self loops.
 The node at which a use case starts execution is not control dependent on other
nodes of the graph.
 The nodes tested by any one test case are a subset of nodes belonging to slice
of a scenario.
Once the intermediate graph, CDD, is constructed, we use it to extract slices with
respect to various scenarios for prioritizing the components within a system.
Extracting slices of CDD with respect to various scenarios and estimating
the Value of a component
Each use case has one main scenario and a number of alternative scenarios. We only
consider the main scenario and do not consider the alternative scenarios. The Value
of a use case is same as the Value of its main scenario.
We compute the slice Si of the CDD with respect to scenario Si and represent it
as Slice(CDD;Si). The slice contains the set of components that are either executed
during the execution of the scenario Si or the results of the components which are
saved in dierent variables, used during the execution of Si.
Value estimation scheme
Once, the business values for all scenarios of a system are determined, we estimate
the business value, V alue(Ci), for a component Ci, as follows.
V alue(Ci) =
nosX
j=1
qj; (5.1)
Where, qj = V aluej; if Ci 2 slice(Sj) else; qj = 0: In Equation 5.1, nos is
the number of scenarios within a system, V aluej is the probability of j-th scenario
and slice(Sj) is the slice of the CDD with respect to j-th scenario. The priority
value of a component intuitively indicates the priority of its being used during an
actual operation of the program. We now algorithmically present our business value
estimation scheme for various components within a system.
Value estimation Algorithm
1. Construct the CDD of the program.
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2. Determine the business value V aluei for each scenario Si within a system.
3. For each component Cj of CDD do, V alue(Cj)=0.
4. For each scenario Si of the program do
(a) Compute the slice of scenario Si from the CDD.
(b) for each component Cj in slice(Si) do, V alue(Cj) = V alue(Cj) + V aluei.
5. Print the Value computed for each component.
We now explain our Value estimation method using a simple example. Let us assume
that the program shown in Figure 5.1a has two use cases: U1 and U2. Each use case
has only one scenario. Let, the business values associated with scenario S1 and S2 be
0.8 and 0.2, respectively. Figure 5.2a shows the Values obtained in various functions
after Slice1, the slice of CDD with respect to scenario S1. Each component that is
executed within the slice Slice1 is getting marked by 0.8, which is the Value of the
scenario S1. Next, the slice of CDD with respect to scenario S2, Slice2, is computed.
The business values of various components after slicing the CDD with respect to
both the scenarios (S1 and S2) are obtained, as shown in Figure 5.2b. In the said
gure, the functions main and f2, have Value 1, each. This means that both the
functions main and f2 are either getting executed or their results are used by both
the scenarios S1 and S2. It may be noted that the business value of 1 for a function
indicates that it is required for all scenarios of the system. Table 5.5 shows the
business values associated with various components of ATM system.
O1
O2
main
0.8i
 
0.0
0.8
0.8
f1
f3
f2
(a) Values after slicing scenario S1
O1
O2
main
1.0i
 
0.2
1.0
0.8
f1
f3
f2
(b) Values after slicing scenarios S1 and S2
Figure 5.2: Priority of each component after slicing S1 and S2
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Table 5.5: Business values associated with various components of ATM system
Component V laue
Session 0.93
Withdrawal 0.77
Deposit 0.69
Transfer 0.39
Inquary 0.58
Cardreader 1
EnvolopAccepter 0.69
CustomerConsole 1
Log 0.86
Table 5.6: Criticality computation for Transfer component of ATM system
Influence value EEC SC Severity Val Criticality
0.67 0.3 0.3 0.75 .39 2.41
5.1.4 Criticality computation
For assigning criticality, the commonly used method is to do a proper weight assign-
ment and then, calculate a weighted sum for a class [105]. We assign a relative weight
for each chosen factor of a class. For each factor, we assign equal weight. The weight
may vary depending on the nature of the system. An example of criticality computa-
tion for a component is shown in Table 5.6. The headings used for dierent columns
of the table are: EEC- Expected Execution Time, SC- Structural Complexity and
Val- Business value associated with a component within a system. The estimated
criticality of a component is normalized by dividing the criticality of the component
with the sum of the total criticality of all components within the system.
There are a lot of technical, productivity and environmental complexity factors
that exist within a system. For simplicity, we consider only ve factors for complexity
estimation. Consideration of a number of factors improve the accuracy of criticality
estimation method but, it will make the process complicated and confusing. In Table
5.6, we assign weight of 1 to each complexity factor. It may vary from application
to application and it is purely a subjective matter.
5.2 Experimental Studies
We have applied our proposed complexity estimation method and prioritized the test
eort according to their estimated complexity on LMS, SMA and ATM case studies.
These are implemented in Java and are introduced in Chapter 4.
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First, we applied our proposed algorithm, MethodInuence (discussed in Chapter
4) for each case study to get the inuence of various classes within a system. Then,
the average execution time of a class within a system was decided by executing
the system 100 times and collecting the execution time of various classes in each
run. 100 test cases were selected randomly based on operational prole data. We
calculated WMC for a class manually through the source code. To get the RFC of
a class, we have developed an algorithm that traverses the ESDG of the system and
generates RFC for the class. The severity of a class within a system was decided
by seeding dierent types of faults in the class and observing the system failures by
executing the system a number of times in the operational environment. Finally, we
have computed the criticality for each class as shown in Table 5.6 and ranked the
classes according to their criticality. Once the criticality of various classes within a
system are estimated, our aim is to validate our result. For this, we have conducted
experiments to check how the faults in these classes are aecting the reliability of the
system. The experiment is described below.
We have used fault seeding for evaluating the eectiveness of our proposed ap-
proach. It has been shown that, fault seeding is an eective practice for measuring
the testing method eciency [106]. We have carefully chosen some mutation oper-
ators to seed bugs randomly. The fault density is considered as a constant equal to
0.05 for each case study. This means that in a case study consisting of 1000 number
of lines, 50 number of bugs were inserted. The seeded faults are either class mutation
operators [93] or interface mutation operators [22, 107]. The class mutation oper-
ators are targeted at object-oriented specic features which Java provides such as
class declaration and references, single inheritance, interface, information hiding and
polymorphism. In this chapter, we have considered four class mutation operators to
simulate the faults. These are:
 CRT operator-Type replacement: This operator replaces a reference type with
all the compatible types (the name of other classes and interfaces) found from
a cluster. There is a chance of subtle type errors by this mutant.
 CON operator- Initial states and object replacement: A Java class usually
provides a number of constructors to capture the dierent ways of creating
objects (constructor overloading). This operator replaces a constructor with
other overloaded constructors. Some times, constructor of sub class may be
replaced by constructor of super class by this operator. Object initialization
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error is related to this operator which happens frequently.
 OVM operator- Method replacement: This operator generates a mutant by
deactivating the overriding method so that a reference to the overriding method
actually goes to the overridden method. Actually a overriding method in a sub
class has dierent functionality to the overridden method in a super class. So
there is a chance of some semantic errors by this operator.
 AMC operator- Access mode replacement: This operator replaces a certain
Java access mode with three other alternatives such as private, protected and
public. For example, a eld declared with a protected access mode can be
mutated to private and public.
There is a number of interactions among components in an object-oriented applica-
tion. Therefore, there are opportunities for integration/interface faults. Delamaro
et. al. [107] have proposed Interface Mutation (IM) with the aim to test thoroughly
the interactions among various units. Suppose, there are three functions f1, f2 and
f3 within a system and to test the connection between f1 and f3, we insert mutants
inside the component f3. In this case, these mutants may be identied through the
test cases that execute calls to f3 from f2. As a result, the connection between f1-f3
cannot be tested. For this, there is a need to consider the proper place from where a
function is called. Keeping this in view, we have carefully considered some interface
mutation operators from the mutant set proposed in [107]. The IM are as follows.
1. Applying mutants within the called function: The mutants considered under
this category are: Direct Variable Replacement operator, Indirect Variable op-
erator and Return Statement operators.
2. Applying mutants inside the calling function: It is applied to the call arguments.
The mutants considered under this category are Unary Operator Insertion and
Function Call Deletion. The last operator is a missing transition. It is not
applied to the argument but to the whole function call. In a connection f1-f2,
it deletes the call to the function f2. At the time of implementing the mutant
inside an expression, special care is taken to replace it by an appropriate value,
if the deleted function is returning any value.
First, the testing time for each case study was decided based on the number of
classes, complexity of each class and number of object points [92] in the case studies.
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Then, we made two copies of the source code of each case study and applied two
dierent testing methods. In the rst testing method, the components are priori-
tized according to their structural complexity [41] only, whereas in the second testing
method, the components are prioritized according to their estimated complexity based
on our proposed complexity estimation approach. The rst testing method was ap-
plied to the rst copy and the second testing method was applied to the second copy
of each case study.
Same testing time was allocated for each copy of a case study. At this point, we
emphasize the fact that our aim is not to achieve complete fault-coverage with the
available test resources, but to check the eciency of our proposed testing method.
The number of test cases designed for a component at the unit level was decided
according to their estimated criticality values. As a class with high influence value
provides services to others, a single bug in the class may cause interface bugs, which
we cannot detect at the unit level. Interface bugs are detected at the integration level
and interface testing assures that the classes have communicated correctly. So, at the
integration level, we applied coupling based testing techniques [108], which is based on
client-server concept. In the coupling based approach [108], when a client class calls
another server class, rst some method sequences of the client class are considered.
These method sequences are subset of the set of method sequences decided at unit
testing. Then, for each method sequence, the method sequences of the called class
(server) are decided. At a time, one server class is considered for each client class.
For one client method sequence, there can be number of server method sequences. In
this level, the testing will be eective, if the method sequences of the client class will
be complete. As we have tested thoroughly the classes with high criticality at the
unit level in the second copy of a case study, we have considered the coupling-based
integration testing [108] to cover all the possible interface faults of critical classes.
We have taken the help of a coverage analysis testing tool JaBUTi [109] for getting
the coverage report of a test case. The example of the coverage report by two test
cases at the unit level through JaBUTi is shown in Figure 5.3.
At the unit and integration level, though testing time is same for the two copies of
a case study, the test sets are dierent as the priority level of a component is dierent
in dierent testing methods. After the completion of integration testing, we checked
the mutation score of the test sets generated for two copies of a case study by two
dierent testing methods.
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(a) Test cases executed for the component CashDispenser of ATM
(b) Coverage shown by JaBUTi test tool
Figure 5.3: Test execution details for the component CashDispenser
The mutation score S, for a test set T, is dened as follows.
MutationScore(S,T) =
#dead mutants
#mutants seeded #equivalent mutants
Table 5.7 shows the mutation score of generated test sets by two dierent testing
methods. In Table 5.7, it is observed that MST and MSP are nearly equal. In
LMS case study, mutation score of the rst testing method is high, whereas in
SMA and ATM case studies, the mutation score of the second testing method is
high, in which our method is applied. We observed that our method is also equally
competent with the rst testing method in nding mutants. As we consider average
execution time, inuence value and severity for test eort prioritization in addition to
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Table 5.7: Mutation Score by two testing methods
Test TC# Mu# EMu# MST MSP
LMS 112 22 2 0.89 0.82
SMA 73 17 0 0.74 0.77
ATM 211 31 7 0.8 0.89
TC#:Number of test cases, Mu#: Number of mutants, EMu#: Number of equivalent mutants, MST : Mutation
score by rst testing method in which the components were prioritized based on their structural complexity, MSP :
Mutation score by second testing method in which the components were prioritized based on our proposed
approach.
structural complexity, we claim that our method exposes the important bugs, which
are responsible for frequent failures or severe failures. We conducted another set of
experiments to check the types of failures observed in the operational environment.
After resolving the detected bugs, we found that some residual bugs are existing
in both the copies of the case studies. A few bugs were detected toward the end of
testing, which could not be xed due to the shortage of testing time. At this point, we
again emphasize the fact that our aim is not to achieve complete fault-coverage with a
minimal test suite size. We xed a test budget for each case study before the testing
phase and our aim is to ensure the eciency of both testing methods within the
available test budget. Therefore, after the completion of testing phase, we observed
the eect of those residual bugs in both copies of each case study by invoking random
services. For this, new system level test cases were randomly generated based on
operational prole [9] for observing the behavior of the system at post-release stage.
At this point, we did not x any detected bug. Analytical comparison of the two
testing methods were done by running the same input set on the results obtained by
the discussed testing methods. The tested source code of each case study were again
executed to test their behavior at the operational environment.
5.2.1 Result analysis
The results of our simulation studies are summarized in Table 5.8. The headings
used for the dierent columns of the table are listed below.
Test# is number of test cases in the test set.
Failt# is the number of failures observed in the tested source code obtained through
rst testing method in which the components were prioritized for testing according
to their structural complexity.
Failp# is the number of failures observed in the tested source code obtained through
second testing method in which the components were prioritized for testing according
to their estimated complexity obtained through our proposed method.
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CS is a Case Study
FCa, FCr, FMa and FM represent the number of catastrophic, Major, marginal and
minor failures.
From Table 5.8, it is observed that the post-release failures are less in the second copy
of a case study, Failp#, to which our method is applied. Not only the number of
failures are less, but also catastrophic and critical failures are rarely observed. Only
some minor failures are observed in the copy tested by our approach, Failp#, such as
displaying results in some dierent format. This type of failures have very less eect
on the system and also on customer. Some highly severed failures are observed in the
rst copy of each case study. It is because, some critical bugs were detected toward
the end of test cycle, which were not xed due to shortage of testing time, whereas
these critical bugs were detected at the early stage of test cycle in the second copy
of a case study to which our approach was applied.
Through a detailed analysis of the results of both testing methods, we conclude
that our proposed test eort prioritization method helps to minimize the post-release
failures of a system and also helps in minimizing the catastrophic and major types
of failures at the operational environment. As a result of this, user's perception on
overall reliability of the system is improved. The eciency of our proposed method
will be improved, if we run the software for long duration by taking a number of test
cases based on operational prole.
Table 5.8: Failure observation at the time of release
CS Test# Failt# Failp#
FCa FCr FMa FM FCa FCr FMa FM
LMS 50 0 2 3 0 0 0 2 1
100 0 5 3 4 0 0 3 3
150 1 6 3 5 0 2 3 4
SMA 50 0 1 1 4 0 0 1 3
100 1 1 1 4 0 0 2 4
150 1 2 1 4 0 1 2 4
ATM 50 0 2 3 6 0 0 2 2
100 0 2 4 6 0 0 4 2
150 0 2 4 4 0 0 4 4
We observed that the performance rate is drastically increased by our method,
when the system is executed for a long time, in all the three case studies.
5.3 Summary
We have proposed a criticality estimation method at the code level and prioritized
the test eort for various elements within a system according to their estimated crit-
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icality. We have considered ve important factors of a component: inuence value,
average execution time, structural complexity, severity and business value for criti-
cality computation. Our test eort prioritization method guides the tester to detect
the important bugs at the early phase of testing that are responsible for frequent or
severe failures. As a result, the user's perception on the reliability of the system is
improved within the available test budget. Our approach helps to increase the test
eciency as it is linked to the measure for both internal and external factors of a
program element.
The limitation with this approach is that once a priority value is assigned to a
component, it is not changed throughout the testing phase. We observed that the
importance of a component for testing varies at dierent instances of testing phase.
To solve this problem, we propose a multi-cycle based test eort prioritization method
in the next chapter, in which the priority of a component changes between two test
cycles.
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Multi Cycle-based Test Eort
Prioritization Approach
A moderate size application generally consists of a number of components. The
components interact among themselves through a number of operations. Thorough
testing of all components is often not feasible due to limited testing budgets. For
achieving the desired level of reliability within the available test budget, a good test
plan is required. A good test plan helps to monitor and improve the eciency of
testing. Sometimes, the testing team nds important bugs (important from the user's
point of view) toward the end of the testing phase. As a result, the development team
may not x it due to shortage of time. Even if the detected bugs are xed, the testing
team may not be able to validate it within a short period.
Test eort prioritization technique helps the tester to do the best possible job
within the available test resources [105]. The tester gets the best possible chance
to reveal the important bugs. Important bugs are those that reside within critical
functions and modules of the system
Our aim is to identify the criticality of a component before the testing phase and
allocate test eort to the component according to its criticality. If bugs from the
critical components are detected and xed during testing, the post-release failure
rate of the system will be reduced. The importance of a component may vary at
dierent points of the testing phase. If a component has failed in past, then there
is a possibility that it will fail in near future [54, 110]. Hence, we analyze the failure
history of a component within a system and use it as a factor for estimating the test
priority of the component in the next phase of testing.
We propose a multi cycle-based test eort prioritization approach to test the basic
functionalities of the system. We institute three dierent test cycles meant to focus
on dierent aspects of the quality of the system: (i) coverage of critical components,
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(ii) coverage of fault-prone components and (iii) coverage of components with high
business values.
In the existing prioritization-based testing methods [4{6], the priorities are as-
signed to the test cases and the priority assignment is done only once for the entire
duration of the test. Unlike the existing approaches, we assign priorities to the pro-
gram elements instead of assigning that to the test cases. We also assign dierent
priorities to the same program element at dierent test cycles. A stipulated time
period is set for a test cycle. The duration of a test cycle may vary under certain
circumstances, but the duration of the entire testing time is xed.
In the rst test cycle, we estimate the criticality of a component within a system
on the basis of its inuence value, severity and execution probability. In our previous
work (Chapter 4), we presented a static metric to compute the inuence value of a
class within a system. Dynamic metric captures the dynamic behavior of an appli-
cation and helps the analyst to make a good test plan. In this chapter, we propose
an algorithm to get the inuence value through dynamic analysis of source code. We
assign test eort to the components according to their estimated criticality. Test pri-
ority of a component is set to its estimated criticality with the aim to reveal a number
of bugs from high critical components. Though, the inuence value of a component
aects the reliability of a system, this factor alone is not sucient to estimate the
criticality of a component. In addition to this, we consider another two factors: (i)
severity and (ii) execution probability. Severity estimates the impact of failure of the
component on the system. Our aim is not only to improve the reliability of a system,
but also to reduce the post-release failures that have a high consequence on the sys-
tem. The reliability calculation only counts the number of failures observed after the
testing phase and it does not consider the impact of a failure (severity of a failure)
on the system. We consider the execution probability of a component as a factor for
criticality computation because the chance of failure is high for a component, which
is executed for a number of times. Once the criticality of a component is computed
within a system, exhaustive testing has to be carried out to minimize bugs in high
critical components. This means, we cut down testing in less critical components to
save the testing time for a high critical component. In this cycle, we conduct unit,
integration and system testing.
In the second test cycle, the prioritization technique is dierent. At this stage,
we assume that the critical components were tested thoroughly during previous test
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cycle. The components in which a number of faults were detected in the past are likely
to be faulty in future [110]. Keeping this in mind, we set a goal in this cycle, which
is dierent from that of the rst cycle. Our aim is to allocate extra test eort to the
components that have failed a number of times in the previous cycle. So, we assign
test priority to the components on the basis of their failure history. We allocate extra
testing eort to the components that have failed a number of times during previous
cycle. In this cycle, we again conduct unit, integration and system testing. We match
the coverage history of the components with their current estimated priority. There
may be some components with dierent priory in dierent test cycles. If the desired
code coverage level [11, 12] of a component in this cycle is already covered in the
previous test cycle, we leave this as it is; otherwise, new test cases are executed for
the component.
It is a dicult task for a developer to guess, which high level functions are impor-
tant to the customer. To get the customer satisfaction and make the testing process
eective within the available test budget, we consider the business value associated
with a use case scenario for testing at the third test cycle. In the previous test cycles,
the components were prioritized based on their criticality and failure history. In the
third test cycle, the goal is to rigorously test the use cases that are important to the
organization. Domain experts observe that the values of use cases follow a Pareto
distribution, i.e., 20% of the requirements cover 80% of business value [20]. Hence,
from a business point of view, test eort distribution based on the return on invest-
ment will be eective. In the third test cycle, we rst prioritize the use case scenarios
within a system based on their business values and then conduct only system testing.
We apply our proposed multi cycle-based test eort prioritization approach on
LMS, SMA and ATM case studies. These are already introduced in Chapter 4. We
illustrate our proposed approach through the case study ATM. Figure 6.1 shows the
communication diagram of withdraw use case of ATM. We consider it as an running
example in next section.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. We discuss our proposed multi
cycle-based test eort prioritization approach in Section 6.1 and present the experi-
mental studies in Section 6.2. We give a summary of the chapter in Section 6.3.
6.1 Our Approach
It consists of the following steps:
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Figure 6.1: Communication diagram for withdraw use case
1. First test cycle: Computing the criticality of a component and prioritizing the
components for testing according to their estimated criticality (Section 6.1.1).
2. Second test cycle: Collecting the failure and fault detection history of the com-
ponents in the previous test cycle and prioritizing the components accordingly
(Section 6.1.2).
3. Third test cycle: Computing the business value associated with each high level
function (use case) and prioritizing the use case scenarios according to their
estimated business values (Section 6.1.3).
Below, we discuss each step in detail.
6.1.1 First test cycle
First, we compute the criticality of a component within a scenario and then, compute
the criticality of that component within the whole system. For criticality analysis,
we consider two major inputs: dynamic inuence value and severity of a component.
How to estimate the severity of a component at the code level is already discussed in
Chapter 5. First, we discuss about the Dynamic Inuence Metric and then present
the approach for criticality computation. Once the criticality of a component within
various scenarios of a system are estimated, we compute the criticality of the com-
ponent within the whole system. Finally, we assign test eort to various components
according to their estimated criticality.
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Dynamic Inuence Metric
We have already proposed a code-based algorithm to compute the inuence value of
a component at the class level in Chapter 4. Testing the behavior of an object is an
important task in testing the object-oriented program. The behavior of an object
at any execution point can be tested by analyzing the slice of that object at that
point during run time. If an object is executed for a long time then, there is a high
probability of execution of any existing faults in that object. The occurrence of state
transitions is also high in that object due to the invocation of various methods and
modication of its attributes. According to Briand et al. [90], the existence of a
bug within a class with high export coupling causes frequent failures as it is used by
many number of classes. Keeping this in mind, we propose an execution-trace based
metric called Dynamic Inuence Metric and use it for computing the criticality of a
component within a scenario.
To get the Dynamic Inuence Metric, rst we propose a new slicing technique to
compute the slices of various interacting objects within a scenario. Then, we use the
slices to get the inuence value of a given object within the scenario. In Chapter
4, we have already mentioned that the class level inuence metric shows how many
other classes are requesting the services from a class within a system, but in object
level, using the inuence metric, we can get how often these requests are executed
within a scenario. Suppose there are two possibilities within a scenario: (i) class c1 is
requesting services from another class c2 ve times (ii) class c1 is requesting services
from ve dierent classes. The rst one shows the number of service invocations
whereas the later one shows the number of distinct services invoked within a scenario.
The rst one is collected at run time and is used to compute the dynamic inuence
of an object. In object level, our algorithm shows an object is providing services to
which objects and how many times to each object within a scenario. In this level, we
check how many objects are using the given object, directly or indirectly, within a
scenario. At statement level, our algorithm shows how many statements are aected
by the given object out of the total number of statements executed by the test case.
For simplicity, we assume that one use case consists of one scenario; Only the main
scenario is considered, the alternate scenarios are not considered. At run time, our
approach on Dynamic Inuence Metric maintains all dynamic informations such as
the occurrence of object creations, deletions, invocation of various methods, attribute
references etc.
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The successful execution of a method is dependent on the corresponding state of
its object. For any unpredictable behavior of a method, it is required to check the
consistency of its corresponding object's state. Our object slicing approach helps the
tester to check the state space before and after the execution of a method through
its data members. Our approach acts as an active monitor and reports the objects
which are responsible for changing the state of the corresponding object within a
scenario. Our dynamic slicing approach overcomes some limitations of the existing
graph reachability methods for slicing [28, 31, 38]. The main limitation in these
existing slicing methods is that when the slicing criteria changes, we have to again
start from the slicing point. The slices for dierent variables at dierent nodes
are obtained by traversing the graph several times starting from the slice point.
The advantage of our slicing approach is that, the previous results that are saved
in memory can be reused instead of starting from the beginning every time. The
dynamic slice of an object at any execution point is the combination of dynamic
slices of its data members. Mund and Mall [111] have proposed an inter procedural
dynamic slicing algorithm to compute the dynamic slice of procedural programs. The
advantage of their method is that, the previous results that are saved in memory are
reused instead of starting from the beginning every time. They have not considered
the object-orientation aspects. We have extended their work to get the dynamic slice
of object-oriented programs. With this new dynamic slicing approach, we compute
the Dynamic Inuence Metric that gives the inuence value of an object by checking
its contribution at every execution step.
We propose an algorithm called Inuence Through Dynamic Slice (ITDS) to com-
pute the inuence value of an object within a scenario. The rationale behind this
algorithm is to prioritize the regions of the source code for testing because, some
components of a program are more critical and sensitive to bugs than others, and
thus should be tested thoroughly. In this section, we rst provide the denitions used
in our algorithm and then, present our proposed algorithm, ITDS. We also explain
the working of our proposed algorithm through an example.
Denitions used in the algorithm
Before presenting our proposed algorithm, we rst introduce a few denitions that
are used in the algorithm. Def(var) and Use(var) represent the set of nodes in the
intermediate graph that are used for dening and using the variable var, respectively.
During the execution of a program, a statement always corresponds to a node n in
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CDG. In the rest of the thesis, we use the terms vertex and node interchangeably.
Def. 1. RecDefV ar(v) and RecDefControl(n): A node dening a variable v
maintains a data structure named RecDefV ar(v) that stores the set of nodes on
which the variable v is dependent. Similarly, a predicate node n, called control node,
maintains a data structure named RecDefControl(n) that store the set of nodes
on which node n is dependent. At the time of execution, a node which maintains
RecDefV ar(v) or RecDefControl(n) based on the node type (dening a variable,
a predicate) is updated as:
fn [ RecDefV ar(var1) [ RecDefV ar(var2)[ : : : [ RecDefV ar(vark)
[ RecDefControl(S) [ ActiveCallSliceg where, fvar1; var2; : : : ; varkg are the
variables used at node n and S is the most recently executed control node under
which node n is executing. ActiveCallSlice is described below. It stores the infor-
mation of calling function. If n is a loop control node, and the present execution of
node n corresponds to exit from the loop, then RecDefControl(n) = ;.
Def. 2. ActiveCallSlice: At the time of execution of a program, the data structure
ActiveCallSlice is used to maintain the information of the most recent function call.
At a particular instance of execution time, it represents node n corresponding to the
most recent execution of calling a function.
Def. 3. CallSliceStack: It is a stack of function calls. At the execution time, it
stores a relevant sequence of nested function calls.
Def. 4. ActiveReturnSlice: It maintains the data structure of a return statement.
At the execution of a return node n,
ActiveReturnSlice = f n [ActiveCallSlice [RecDefV ar(var1) [RecDefV ar(var2)
[    [ RecDefV ar(vark) [ RecDefControl(S)g,
where var1; var2;    ; vark are the variables used at node n and S is the most re-
cently executed control node under which node n is executing.
Def. 5. Formal(n; f); Actual(n; a): When a function is called at node n, some pa-
rameters may be passed by value or by reference. If at the calling node n, the actual
parameter is a and its corresponding formal parameter is f then, Actual(n; a) = f ,
Formal(n; f) = a.
The examples for each of the above denition are given later in this section through
an example program (working of ITDS algorithm).
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Algorithm ITDS
The input data are provided to run the program and the name of the desired object
is provided to calculate its inuence. ITDS provides two outputs: (i) the dynamic
slice of an object at any execution point and (ii) the inuence value of the given
object after the execution is completed. The dynamic slice of an object is required to
compute inuence value and also used at the time of debugging. inuence value of an
object is used as an input at the time of criticality computation. The inuence value
of an object is computed by checking how many statements of the source code are
dependent on the given object out of the total number of statements executed by
the supplied input. First, an intermediate representation of the source code called
Control Dependence Graph (CDG) [112] is constructed. We store the frequency of use
of a node by a given object at run time, as there is a dierence between a node used
by ten dierent objects and a node used by an object ten times. At the execution of
a scenario, our algorithm maintains the set of objects that are dependent on a given
object and computes the inuence value of the given object within the scenario.
During the execution of a program, we maintain a set of dependent nodes for
each variable that are used during program execution. Our algorithm, ITDS, checks
whether the currently executed node is using the desired object, for which the in-
uence value is computed. The currently executed node will be added to the inu-
ence set of the desired object, if it uses any node from the dependence set of the
desired object. We use the data structure named Active object set to get the list of
currently executed objects at any instance of execution. When a method is invoked,
all the data members of the corresponding object are passed as call by reference.
Now, we present our algorithm, ITDS, in pseudo code form.
Algorithm: ITDS(CDG, Object O) f
Input : CDG of an object-oriented program and the desired object for which the
inuence value will be calculated.
Output 1: Dynamic slice of an object at any execution point.
Output 2: inuence value of the desired object.
1. Do the initialization before the execution of the program starts.
Set CallSliceStack = ;, ActiveCallSlice=;, influence(O) = ;,
total executed nodes = 0, temp = ; and Active object set = ;.
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2. Run the program with the given set of inputs and repeat the following steps
until the program ends.
Let node n in CDG corresponds to the statement s of the program.
2.1 Carry out the following before each statement s of the program is executed.
a) If node n represents a method invocation, do the followings:
a.1) If node n is a call to a constructor class then, store the object in
Active object set and for each data member d of O do:
RecDefV ar(O:d)= ;.
If node n is a call to a destructor class then, delete the object
from Active object set.
a.2) Update ActiveCallSlice and CallSliceStack as in Def. 2 and Def.
3, respectively.
a.3) For each actual parameter a explicitly dened in the calling node
n do:
RecDefV ar(Formal(n; a)) = RecDefV ar(a)
// If the actual parameter is an object then, each data member of
that object is an actual parameter for that function call.
b) If n is a RETURN node then, update ActiveReturnSlice as in Def.
4.
2.2 Carry out the following after each statement s of the program P is exe-
cuted.
// update the data structure of node n
a) If node n is only dening a variable var and not a call node then
Update RecDefV ar(var) as in Def. 1.
b) Else if node n is a control node then update RecDefControl(n) as in
Def. 1.
c) Else if n is a node which represents a method invocation statement
then
c.1) If the corresponding invoked method returns a value which is
dening a variable var in node n then
RecDefV ar(var) = ActiveReturnSlice.
c.2) First, update CallSliceStack and ActiveCallSlice as in Def. 3
and Def. 2 respectively and then, set ActiveReturnSlice = ;.
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c.3) For each local variable l var of the called function do
RecDefV ar(l var) = ;
d) Store the updated data structure of node n in set temp.
e) total executed nodes++
2.3 Carry out the following to include the current node n in the inuence list
of object O
//Check Inuence of the Object
a) If node n is a call to a member function by the input object O or
object O is an actual parameter in the function call then, mark node
n.
b) Else, check the set temp to nd whether any node of
RecDefV ar(O:di) is used in current node n. If the node is used then,
mark node n.
// RecDefV ar(O:di) contains the set of nodes used in dening the
data members of object O
c) If n is marked then add n and RecDefControl(S) to influence(O),
where S is the most recently executed control node under which node
n is executing, i.e. influence(O) = influence(O) [ n [RecDefControl(S).
2.4 temp = ;
// Object Slicing
2.5 If a slicing command < n; obj > is given, where n is the currently executed
node and obj is any object in the Active object set, then
DynamicSlice (n; obj) = RecDefVar(obj:d1) [ RecDefVar(obj:d2)[    [
RecDefVar(obj:dn), where di is the i-th data member of obj and RecDefVar(obj:di)
is the updated data structure of di after execution of current node.
2.6 Exit if the execution of the program is completed or aborted.
3. After the end of execution, calculate % of inuence of the object O as follows:
influence value(O) =
Number of elements in the set inuence (O)
total executed nodes
 100
g
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Explanation of ITDS Algorithm: Algorithm ITDS calculates the inuence of
a single object in an object-oriented program, where inuence refers to the contri-
bution or usage of the object at every execution step. The inuence is calculated as
the total number of execution points (statements) involving the given object divided
by the total number of execution points in the program. This inuence value serves
as a metric in test eort prioritization. The algorithm also produces the dynamic
slice of an object, identifying the nodes of the program source that would need to be
reviewed with a high priority in order to detect bugs in the given object.
ITDS checks the type of each node in a CDG and performs dierent operations
on dierent nodes. A statement of a program is represented as a node in CDG. A
node may be a call node or a denition node or a control node or a return node.
Call node calls a function. A denition node denes a variable. A control node
denes a loop, on which the execution of other nodes are dependent. A return node
returns the output of a called function. The algorithm performs some computation
after the execution of a node. When a node dening a variable is executed, the
algorithm maintains the set of nodes on which the variable is dependent. Similarly,
when a control node is executed, the algorithm maintains the set of nodes on which
the control node is dependent. If a node is a call node or return node, it performs
some operation before the execution of the node and also performs some operation
after the execution of the node. When a new object is created due to the execution
of a call node, which calls to a constructor class, the algorithm maintains dependent
list for each data member of the object from that execution point. The algorithm
maintains a list of objects that are interacting at any execution point. The algorithm
maintains a stack to store the nesting of calls, which is updated before and after the
execution of a call node. The algorithm updates the data structure of the formal
parameters with that of the actual parameter.
Once the data structures are updated after the execution of a node, the algorithm
performs a set of operations to check whether the currently executed node will be
included in the inuence list of the given object. When a slicing command is given
to get the dynamic slice of an object, the algorithm computes the dynamic slice of
the object by taking a union of the dynamic slices of its data members. After the
execution of the program is completed, the algorithm checks how many nodes are
executed and out of that how many nodes have used the given object.
Complexity Analysis: Each statement of our considered program is either a
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control statement or dening a variable or calling a function or an output statement.
The data structures used in the program are Active object set, RecDefV ar(var),
RecDefCon(n), ActiveDataSlice, ActiveReturnSlice and
CallSliceStack. Excepting CallSliceStack, each one has the maximum size of N ,
whereN is the total number of statements in the program. The size of CallSliceStack
is c  N , where c is the maximum level of call nesting in a program. So, the worst
case space complexity is O(N). The time complexity is linear to the execution time
of a program.
Working of ITDS Algorithm
Consider the example program shown in Figure 6.2a. The Control Dependence Graph
(CDG) of the example program is shown in Figure 6.2b. During the initialization
step, the algorithm sets CallSliceStack=; and ActiveCallSlice =;. We have run the
program with input 12 for n and computed the inuence value of object bx after the
execution is completed. Now, we have the followings for some executed nodes of the
program.
(a) An example program (b) Its Control Dependence Graph
Figure 6.2: Program with its Control Dependence Graph
 After execution of node 10:RecDefV ar(bx:a) = f2; 10g; RecDefV ar(bx:b) =
f3; 10g
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 After execution of node 11: RecDefV ar(cx:a) = f2; 11g; RecDefV ar(cx:b) =
f3; 11g
 After execution of node 12: RecDefV ar(dx:a) = f2; 12g; RecDefV ar(dx:b) =
f3; 12g
 Before execution of node 13: CallSliceStack = f13g; ActiveCallSlice = f13g
 After execution of node 5: RecDefControl(5) = f5 [ RecDefV ar(bx:b) [
ActiveCallSliceg=f5; 3; 10; 13g
 After execution of node 7: RecDefV ar(bx:b) = f7 [ RecDefV ar(bx:b) [
ActiveCallSliceg=f7; 3; 10; 13g
 After execution of node 13: CallSliceStack = f;g; ActiveCallSlice = f;g
 After execution of node 14: RecDefV ar(n) = f14g
 Before execution of node 15: CallSliceStack = f15g, ActiveCallSlice=f15g,
RecDefV ar(Formal(n)) = fRecDefV ar(i)g = f14g .
 After execution of node 4: RecDefV ar(bx:b) = f4 [RecDefV ar(bx:b)[
RecDefV ar(i) [ ActiveCallSliceg=f4; 7; 3; 10; 13; 14; 15g
 After execution of node 15: CallSliceStack = f;g; ActiveCallSlice = f;g
 Before execution of node 16: CallSliceStack = f16g; ActiveCallSlice = f16g
 After execution of node 5: RecDefCon(5) = f5 [RecDefV ar(bx:b)[
ActiveCallSliceg = f5; 4; 7; 3; 10; 13; 14; 15; 16g
 Before execution of node 6: CallSliceStack = ff16g, f6 [ RecDefCon(5) [
ActiveCallSlicegg = f16; 6; 5; 4; 7; 3; 10; 13; 14; 15; 16g,
ActiveCallSlice = f6; 5; 4; 7; 3; 10; 13; 14; 15; 16g
 After execution of node 1: RecDefV ar(bx:a) = f1 [RecDefV ar(bx:a)
[ RecDefV ar(bx:b) [ ActiveCallSliceg = f1; 2; 10; 4; 7; 3; 13; 14; 15; 5; 6; 16g
 After execution of node 6: CallSliceStack = f16g, ActiveCallSlice = f16g
 After execution of node 7: RecDefV ar(bx:b) = f7 [ RecDefV ar(bx:b) [
ActiveCallSliceg = f7; 4; 3; 10; 13; 14; 15; 16g
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 After execution of node 16: CallSliceStack = f;g; ActiveCallSlice = f;g
The dynamic slice of an object is the union of the dynamic slices of its data mem-
bers. The data structure RecDefVar(v) stores the dynamic slice of a variable v. For
example, the dynamic slice of bx after the execution of node 16 is given by
DynamicSlice(16; bx) = fRecDefV ar(bx:a) [ RecDefV ar(bx:b)g
=f 1, 2, 10, 4, 7, 3, 13, 14, 15, 5, 6, 16 g [ f 7, 4, 3, 10, 13, 14, 15, 16 g= f 1, 2, 10,
4, 7, 3, 13, 14, 15, 5, 6, 16 g. Proper inspection or review is required only for these
statements instead of the whole program in order to nd the bugs in object bx.
A node will be added to the inuence set of an object, if the node is using a node
that belongs to the dynamic slice of that object. We have checked this in Statement
2.3 of ITDS algorithm. After the execution of the program is completed, the in-
uence set for object bx is computed as inuence set(bx)= f 10,13,15,16,1,4,5,6,7 g.
So, inuence value(bx)=(9/19)*100=47%.
Severity Analysis
For each failure mode of a component within a scenario, we identify the worst con-
sequences on the system, service or customer and determine the seriousness of the
worst eect. It is called the severity of the failure mode. The severity weights of
0.25, 0.50, 0.75, and 0.95 are assigned to Minor, Marginal, Major, and Catastrophic
severity classes respectively as suggested in [82]. We consider only the highest sever-
ity among the severities of all failure modes of a component within a scenario. For
example, the severity of the failure of function dispenseCash(amount) of component
CashDispenser within withdraw scenario is decided from Table 6.1. As we consider
Table 6.1: Failure mode of dispenseCash() of component CashDispenser
Potential Failure Mode Eect of failure Severity Cause of Failure
Does not dispense cash Customer is dissatised Major Insucient cash but no
message to the customer
Dispense too much cash Bank looses money Catastrophic Loading procedure is
wrong or Bills stuck
together
Takes too long time to dis-
pense cash
Customer becomes irri-
tated
Minor Heavy computer network
trac
only the software failures and not the hardware failures, only the rst failure mode,
Does not dispense cash is considered. The failure might be due to a fault in showing
an insucient cash alert message by CashDispenser component.
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Criticality computation for a component
We compute the criticality of a component by combining two factors of the component
within a scenario: (i) inuence value and (ii) severity.
Actually in the run time environment, we deal with objects instead of components.
We get the inuence value and severity for an object within a scenario. If multiple
objects of a component exist within a scenario then, inuence of the component refers
to the highest inuence value among the inuence values of all objects of the same
component. Similarly, the severity of the component refers to the highest severity
value among all severity values assigned to various services of dierent objects of the
component within the scenario.
The criticality of a component ci within a scenario Sj is computed as follows.
criticality(ci
j) = influence(ci
j) severity(cij) (6.1)
where, influence(ci
j) and severity(ci
j) represent the inuence value and severity of
component ci within scenario Sj. The normalized criticality of component ci within
scenario Sj, crit(ci
j), is obtained by normalizing the criticality of component ci with
respect to the sum of criticality for all active components within the scenario Sj i.e.
crit(ci
j) =
criticality(ci
j)Pn
k=1 criticality(ck
j)
(6.2)
Once, the criticality of a component within a scenario is decided, we add the
criticality of the component within various scenarios and obtain the criticality of
the component within the entire system. For this, the extra input we require is
the execution probability of various scenarios within the system. The execution
probability of a scenario is estimated through operational prole of the system. The
criticality of a component within a system is computed as follows.
criticality(ci) =
nosX
j=1
(crit(ci
j) p(j)) (6.3)
where, crit(ci
j) is the normalized criticality of component ci within j-th scenario,
p(j) is the execution probability of j-th scenario and nos is the number of scenarios
within a system. crit(ci
j)=0, if the component ci is not used within j-th scenario.
We obtain the normalized criticality of a component within a system using Equation
6.2.
Now, we apply our proposed approach on ATM case study. For simplicity, we
consider only the main scenario of a use case. As, we consider only one scenario of a
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Table 6.2: Execution Probability of various use cases of ATM
Use Case withdraw inquiry deposit transfer
Probability 0.7 0.2 0.05 0.05
use case, the execution probability of a use case is assigned to its main scenario. We
assume the execution probabilities of various use cases of ATM as given in Table 6.2.
Table 6.3 shows the normalized criticality of various components within the scenario
of withdraw use case. It shows that Withdrawal component is the most critical. Sim-
Table 6.3: Normalized criticality of various components within withdraw scenario
Comp Withdrawal Session CD CC CR NB Receipt Message
Crit 0.24 0.21 0.12 0.08 0.13 0.17 0.02 0.03
CD: CashDispenser; CC: CustomerConsole; CR: CardReader; NB: NetworkToBank
ilarly, the components Session and NetworkToBank have also high inuence values
within the scenario.
We have computed the criticality of various components within the whole sys-
tem using Equation 6.3 and observed that the components Session, NetworkToBank,
CardReader, Withdrawal and CustomerConsole are critical than others, within the
ATM system.
Priority assignment and testing
In this cycle, we prioritize the components within a system according to their criti-
cality. At the unit level, the percentage of code coverage for various components are
decided based on their priority values. For example, 100% statement coverage and
90% decision coverage may be conducted for the highest critical component whereas,
it may be less for a component having low criticality. Similarly, at the time of inte-
gration testing, 90% parameter and 80% interface coverage may be conducted for a
high critical object whereas it may be low for others.
At the time of system testing, the test cases are selected keeping in mind that the
high priority components will be executed a number of times compared to others.
Hence, the cost of a test case1 is considered as the sum of the criticality of various
components that are covered by the test case. The cost of a test case Ti, denoted as
Cost(Ti), is expressed as follows.
Cost(Ti) =
X
Ck2exe set(Ti)
priority(Ck) (6.4)
1A test case at the system level is designed to execute one scenario.
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where, exe set(Ti) is the set of components that are covered by Ti and priority(Ck)
is the criticality of k-th component, Ck, in the set exe set(Ti). Suppose the testing
team developed a test suite TS0 and tested an initial build BD0 for the system under
test. Some defects were detected and xed. This created a new build BD1. When
a new build is developed, two possibilities may arise; either the testing team cannot
x all the detected defects or generate new defects at the time of xing the detected
defects. So, in each test cycle, a sequence of test suites TS0, TS1,..TSk are generated
for testing a sequence of builds BD0, BD1,...,BDk. It is expected that the quality of
k-th build is higher than (k-1)th build. The test manager decides how many builds
to generate based on the test budget and test time. Once a test cycle is complete,
the latest build (BDk) is submitted to the second cycle for testing.
6.1.2 Second test cycle
There is a chance of occurrence of new defects at the time of correcting an existing
defect. In this cycle, we consider the failure rate of use case scenarios in the previous
cycle. For each failed scenario, we detect the failure point by identifying the faulty
component, which is responsible for the failure. The detected bug might be xed in
the previous test cycle. Some detected bugs might not be xed in the same cycle
or new bugs might be introduced at the time of xing the detected bugs. So, in
this cycle, we prioritize the components according to their frequency of failures in
the previous test cycle. For this, we also consider the number of defects found in
each component in the previous cycle. First, we extract the objects that have failed
more than once in the previous test cycle. We put them in a set called Failed-Set.
Each element of the set consists of two attributes: (i) Name of the object (ii) Failure
frequency. Then, we extract the dynamic slice of each object of the Failed-Set based
on our proposed ITDS algorithm. It helps us to extract the dependent objects of the
said object for testing.
We rst extract the objects one by one according to their priority and compute
the dynamic slice of the object based on our proposed ITDS algorithm, discussed
in Section 6.1.1. It gives us the dependent objects of the said object. During the
testing phase, we give importance not only to the failed objects but also to the set of
objects that are dependent on the failed objects. It is because, these objects might
be infected through the failed objects.
As the priority criteria is changed in this cycle, the priority values of some com-
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ponents may be changed. We check the component's coverage report of the previous
cycle. If the required level of coverage of a component in this cycle is already covered
in the previous test cycle, then there is nothing to do. Otherwise new test cases are
executed in this cycle for the component to cover it upto the desired level. In this
cycle, we again conduct unit, integration and system testing. We explain it through
ATM case study. We check the failure history of each component of ATM in this cycle
and observe that the components Transfer and Session get higher priority and also
equal priority. We check their code coverage history and nd that the percentage of
code coverage conducted for component Transfer is not covered as per its priority in
this cycle. New test cases are required for the code coverage of component Transfer
in this cycle. There is no need of test case generation for component Session because
the required percentage of code coverage for the component in this cycle is already
conducted upto the desired level in previous cycle due to its high criticality. Table
6.3 shows the estimated criticality of various components. We design new test cases
only for component Transfer and cover it upto the desired level in this cycle. We
again conduct integration and system testing as in the previous cycle.
6.1.3 Third test cycle
In this cycle, we conduct a value-based testing [20] with an aim to get a high return
on investment and to improve the customer satisfaction on testing. To conduct a
value-based testing, it is required to know the business value associated with a high
level requirement/feature. A feature is a characteristic or attribute of a product for
which work must be done to develop it and deliver it. A feature within a software
provides some business value. A feature of a product is delivered to the customer with
a hope to get some benet for a reasonable cost. For a feature, the value is roughly
dened as the amount the stake holder is willing to pay for the implementation of
the feature.
Business value is estimated based on the relationship among satisfying needs, ex-
pectations and the resources required to achieve them [20]. The stake holder decides
what is his/her requirement and what he gets for what he pays. From various sources,
the domain expert rst collects the list of requirements, which are important for the
customer and the end-user. The tester and the domain expert sit together and prior-
itize the requirements for testing based on the business value that come from market
and from customer. From a business point of view, test eort distribution should be
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conducted based on the return on investment. The failure of a high level requirement
may cause a great loss to the stake holder and to the organization. Hence, a feature
with high business value is assigned high priority in this cycle. During the testing
phase, the contribution of business helps to increase the return on investment.
According to Wiegers [44], Business Importance shows the business value of a fea-
ture. It is the weighted sum of two factors: the benet of including a feature within
a system and the penalty of not including the feature within the system. Benet
is associated with the requirements of the product's business. Penalty is associated
with the consequence that the customer or business would suer if the feature is not
included. Both the benet and penalty are judged by the customer representatives
of the software. For example, failing to comply with a government regulation could
acquire a high penalty even if the customer benet is low. The set of requirements
with a low benet and a low penalty add cost but little value. As benet and penalty
are two factors associated with Business Importance, we dene the weights of the
features as a vector [1].
Weights of Business Importance =
24Wb
Wp
35,
where Wb and Wp specify the weights associated with benet and penalty, respec-
tively. The Total Business Importance is dened as follow:
Total Business Importance =Wb Benefit+Wp  Penalty (6.5)
We get the Total Business Importance on the basis of individual ranking of the
benet and penalty of a working feature. We get the normalized Business Importance
for a feature by normalizing the Total Business Importance. Figure 6.3 [1] shows the
process for estimating the business importance for various features within a product.
In the gure, Business Importance index shows the variations in business values of a
product over a period of time.
The business values for various use cases of ATM are shown in Table 2.1. We con-
sider only the use cases that are used by the customer. ATMStartup and ATMShut-
down use cases are not considered as they are the basic use cases to run the system.
In this cycle, our aim is to assign priorities to the use case scenarios according
to their business values. Unlike the previous test cycles, we do not prioritize the
components in this cycle. We assign priorities to use case scenarios and conduct
only system testing. For each use case, we consider only one scenario; the successful
scenario. The cost of a test case at the system level is decided based on the priority
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Figure 6.3: Business Importance estimation
of a scenario.
6.2 Experimental Studies
We have implemented our proposed multi cycle-based test eort prioritization ap-
proach on three case studies and checked the eectiveness of our approach by com-
paring it with a related approach. We empirically evaluate our approach through
ATM, LMS and SMA case studies, explained in Chapter 4.
In order to verify the eectiveness of our approach, we have carried out a series
of experiments on the case studies. It has been shown that mutation testing is an
eective practice for measuring the eciency of a testing method [106]. A mutant
is said to be killed when it is executed by a test case and the test case fails. We
have selected seven number of class mutation operators in our experiment from the
mutant model [93]. These operators are mainly designed to modify object-oriented
features such as inheritance, polymorphism, dynamic binding and encapsulation.
The mutants are selected after a very careful consideration of various types of unit
level and integration level faults that may occur during source code implementation.
The considered mutation operators are (i) Compatible Reference Type (CRT) (ii)
Instance Creation Expression (ICE) (iii) method Parameter Order Change (POC)
(iv) Overriding Method Removal (OMR) (v) Access Modier Changes (AMC) (vi)
Exception Handler Removal (EHR) (vii) Exception Handling Change (EHC). These
operators are already explained in Chapter 5. Table 6.4 shows the various types of
mutants considered for each case study.
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Table 6.4: Various types of mutants applied to our case studies
Mutant Operators LIS ATM SMA
CRT 5 8 4
ICE 8 6 2
POC 7 12 9
OMR 6 7 3
AMC 5 2 1
EHR 9 13 0
EHC 13 8 2
Total 53 56 21
We compare our approach with Musa's approach [9] as our aim is to improve
the reliability of a system under test which is similar to Musa's approach. We made
two copies of the source code of each case study. Musa's approach is applied to
a copy of the source code of a case study, called Copy1 and our proposed multi
cycle-based testing approach is applied to the other copy of the source code, called
Copy2. Musa's approach is basically a black box approach, which assigns test eort
to various high level functions based on operational prole. We have extended it from
function level to component level and assigned priority values to various components
based on their execution probabilities. This helps us to test rigorously the highly
executed components during unit testing.
Same testing time was allocated to both the copies. For both the copies, we have
used two well known testing criteria based on control-ow: all-nodes (all-primary-
nodes2 and all-secondary-nodes3) and all-edges (all-primary-edges4 and all-secondary-
edges5) at the unit and integration level. At the time of unit testing, our aim is 100%
statement coverage and 70%-99% decision coverage depending on the priority of com-
ponents. Similarly, at the time of integration testing, our aim is 70%-95% parameter
coverage and 60%-80% interface coverage. We use the testing tool JaBUTi [109] to
show the percentage of code coverage by a test case. The tool also works as a guide
line at the time of generating test cases. It helps to get the various types of com-
plexity through static analysis of the source code, which are required for estimating
the number of test cases required for a component. Figure 6.4 shows the complexity
metrics obtained by JaBUTi for various components of ATM case study. Figure 6.5
shows (a) the source code of test cases executed to test component Transaction at
unit level, (b) the execution result of test cases for component Transaction and (iii)
2Statements that are not related with exception-handling mechanism.
3Statements that are related with exception handling.
4The evaluation of each conditional expressions as true and false.
5For each possibility of raise of an exception, the execution of exception-handler.
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Figure 6.4: Complexity metrics of ATM obtained through JaBUTi
the coverage report by an individual test case through JaBUTi test tool. Table 6.5
shows the fault detection capabilities of the two dierent prioritization methodap-
proaches, our approach and Musa's approach.
Table 6.5: Mutants killed by the two dierent testing approaches
Mutant Operators Our approach Musa's approach [9]
LIS ATM SMA LIS ATM SMA
CRT 4 7 3 4 5 2
ICE 6 5 2 5 3 1
POC 6 11 7 5 9 6
OMR 5 5 2 5 4 2
AMC 4 1 1 4 2 1
EHR 7 11 0 5 10 0
EHC 11 6 1 9 5 1
Total 43 46 16 37 38 13
From Table 6.5, it is observed that more mutants were killed in our approach
than Musa's approach. As our approach considers the inuence value of an object
and also gives importance to the faulty objects from the test history, more number
of faults were detected in our approach than Musa's approach. However, it is not
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(a) Source code of a test case to test
Transaction class
(b) Execution Result of test cases
(c) Coverage Report by individual test case
Figure 6.5: Test Case execution result and coverage report of component
Transaction in ATM
true that a testing approach which is eective in detecting faults is also eective in
improving the reliability of a system. The reliability of a system is not related to
the number of existing faults in a system under test, but related to the probability
that a fault leads to a failure which occurs during software execution [9, 13, 14]. It
is because, the data input supplied by the user decides which parts of the source
code will be executed. An error existing in the non-executed parts will not aect the
output.
We conducted a series of experiments for assessing the reliability of the outcome of
the two discussed approaches after completion of the testing processes. The software
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reliability of a system, R, is calculated as given below.
R =
mX
i=1
pi i (6.6)
where, pi and i represent the execution probability and failure rate of i
th sub-domain
respectively.
i is computed as follows:
i =
1
ni
niX
j=1
zij (6.7)
where, zij represents the execution result of a test case which is selected from i
th
sub-domain for jth time. The value of zij is 1, if a failure is observed else the value is
0. ni is the total number of test cases selected from i
th sub-domain and
Pm
i=1 ni = n,
where n is the total number of test cases executed in the system and m is the total
number of sub-domains of the input domain.
Table 6.6 is a subset of test cases that are designed for ATM case study. Table
6.7 shows the reliability computed for the tested source codes that are obtained by
using our approach and Musa's approach, respectively. In this table, Copy1 is the
source code that is tested by Musa's approach [9] and Copy2 is the source code that
is tested by our multi cycle-based approach.
6.2.1 Result analysis and discussion
From Table 6.7, we observed that high reliability is observed in Copy2 compared to
Copy1, in each case study. We discuss some situations in which the testing based
on Operational Prole implemented in Musa's approach is not giving good result.
For example, consider a situation. Suppose, there is a fault in a method m which
is executed for a short duration. The return value of m is saved and used by some
frequently executed methods of other components. If methodm returns a wrong value
then, the failure of the system will be high. In this situation, the fault in method m
may not be detected as the method is getting less attention in Musa's approach due to
low execution probability. It is better explained through the graphical representation
of a simple example instead of going to the details of the case studies. Consider the
sequence diagrams shown in Figure 6.6. Suppose the execution probabilities of SD1
and SD2 are 80% and 20% respectively. The average execution time of class D is
the lowest as it is used only in SD1, but the inuence value is high as it is providing
services to a number of classes. As shown in Figure 6.6a, the returned value of class D
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Table 6.6: Test cases designed to test various use cases of ATM case study
Use case Function to be
tested
Initial condi-
tion
Test data Expected Output
Session Read ATM card of
a customer
System is on
and no card is
inserted to the
system
A card is inserted System accepts the
card and asks for PIN
number
Read an invalid
card
same An invalid card is inserted System ejects the card
and display a message
in a new screen
Accepts the en-
tered PIN
System is ask-
ing to enter the
pin
PIN is entered System displays a
transaction menu.
Perform a transac-
tion
A transaction
menu is dis-
played
a transaction is performed System displays a new
screen asking whether
to continue another
transaction.
withdraw Choose an account
for withdraw
Transaction
menu is dis-
played
Withdraw transaction is cho-
sen
System displays a
menu of account types.
Enter Dollar
amount to with-
draw
Menu of ac-
count type is
displayed
Checking account is chosen System displays a new
screen to enter amount
for withdraw.
Perform a with-
draw transaction
properly
A screen is dis-
played to en-
ter amount for
withdraw
An amount is entered which is
not exceeding the total balance
of the account and the required
amount is currently available
in the cash dispenser.
CashDispenser dis-
penses the entered
amount of cash. Sys-
tem prints a receipt
showing amount and
correct updated bal-
ance. Transaction is
recorded in the Log.
Table 6.7: Reliability assessment based on two dierent testing strategies
Case Study n TestedCode Reliability
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R-
ATM 100 Copy1 0.801357 0.800048 0.788101 0.810551 0.811930 0.8023974
Copy2 0.839137 0.851994 0.8428719 0.8379159 0.851109 0.84460556
150 Copy1 0.819388 0.816765 0.819539 0.82117456 0.818901 0.819153312
Copy2 0.840019 0.849270 0.851140 0.842059 0.849718 0.8464412
200 Copy1 0.829901 0.821617 0.820007 0.823166 0.832949 0.825528
Copy2 0.847823 0.839691 0.848823 0.850018 0.848388 0.8469486
LMS 100 Copy1 0.890012 0.9019256 0.890081 0.899901 0.902135 0.89681092
Copy2 0.930936 0.940019 0.943211 0.930089 0.929908 0.9348326
150 Copy1 0.891107 0.902517 0.900168 0.900151 0.899079 0.8986044
Copy2 0.941132 0.951108 0.927940 0.949029 0.941187 0.9420792
200 Copy1 0.899567 0.902311 0.899855 0.899129 0.896635 0.8994994
Copy2 0.948783 0.921908 0.942879 0.950125 0.940057 0.9447504
SMA 100 Copy1 0.901571 0.915189 0.907651 0.910089 0.901213 0.9071426
Copy2 0.963219 0.958199 0.960001 0.951081 0.948613 0.9562226
150 Copy1 0.902335 0.912877 0.912048 0.908901 0.913687 0.9099696
Copy2 0.957186 0.951928 0.952887 0.959931 0.960896 0.9565656
200 Copy1 0.910093 0.918119 0.908931 0.913913 0.913719 0.912955
Copy2 0.959629 0.959138 0.960019 0.958913 0.951584 0.9578566
Copy1:Code tested by Musa's approach; Copy2: Code tested by our multi cycle-based approach; Ri:The reliability
obtained at i-th run; R-:=
P5
i=1(Ri)
5
is used in class B, C and A, directly or indirectly. If class D will return incorrect value,
the highly executed classes A, B and C will be aected. It will increase the failure
rate of the overall system. Class D is getting less attention in Musa's approach due
to its low execution time. As we are considering the inuence value of an object as
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one factor for test eort prioritization, class D is not neglected in our test approach.
It gets appropriate test eort. Another thing is that we have not explicitly shown the
(a) SD1 (b) SD2
Figure 6.6: Two sample sequence diagrams
severity of a failure in the experimental result. Reliability estimation only considers
the number of failures, the severity of a failure is not considered. The reliability
calculated in Table 6.7 gives equal weight to each failure. In a real life application, it
is observed that the eect is critical for some failures. As we consider the severity of a
failure within a scenario in the rst test cycle and business value in the third cycle, a
number of important faults were detected and xed in due time in our approach. All
the inserted faults could not be covered in both the copies of the source code, within
the allocated testing time. We checked the impact of the observed failures during
reliability assessment. Some marginal and minor failures were observed in Copy 2
which was tested by our approach whereas, some major failures were observed in
Copy 1 which was tested by Musa's approach. One such major failure found in
the tested copy through Musa's approach is just explained below using LMS case
study. Instance Creation Expression (ICE) mutant creates an object of same type or
dierent type with dierent initial states. We observed a failure in Copy 1 at the time
of creating a new user (Borrower). In LMS, the borrowers are students (graduates,
post-graduates) and sta. The sub-classes of sta are: (i) teaching stas (professors,
assistant professors, lecturers) and (ii) non-teaching stas. They are classied to
various groups according to the access privileges to various system resources. As per
the business rule of our case study, LMS, post-graduate students and teaching stas
are only allowed to access journals and transactions. Due to an ICE mutant, the
system allowed a non-teaching sta to issue a journal.
As we included severity analysis as one attribute for testing and considered the
business value of a scenario, such types of major failures were not observed in the
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tested source code obtained using our approach. Now, we discuss one minor failure
that was observed in Copy 2 of ATM case study. Copy 2 was tested through our
approach. We have inserted an invalid card. The system has opened the transac-
tion screen and allowed for a transaction instead of ejecting the card, though any
transaction was not performed with the invalid card. This is shown in Figure 6.7.
From the log le shown in Figure 6.7b, it is observed that neither the deposit nor the
(a) ATM screen (b) ATM log
Figure 6.7: A minor failure in ATM
withdraw transaction is performed in Card# 4, but the system is not ejecting the
card after recognizing an invalid card. As shown in Figure 6.7a, only the card was
ejected when, the user did not want to continue any transaction further.
6.3 Summary
In this chapter, we have proposed a multi cycle-based test eort prioritization ap-
proach for improving the reliability of a system. Our aim is to minimize the critical
faults in a system which are responsible for frequent or severe failures in the opera-
tional environment. We have computed the criticality of a component and prioritized
the components according to their criticality in the rst test cycle. In the second
test cycle, the components are prioritized based on their failure history and fault
detection history. In the third test cycle, the scenarios are prioritized based on their
business values. Based on our analytical comparison, we found that the objects with
higher criticality indeed determine the probability of failure to a large extent. We
have validated our claim through a series of experiments. From our experimental
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results, it is concluded that by spending extra time and eort in key objects of a
system compared to others at the time of testing, the reliability of the system can be
improved within the available test budget. The tester gets the best possible chance to
reveal the important bugs at the early phase of testing that are occurring frequently
or have a negative impact on the user. Since, we have considered the impact of a
failure within a scenario, our approach not only helps to increase the reliability of a
system, but also minimizes the occurrences of severe types of post-release failures.
Planing at the high level enhances the decision on resource allocation. Estimating
the criticality of an architectural element helps both the system analyst and the test
manager in planing suitable provision for the crucial elements. If the critical elements
are detected at the early phase of software development life cycle then, it will be useful
in allotting resources in afterward development phase.
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Chapter 7
Ranking Use Cases for Testing
A use case is related to a set of requirements. Cockburn [113] states that, "people
seem to consider use cases to be the central element of the requirements or even
the central element of the project's development process". For both developer and
customer, use case is treated as a semantically meaningful function that provides
some value from the user's point of view. As the use cases are available in early
iterations, test plan can begin early. An empirical research [19, 77] on early eort
estimation have proposed various methods for estimating development eort, but the
estimation of test eort is overlooked. A software product can be lunched in due time
with sucient testing, if a test plan is prepared early.
Musa [9] suggested that a tester should select test cases according to the frequency
or probability of operational use, for achieving a better reliability. We give an example
of test eort distribution among various use cases of an application based on their
execution probabilities only. First, the test manager decides how many test cases are
required to design based on dierent test variables such as expected time taken to
design and run a single test case, time taken to nd a bug, time taken to correct a
bug and the estimated test budget. Suppose, the following data are given for the
estimation of test eorts for LMS case study.
1. To design and run one test takes 2 hours.
2. 10 percent of tests nd bugs.
3. Each fault takes 8 hours to correct.
4. Test budget = 1000 hours.
Then, the total number of test cases, T, is decided as: 2  T + (0:1  T  8) = 1000,
i.e. T=358.
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Suppose, the execution probability of IssueItem use case is 0.1. The total number
of test cases assigned to it is 0:1  358 = 36. In this case, test eort distribution is
purely a black box approach and the architectural information of use cases are not
used for distributing test cases.
Test eort allocation based on only operational prole does not give accurate
results always. We present a simple example to explain it. Suppose, for a program
under test, the input domain is divided into two sub-domains with equal size. The
execution probability of the rst one is 49% and the second one is 51%. Further, we
assume that the rst one contains 50 and the second one contains 200 failure-causing
test cases. Suppose, each failure has equal eect on the system. In this case, the test
eort distribution based on operational prole will not help to achieve high reliability.
As the execution probabilities of both the sub-domains are nearly equal, each will get
almost equal test eort though, the second input sub-domain is more failure-prone
than the rst input sub-domain.
A complex program might contain more number of faults compared to a simple
program [55]. As the factor complexity is the most important bug generator, the
complexity metric is used as a parameter for testing [56, 57]. The complexity can
vary from one use case to another. In a moderate size application, a simple use case
generally takes at most 5 number of steps for its success scenario and its implemen-
tation also involves less number of classes. A complex use case takes at least 10
number of steps and its implementation also involves a number of classes. The job of
a test manager is to estimate the complexities associated with various use cases and
consider the complexity as an important factor at the time of test planing. Though,
the estimation of complexity for high level functions at the analysis stage is a tough
task, it is better to estimate it as early as possible and rene it in the low level rather
than delaying the test estimation and proceeding it in an unplanned fashion. To
estimate the complexity of a use case in a quantitative manner at the architectural
level, it is required to understand both the structural and functional details of a use
case. Complexity estimation at the architectural level helps to estimate the test eort
required for a use case, before its implementation and hence, an eective testing can
be conducted within the available test resources.
At the time of realization of a use case, many interacting objects change their
states and dierent values of an operational variable force the system to behave
dierently. Many conditions are checked to execute various scenarios within a use
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case. Dierent types of messages such as synchronous and asynchronous pass at the
realization of a use case, within a system. Out of these messages, some are critical
to the sender and failure of these massages may cause severe damage to the whole
system. In a distributed system, dierent components reside in dierent nodes and
communicate through networks, that increase the probability of connector failures.
Due to the architectural dependencies among use cases within a system, some use
cases execute in parallel whereas, some execute serially. We analyze the structural
and behavioral aspects of a use case and estimate its complexity in a quantitative
manner. For this, we collect information from sequence diagrams that are realized
for the use cases, state chart diagrams of various components that are activated at
the execution of the use case, class diagrams and deployment diagrams of the system
under test. Deployment diagrams are required in case of distributed systems. The
ability to quantify the complexity of a use case at the analysis stage helps in rening
the resource estimation and creates an acceptable quality standard.
Though, the complexity of a use case is related to its fault density, the observed
failures within a system are also related to the execution probabilities of various
use cases that lead a fault to a failure. The main objective of software testing is to
improve the reliability rather than to detect defects. For this, the test cases should be
selected based on both the criteria: (i) defect distribution and (ii) how the software is
used. Defect distribution is estimated based on the complexity of the system and the
expected use of a software is decided based on the operational prole of the system.
To identify the failure-prone use cases, we consider the execution probability of a use
case along with its estimated complexity and call it Occurrence Complexity (OC).
There is a close relationship between testing and business value of a high level
function that comes from market or from customers [43]. Each use case of a system
should not be treated with equal importance [97]. Keeping this in view, we propose
a test eort prioritization method to estimate the test priority for a use case within
a system on the basis of its factors- (i) complexity, (ii) execution probability and (iii)
business value (Value). The use cases of a system are ranked according to their
priority values. Our proposed prioritization method provides a path to discover
the truly critical use cases. This ranking method helps the developer and the test
manager to take a decision on test eort distribution in a critical environment, where
the customer's expectation is high on the overall quality of the system, timelines
are short and resources are limited. It is observed that some use cases with high
106
7.1 Complexity Factors Ranking Use Cases for Testing
complexity are less valuable to the organization. The balancing strategy is to assign
less eort to low ranked use cases. It can save the resources which can be used for
high ranked use cases. As the important use cases are getting a chance to be tested
rigorously through our proposed approach, the reliability of the system under test is
improved.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: We have proposed some factors
aecting the complexity of a use case in Section 7.1. We compute the complexity of
a use case on the basis of the proposed factors and compute the priority for the use
case in Section 7.2. We have conducted a lot of experiments and validated our claim
in Section 7.3. The summary of the chapter is discussed in Section 7.4.
7.1 Complexity Factors
When the test plan is made before coding, at the design level, the test manager
considers the architecturally relevant aspects. The diculty lies in analyzing all the
architecturally relevant aspects of a use case and ranking it appropriately.
We propose the following eight factors that aect the complexity of a use case.
These factors are described with examples in subsequent sections.
1. Sum of complexities of linearly independent paths within a SD.
2. Number of test paths generated within a SD.
3. Number of critical messages transmitted within a SD.
4. Number of operational variables used within a SD.
5. Length of the longest Maximum Message Sequence (MMS) within a SD.
6. Number of external links used within a SD.
7. Number of polymorphic calls within a SD.
8. Architectural dependencies among use cases.
These above proposed complexity factors are explained with examples in the following
sections.
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7.1.1 Sum of complexities of Linearly Independent Paths
within a SD
Cyclomatic-complexity is dened as the number of linearly independent paths1 in a
graph. There is a strong correlation between the cyclomatic-complexity measure and
the number of bugs in a program [99]. In this section, we generate the Control Flow
Graph (CFG) of a SD and count the number of linearly independent paths within the
SD and then, estimate the complexity of each path in terms of test eort required.
The sum of complexity of all linearly independent paths is the complexity of the SD
of the use case. The test manager allocates test eort to the use cases based on their
estimated complexity. Higher the complexity of a SD, more test eort is required to
test it.
First, the Control Flow Analysis (CFA) of the SD is performed to get the CFG.
CFG is used to extract the basic individual paths within a SD. It is the source
of estimation for testing. It is named as Concurrent Control Flow Graph (CCFG)
instead of CFG, due to the presence of asynchronous and parallel messages within
a SD [114]. At the time of execution of a synchronous message, the caller waits
for the reply message from the callee. The caller could not initiate any message in
between, but in an asynchronous message, the caller does not wait for reply message.
It proceeds immediately and cause a concurrent control ow in the SD. Another event
for a concurrent control ow is the interaction operator par. It is used to support
parallel execution of a set of interacting components by causing a number of threads
of control. Figure 7.1a shows an example of a SD with par interaction operator
and Figure 7.1b shows an example of a SD with asynchronous message. Figure 7.1a
is a part of the SD that implements Issue Item use case of LMS case study. The
object IssueController controls the issue of a book. States of the objects Book and
LogRegister, need to be updated when a book is issued. The controller sends two
messages in parallel, one to Book and one to LogRegister object. Now, these two
messages run concurrently. So, the CCFG of a SD is aected by the interaction
operator par, which causes at least two concurrent threads of control.
In CCFG, each message of SD represents a node. Once the CCFG of a SD is
generated as shown in Figure 7.2, we extract all linearly independent Concurrent
Control Flow Paths (CCFPs) of the CCFG for testing. CCFP is a control ow path
with extra feature: sub-paths are added in CCFG due to concurrent control ow.
1A path is linearly independent within a graph if it introduces a node of the graph that is not
included in any other linearly independent paths.
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Parallel and asynchronous messages cause concurrent control ow at the execution
of a scenario within a SD. The concurrency within a CCFG is identied through fork
and join nodes. In a CCFP, an open and close parenthesis represent fork and join
nodes respectively. A CCFP within a CCFG is a path which includes all sub-paths
going out from a fork node. It includes a path from the start node to the end node
containing all residing nodes in the path. There can be a number of CCFPs in a
CCFG. In our example, as there is no condition in the SD (see Figure 7.1b), we get
only one linearly independent path in the CCFG shown in Figure 7.2 and call it 1.
It is given below.
1 = m1r1m2m3
0BBB@
m4r4
m5
0@ m6
r5
1A
1CCCA r2
(a) SD with parallel message (b) SD with asynchronous message
Figure 7.1: SDs with asynchronous and parallel messages
To estimate the complexity associated with a CCFG, we require two inputs: (i)
the number of linearly independent paths and (ii) the complexity of each path. The
complexity of a path is determined by checking the number of simple nodes and fork
nodes (concurrent sub-paths) in a path. If there is a couple of concurrent sub-paths
in a path then, extra eort is required to test the path. It is because, testing of
a concurrent path is not straight forward. Concurrent bugs are dicult to detect
due to the nondeterministic behavior exhibited by parallel applications. Even if
these bugs are detected, it is also a dicult process to reproduce them consistently.
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Figure 7.2: CCFG of Figure 7.1b
Further, after a bug is xed, it is also a dicult job to ensure that the bug is corrected
truly and not simply masked. The concurrent bugs are categorized as race conditions,
incorrect mutual exclusions, and memory reordering. We cannot immediately observe
the consequences of a race condition. It might be visible after some time or in a totally
dierent part of the program. There is also a need to synchronize the operations
between threads. For this, extra overhead is required. As extra test eort is required
for a concurrent node, we assign high weight to a concurrent node compared to a
simple node, at the time of calculating complexity for a path. We assign weight of
5 to a concurrent node (node under a fork) and weight of 1 to a simple node. The
complexity of path 1 of Figure 7.2 is calculated as 1  5 + (3 + 2  5)  5 = 70: The
complexity of a CCFG is the sum of complexities of its paths. It is given by
Complexity(CCFG) =
nX
i=1
(Complexity(CCFPi))
where, Complexity(CCFP i) is the complexity of CCFP i of the CCFG and n is the
number of paths in CCFG.
Now, we consider some use cases of LMS case study. Figure 7.3 shows the SD of
the use case Remove Title of LMS. The actor for this use case is the Librarian and
the input is the ISBN of the book. The pre-conditions for the use case are: (i) the
title is not in reserved condition and (ii) no item of the title is issued by any borrower.
The post-condition is: (i) the title will be removed from the library database along
with its all items, after the successful execution of the use case. Now, we get the
number of linearly independent paths within the use case. The CCFG of the SD
of the Remove Title use case is shown in Figure 7.4. In the gure, Dn stands for
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Decision node. There is no asynchronous message or parallel message sent by any
object. Hence, there is no concurrent sub-path in a path. All possible paths in the
CCFG are:
1=1, 1.1, 1.2, 1.2.1A, 1.2.1A.1, 3, 3.1
2=1, 1.1, 1.2, 1.2.1, 1.2.1.1, 1.2.1.1, 1.2.1.1.1, (1:2:1:1:2), 2, 2.1, 2.1.1A, 2.1.1A.1,
3, 3.1
3=1, 1.1, 1.2, 1.2.1, 1.2.1.1, 1.2.1.1, 1.2.1.1.1, (1:2:1:1:2), 2, 2.1, 2.1.1, (2:1:1:1), 3,
3.1
The nodes (1:2:1:1:2) and (2:1:1:1) are repeated nodes in path 2 and 3. The
symbol () represents the value  1. The node 1.2.1.1.2 shows that once the given
ISBN matches with the existing Title ID in the database, all the items of that title
are displayed to the user. When a user deletes the Title ID, all items of that title are
destroyed. So, the node 2.1.1.1 is executed for each item of the title. For simplicity,
we consider the repeated nodes only once in a path at the time of computing the
complexity of the path. As there is no concurrent node in any path of the CCFG,
the weight of each node is 1. The complexities of 1, 2 and 3 are 7, 14 and 14,
respectively. The total complexity of the use case Remove Title is 7 + 14 + 14= 35.
Next, we discuss the concurrent path in a CCFG through an example. For this,
we discuss another use case Issue Item of LMS. Figure 7.5 shows the SD of the use
case Issue Item. The actor for this use case is the Librarian and the inputs are UserID
and BookID (Title ID). The pre-conditions for this use case are: (i) the borrower is
eligible to issue a book and (ii) at least a single item of the given Book Title is in
available state. The CCFG of the use case Issue Item is shown in Figure 7.6. The
possible paths are:
1 = Start;

m0;m1;m2;m3
m5;m6;m7;m8

; Stop
2 = Start;

m0;m1;m2;m3
m5;m6;m7;m8

;m10;

m11
m13;m14;m15
m17;m18;m19;m20

; Stop
3 = Start;
 
m0;m1;m2;m3
m5;m6;m7;m8

;m10;

m11
m13;m14;m15
m17;m18;m19;m20

;

m22;m23;m24
m25;m26;m27
m28;m29;m30

;m31; Stop
In 1, there are eight concurrent nodes and two simple nodes. The complexity of 1
is 85+21 = 42. Similarly, the complexities of 2 and 3 of use case Issue Item are
83 and 128, respectively. The total complexity of use case Issue Item is 253. Extra
test eort is required to test use case Issue Item compared to use case Remove Title,
as the complexity of the CCFG of Issue Item is high.
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Figure 7.3: SD for use case Remove Title
Figure 7.4: CCFG of Figure 7.3
7.1.2 Number of Test Paths generated within a SD
We consider all possible test paths within a SD as an inuencing factor for complexity
computation. Each test path is covered by an individual test case. The amount of
test eort required for a use case is decided on the basis of the number of test paths
generated within the SD of the use case. We consider the total number of possible
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Figure 7.5: SD for use case Issue Item
transitions covered by each modal class within a SD as an input for getting the
possible test paths within the SD. An object of a modal class can receive a message
in various states within a scenario and the object may change its state after receiving
the message.
Total number of possible transitions covered by a modal class within a scenario
is derived on the basis of message sequences generated within the SD and the state
chart diagrams of the interacting classes within the scenario. The aim is to give extra
test eort on a use case, in which a number of objects are changing their states by
modifying their attributes repeatedly. Total Number of Test Paths (NTP) generated
within a scenario is calculated by taking the product of transitions covered by each
interacting modal class [115]. It is given by the following equation.
NTP =
nY
i=1
NTi
x; (7.1)
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Figure 7.6: CCFG of the SD of Issue Item use case
In this equation, n represents the total number of modal classes and NTi
x represents
the total number of transitions covered by i-th modal class within scenario Sx. The
total number of possible test paths generated by a use case is obtained by taking the
summation of total number of test paths of the SD that implement the use case.
Now, we have to show the total number of test paths generated within the SD
of use case Issue Item. For this, we should get the total number of state transitions
occurred within the SD. To get this, we need the state chart diagrams of the objects
that are interacting within the SD of the use case. All the required state chart
diagrams are shown in Figure 7.7. For the successful execution of the use case Issue
Item, the Book object may be in the available (B1) state or in the committed (B3)
state at the initial stage. When the issue() function is executed on the object Book
(Refer the SD shown in Figure 7.5 and the state chart diagram of Book shown in
Figure 7.7a), its new state will be Issued.
All possible state transitions of various objects in the use case Issue Item are
shown in Figure 7.8. Let us consider an object of Borrower. At the initial state of
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(a) BOOK (b) RESERVE
(c) BORROWER
Figure 7.7: State chart diagrams of various objects of LMS
Table 7.1: Possible transitions of various objects in Issue Item use case
ObjectName MessageReceived Transitions#
Book issue() 2
Reserve issue() 1
Borrower issue() 4
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Figure 7.8: Possible state transitions of objects in Issue Item use case
Issue Item use case, the object of Borrower will be either in U1 or U3 state as shown
in Figure 7.8. The possible four transitions in the object are: (i) U1! U1, (ii) U1!
U4, (iii) U3 ! U3 and (iv) U3 ! U4. These transitions are extracted by analyzing
the SD of the use case and the state chart diagrams of various interacting objects
within the use case. Table 8.3 shows the total possible transitions of various objects
within the SD of use case Issue Item. From the table, we infer that extra test eort
is required to Borrower object than others. The total number of possible test paths
generated by the successful execution of Issue Item use case is 421 = 8. Only three
messages (m24, m27 and m30) change the states of the interacting objects within
the SD of the use case. There is no state transition by other messages in the SD.
7.1.3 Number of Critical Messages transmitted within a SD
There are certain messages within a SD that are critical to the sender [116]. The
failure of services for those messages may lead to catastrophic consequences. There-
fore, we should check the severity associated with a message within a SD for test
eort prioritization. We check how the failure of receiver aects the sender, within
a SD. The value returned by the receiver may be used by the sender for taking any
important decision. The returned value may be used in some computations in which
the inaccuracy may lead to catastrophic consequences. There are some messages
within a scenario that are providing exception handling of rare but critical condi-
tions. Though, the execution probability of that messages are low, the failure of any
one of them may cause a sever loss to the system. Therefore, we consider the severity
associated with a SD through the criticality of messages. We assign severity to a mes-
sage within a SD on the basis of how the system operation is aected by the failure
or incorrect services provided by the receiving object of the message. At the analysis
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stage, the critical behavior can be identied from domain experts or customers. It is
traced to use cases and then to SDs to identify elements of the system that need to
be analyzed in depth and need to be tested thoroughly.
For example, Figure 7.9 shows the criticality of messages sent from FireDetector
and FireController with tagged value in an automatic Fire Controller System. When
the system detects the unwanted re, it switches o the Oven and inform to the re
department and owner. All three events happen in parallel. The business logic of
this system sets the criticality of the message reAlert() from FireDetector to Fire-
Controller to Very High, since the failure of this message has a catastrophic impact
on the system. FireController sends three messages in parallel. Out of these three,
the message switchO() is Very High, then the message MakeCall() to FireDeptt is
High and MakeCall to Owner is Low. The assignment of criticality to a message is
subjective. It is decided by checking the impact of the failure of the message on the
system. We consider only messages with critical value Very High and High. The
complexity of a SD on the basis of critical messages handled is given below.
#critical messages transmitted
#messages transmitted
 100 (7.2)
Figure 7.9: An example of a SD showing message criticality in a Fire Con-
troller system
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7.1.4 Number of Operational Variables used
An operational variable determines the response of a use case by providing system-
atically the information required for test design. An operational variable can be an
explicit input/output, environmental condition and/or abstraction of state of a sys-
tem under test. For example, the dierent states of an ATM can be ready, out of
cash, out of service etc. These variables play a great role at the time of testing a use
case. Test cases are designed based on operational variables. For example, consider
the establish session use case of ATM system. To establish a new session, a customer
has to insert an ATM card into the card reader slot of the machine. The card reader
reads the inserted card (If the card reader cannot read the card, it ejects it. An
error message is displayed, and the system aborts the session). The system asks the
customer to enter the pin. If the pin is valid then, a connection is established with
the bank and the customer is allowed to perform transactions by selecting from a
menu of possible types of transaction. In the use case (establish session), there are
four operational variables used. These variables are encoded pin in the card, entered
pin by the customer, response of customer bank and state of customer account. At
the time of testing, a tester rst considers each possible operational variable at every
step of use case and determines the domain for each variable. Then, the relationship
among dierent variables are set by the help of a decision table to model the response
of a system. Each row in a decision table is called a variant. Table 7.2 shows the
decision table for use case establish session of ATM. In the table, DC stands for Don't
Care condition. At testing phase, every variant for a use case should be exercised at
least once. For a test suite, the minimal coverage metric is given by:
MinimalCoverage =
#variants tested
#variants
 100: (7.3)
So, a use case with a number of operational variables require a number of test cases
to test the boundary condition of each operational variable. The size of a use case is
proportional to the size of its decision box. For the use case Issue Item of LMS case
study, the decision table is shown in Table 7.3. The number of variants in the said
use case is 7.
7.1.5 Length of the longest Maximum Message Sequence
(MMS)
For the successful execution of a scenario, it is required to know (i) What other classes
might be aected when, one class is not behaving properly or returning wrong value?
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Table 7.2: Decision table for use case establish session
Variants Operational Variables Expected Result
Card Pin Entered
Pin
Customer
Bank Re-
sponse
State of Account Messages
1 InValid NA NA DC Invalid Card
2 Valid Matches
with Card
Pin
Ack. from
Bank
Closed Contact your bank
manager
3 Valid Matches
with Card
Pin
Ack. from
Bank
Open Select a Transac-
tion
4 Valid Matches
with Card
Pin
No Ack.
from Bank
DC Please try later
5 Valid Does nit
match with
Card Pin
DC DC Re-enter Pin
Table 7.3: Decision table for use case Issue Item
Variants Operational Variables Expected Result
Book ID Borrower ID Borrower Sta-
tus
Book Status
1 Not
Valid
NA NA NA Book does not Exist
2 Valid Not Exist NA NA Borrower does not
Exist
3 Valid Exist Suspended NA Membership is ex-
pired
4 Valid Exist Non-Issuable NA Cannot issue further
book
5 Valid Exist Active Privilege
=False
This book cannot be
issued
6 Valid Exist Active Reserved by
others
Another person has
reserved the book
7 Valid Exist Active Available or
Reserved by
self
The book is issued
successfully
(ii) What is the minimal set of classes within a SD that are responsible for a frequent
failure of the use case?
Suppose, there are two events e1 and e2 generated by two dierent objects within
a scenario. The object generating event e2 is dependent on the object generating
event e1, if and only if there exists an execution path, in which triggering event e1
makes the event e2 to trigger, either directly or indirectly. At the time of testing an
event, we have to test the events which are in the dependence set of that event. We
identify the interaction faults through the dependence set of an event. For this, it is
required to know the transitive dependencies among objects within a SD. It is easy
to detect a fault in a direct method call, but dicult in indirect case. This indirect
dependency can be extracted from the ow of messages within a SD. The ow is well
understood from message sequences.
First, we dene a Message Sequence (MS) within a SD. Then, we deneMaximum
Message Sequence (MMS). A MS is a concurrent sequence of messages (call message
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or reply message) within a SD having the rst message is a synchronous call and
the last one is the reply message corresponding to the rst one [116]. A MMS is a
message sequence that is not a subsequence of any other message sequence within
the SD [116]. All possible MSs for the SD shown in Figure 7.1b are fm1, r1g, fm4,
r4g, fm2, m3, m4, r4, m5, m6, r5, r2g and MMSs are fm1, r1g, fm2, m3, m4, r4, m5,
m6, r5, r2g. The MS fm4, r4g is not a MMS because it is included within another
MS. In the given SD (see Figure 7.1b), the length of the longest MMS is 8 (fm2, m3,
m4, r4, m5, m6, r5, r2g). There exist context-sensitive dependencies among objects
within a MMS which show both direct and indirect interactions.
The longest MMS within the SD of use case Issue Item (see Figure 7.5) is as
follow.
mms = m10;
0BB@
m11
m13;m14;m15
m17;m18;m19;m20
1CCA ;
0BB@
m22;m23;m24
m25;m26;m27
m28;m29;m30
1CCA ;m31
In this MMS, there are two fork nodes. The longest sub-path in the rst fork
node is 4 (m17, m18, m19, m20) and in the second fork node, each concurrent sub-
path has equal length of 3. Hence, the longest MMS is 9 for the said use case.
A MMS with high value indicates that the dependency among objects is high. A
fault in one can be easily infected to other dependent objects, which increases the
probability of system failure.
7.1.6 Number of External Links used in a SD
In a distributed system, the communication reliability is critical in unsafe environ-
ments. It is required to estimate the probabilities of failures for connectors at the
analysis stage for an eective testing. Consider the SD shown in Figure 7.1b. Sup-
pose objects o1, o2 are residing in node1 and object o3, o4 are residing in node2.
node1 and node2 are linked by a network. This is shown through a deployment di-
agram in Figure 7.10. It is assumed that the probability of connector failure is zero
for the objects in same node. The probability of connector failure between o1 and
o2 is zero, whereas there is a probability of connector failure between o2 and o3 also
o2 and o4. So, the probability of failure is high, when a number of messages are
transmitted through connectors in a use case. For the SD shown in Figure 7.1b, out
of 10 messages, 3 messages (m3, m5, r5) are transmitted through networks. When
the data is transmitted through network, extra test eort is required to check any
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network problem. So, the complexity of a SD based on number of connectors used
within a SD is expressed as Connector Complexity is given by:
ConnectorComplexity =
#messages transmitted through networks
#messages transmitted
 100 (7.4)
The complexity of SD shown in Figure 7.1b is 3/10 based on the consideration of
connectors only. (For simplicity, we have considered equal probability to the failure
of each connector.)
Figure 7.10: An example of a deployment diagram
A use case with a number of external links requires extra test eort to test the
links.
7.1.7 Number of Polymorphic Calls within a SD
A polymorphic call can be identied within a SD through Class Diagram (CD). A
polymorphic behavior occurs at runtime, when the sub-classes override at least one
of the method of the base class. Testing the polymorphic behavior within a scenario
requires extra test eort. The complexity of a use case depends on the number of
polymorphic messages that are transmitted through the SD of the use case. The gen-
eration of test cases to test a SD which contains polymorphic calls, require manual
eorts [117]. In a polymorphic interaction, new test sets are generated for both
inherited and overriding methods. The behavior of the program is not predictable
due to run time binding, which makes the testing process dicult [117]. Polymorphic
interactions are of dierent types, such as simple polymorphic interaction, parameter-
inuenced polymorphic interaction and conguration-inuenced polymorphic inter-
action etc.
Simple polymorphic interaction
In this case, the instance of a derived class is directly passed as a parameter. The
parameter directly controls the polymorphic behavior. It is easy to test this. The
test must consider at least one instance of each class (base and derived classes) as a
parameter in the call. An example of a class diagram is shown in Figure 7.11. For
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Figure 7.11: An example of a Class Diagram
example, consider the SD shown in Figure 7.12a. (Figure 7.12 is taken from [117]).
It is simple to determine the test cases for this SD. The possible test cases are an
instance of a Book, instance of a ComputerCD, instance of a MusicCD and instance
of a DVD.
Parameter-inuenced polymorphic interaction
It is explained through an example. Consider the SD shown in Figure 7.12b. The
possible test cases are identication number of a Book, a ComputerCD, a MusicCD
and a DVD. Comparing to the test cases of Figure 7.12a, these are abstract. For
generating the test cases for the SD, extra information is needed to get the identi-
cation number for an instance of each sub-class. Manual eort such as the data from
domain expert is required to identify the exact appropriate test input values. Due to
this, testing this type of polymorphic interaction is less likely to be automated and
hence, requires extra test eort.
Conguration-inuenced Polymorphic Interaction
For testing this type of polymorphic call, it is necessary to change the conguration
of the system to various states. The initial system state and environment are changed
again and again for setting dierent congurations. Consider the SD shown in Figure
7.12c. The method getTopselling() returns an instance of the best selling product,
which could be a concrete sub-class of class Product. This polymorphic call is based
on the external set up of the system. Parameters of the interaction has no eect
on it. The possible test cases for this are obtained by setting the conguration of
the system four times. These are setting the top selling product to be a Book,
ComputerCD, MusicCD and DVD. Before the execution of each test case, the state
of the system needs to be changed to the required conguration state. Testing this
polymorphic interaction requires extra testing time and automation of this testing
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(a) Simple Polymorphic Call (b) Parameter-inuenced Polymorphic Call
(c) Conguration-inuenced polymorphic call
Figure 7.12: An example of polymorphic calls
is dicult. Manual eort is required to set the conguration again and again for
testing this type of polymorphic interaction.
7.1.8 Architectural Dependencies among use cases
The use cases of a system can be ordered as per the business logic of the system.
In a set of ordered use cases, one use case starts execution after the completion of
its preceded use cases. There is a requirement of logical progression for tackling the
use case that makes sense to the sequence. If the pre-condition of a use case is same
as the post-condition of another use case then, use cases can be ordered to execute
sequentially. For example, in LMS case study, a book cannot be deleted if, it is
issued. So, for deletion of that book, rst Return Item use case is called and then,
Remove Title use case is called. UML-stereotyped association precedes is used for
this relation. A use case may be followed or preceded by a number of use cases.
Order Flow Graph shows the dependencies among use cases within a system.
Sometimes, a preceded use case has to execute a number of times to satisfy the
pre-condition of a particular use case. For example, consider the LMS case study.
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Figure 7.13: Preceded use cases of use case Issue Item
Suppose, the business rule states that a student cannot issue less than ve books at
a time and the books should belong to dierent titles. To satisfy this constraint, we
have to call Add Title and Add Item use cases at least ve times for testing the use
case Issue Item (The use cases of LMS are listed in Table 7.4). Similarly, to test a
Return Item use case, we have to execute Issue Item rst.
For testing a use case, the tester has to check various pre-conditions of the use
case and bring the system to that initial state accordingly. Complication arises when
the initial state of a use case requires execution of other use cases in serial/parallel.
We draw the architectural dependencies associated with the use case Issue Item.
Figure 7.13 shows all preceded use cases of use case Issue Item. It shows that the
tester has to execute the use cases: (Add User), (Add Title, Add Item) at least once,
before the execution of use case Issue Item. As shown in Figure 7.13, (Add User)
and (Add Title, Add Item) can be executed in parallel. A test case which is designed
to test the use case Issue Item also tests indirectly all the three use cases (Add User)
and (Add Title, Add Item) preceded with it, as shown in Figure 7.13. Due to this
precedence relationship, Add Item requires more test eort than Add User and Add
Title and Issue Item use case requires the maximum test eort among the other use
cases shown in Figure 7.13.
7.2 Computing Complexity and Test Priority
In Section 7.1, we have discussed a list of eight factors that inuence the complexity
of a use case. Normally, a weight is associated with each factor, reecting how much
it aects the complexity. In this section, we compute the complexity of a use case
and then, assign priority according to its estimated complexity, execution probability
and business value.
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7.2.1 Computing the complexity of a use case
The factors that aect the complexity of a use case are already discussed in Section
7.1. In this section, we rst compute the complexity of a use case based on the above
discussed factors. The complexity of a use case Ui is computed as follow.
Complexity(Ui) =
8X
i=1
Wi  ci (7.5)
In this equation,Wi represents the relative weight and ci is the estimated value of i-th
complexity factor of a use case. The assignment of weights is a subjective matter. It
may vary from analyst to analyst. The weight is not static, it may be adjusted and
re-calibrated to suit a project's specic needs. The test manager accompanied with
key people associated with development is responsible to decide the weight for each
complexity factor. Our approach helps to estimate the value for each complexity
factor. A value of '0' indicates no inuence of the complexity factor on the use case.
Once the weight and value for each complexity factor of a use case is decided, the
test manager estimates the complexity for the use case by applying Equation 7.5.
Complexity is related to the fault-proneness of a system. To estimate the failure-
proneness of a use case, we include its execution probability along with its complexity.
We dene the Operational Complexity (OC) for a use case Ui based on its execution
probability pi and estimated complexity. The OC of use case Ui is:
OC(Ui) = Complexity(Ui)  pi
7.2.2 Computing test priority
We consider the Operational Complexity and the Value (business value that comes
from customer and market) of a use case along with its estimated complexity for
assigning test priority within a system. We compute the Test Priority (TP) for a use
case within a system by applying the following formula.
TP (Ui) = V alue(Ui) OC(Ui) (7.6)
In this equation, TP (Ui) is the test priority and OC(Ui) is the Operational Com-
plexity associated with use case Ui. V alue(Ui) is the estimated business value of use
case Ui. Business value estimation process is discussed in Chapter 2 (Background).
The normalized test priority, NTP (Ui), of use case Ui is given by:
NTP (Ui) =
TP (Ui)Pn
j=1(TP (Ui))
(7.7)
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Table 7.4: Execution probabilities of use cases with their business values in LMS
Use Case EP V alue
Relative Weights
2 1
Benets Penalty Total Value Value%
Add User 0.05 5 3 13 5.2
Remove User 0.05 2 1 5 1.9
Add Title 0.08 3 2 8 3.2
Remove Title 0.01 1 1 3 1.2
Find Title 0.1 6 8 20 7.9
Add Item 0.01 4 3 11 4.4
Remove Item 0.01 2 3 7 2.8
Make Reservation 0.12 8 9 25 10
Check Reservation 0.1 8 9 25 10
Remove Reservation 0.12 9 9 27 10.8
Search User 0.07 5 8 18 7.2
Issue Item 0.1 9 9 27 10.8
Renew Item 0.03 2 1 5 2
Return Item 0.1 7 9 23 9.1
Find Loan 0.02 5 4 14 5.6
Collect Fine 0.03 6 8 20 7.9
SUM 1 82 87 251 100
EP: Execution Probability.
In equation 7.7, n represents the total number of use cases within the system.
Once the total test cases T for a system under test is decided by the testing team,
the number of test cases will be allocated to a use case Ui is NTP (Ui)  T .
We have implemented our approach on LMS. The use case diagram of LMS is
already shown in Figure 4.1c. Various use cases of LMS with their execution probabil-
ities are shown in Table 7.4. For each high-level function (use case), we collected the
information from the users such as the librarian, the library-incharge and students
regarding the benet of implementing the function and the penalty associated with
not implementing that function. We have identied sixteen use cases in the LMS
case study. We have developed a prototype tool called Complexity Factor Estimator
(CFE) for automating three inuencing factors (factor 1, factor 2 and factor 5 ) out
of the discussed eight factors in Section 7.1. Other factors are estimated manually.
CFE is implemented using Java. The input to our tool, CFE, are the SD of a use case
and the state chart diagrams of all interacting components within the SD. The design
artifacts are produced in MagicDraw [118]. First, the UML diagrams are exported
in XMI format through an existing XMI parser and then, the XMI format is taken
as an input to our tool, CFE. The high level design of our tool, CFE, is shown in
Figure 7.14. As shown in the gure, the main modules of our implemented tool are
XMI parser, CCFG generator, Concurrent path identier, Test path generators and
Message dependency identier. The module CCFG generator generates the CCFG
of a given SD and the module Concurrent path identier identies all the possible
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Table 7.5: Complexity estimation for use case Issue Item
Factors : CCFG NP #CM #NV LMMS #ELs #POLY #AD TC OC
Weight 1 1 1 0.5 0.5 0.25 0.25 0.5 - -
Value 253 10 0 7 9 0 0 3 272.5 27.25
CCFG:
The complexity of the CCFG, NP: Number of Transition Paths, CM: Critical Messages, NV: Number of Variants,
LMMS: Length of longest MMS, EL: External Links, POLY: Polymorphic Messages, AD: Architectural dependency,
TC: Total Complexity and OC: Occurrence Complexity.
paths within the CCFG. Another module, Test path generator extracts all the pos-
sible transitions covered by a component within a path of the SD. A path within
the SD of a use case represents a scenario of the use case. The module Message de-
pendency identier extracts the direct and indirect dependencies among interacting
objects within a SD.
Figure 7.14: High level design of CFE Tool
We illustrate our complexity computation method on use case Issue Item. We
compute the complexity for the use case Issue Item by applying Equation 7.5. Table
7.5 shows the estimated complexity for the said use case. In the table, we have
assigned dierent weights to dierent complexity factors. The weights assigned to
complexity factors is a subjective matter and vary from application to application.
We have broadly categorized the inuences of the factors on the complexity of a use
case as high inuence, average inuence and low inuence with weights 1, 0.5 and
0.25, respectively. For any application, the discussed rst three factors in Section
7.1 have high inuence. The values of various complexity factors shown in second
row of Table 7.5 are already estimated in Section 7.1. The estimated complexity for
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Table 7.6: Priority calculation
Sl: No usecase NTP
1 Add User 0.002731872
2 Remove User 0.001996368
3 Add Title 0.002689843
4 Remove Title 0.002689843
5 Find Title 0.044270336
6 Add Item 0.00439201
7 Remove Item 0.004952394
8 Make Reservation 0.172318081
9 Check Reservation 0.0420288
10 Remove Reservation 0.097590874
11 Search User 0.007060838
12 Issue Item 0.363128834
13 Renew Item 0.014079648
14 Return Loan 0.227883657
15 Find Loan 0.000980672
16 Collect Fine 0.011205929
Sum 1
NP: Normalized Priority;
use case Issue Item is 272.5. It is obtained by applying Equation 7.5. We consider
the execution probability of the use case and estimate the Occurrence Complexity
(OC) in the last column of Table 7.5 as 272:5  0:1 = 27:25. We apply Equation
7.6 and calculate the priority for a use case based on its two important factors: (i)
Operational Complexity and (ii) Value. Finally, we compute the normalized priority
for various use cases of LMS using Equation 7.7, which are shown in Table 7.6. Figure
7.15 shows the contents of Table 7.6 in graphical form. The gure is an input to the
test manager for distributing test eort to various use cases at the architectural level,
so that testing and coding can be conducted simultaneously. From Table 7.6, it is
observed that the use case Issue Item has the highest priority. A use case with high
priority requires more test eort than a use case with low priority. So, the use case
Issue Item requires the maximum test eort. Once the total test eort for the system
is decided, test manager distributes the test eort among various use case according
to their priority values as shown in Figure 7.15. Our approach helps the test manager
in distributing the test resources.
7.3 Experimental Studies
In order to verify the eectiveness of our approach, we have carried out a series of
experiments on the source code of the LMS. We have seeded 36 number of faults
randomly in the source code of LMS. It has been shown that fault seeding is an
eective practice for measuring the eciency of a test method [106]. There is a num-
ber of interactions among components in an object-oriented software. So, there are
opportunities for integration or interface faults. The seeded faults are of integration
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Figure 7.15: Priority distribution among use cases of LMS case study
level faults. We assume that a rigorous unit testing has been done by the developers.
These seeded faults could not be detected through a rigorous testing at the unit level.
The various types of faults that we have considered in our experiment are discussed
below.
1. Three types of interface mutation operators [107] such as Direct variable re-
placement operator, Indirect variable replacement operator and Return state-
ment operator are seeded.
2. Six types of state-based integration faults [22] were inserted such as Miss-
ing transitions, Incorrect transitions, Unspecied event, Incorrect state of the
sender object, Incorrect state of the receiver object, Message passing with in-
correct/invalid value of arguments. The last one is just explained here. Suppose
a message is passed with an incorrect argument or an invalid argument. An
object Oi is sending a message mi(a1; a2; a3). Instead of passing the correct
value of a1=x1, it is passed with the value a1=x2, where the value x2 is an
incorrect or invalid data. Four number of faults from each discussed type were
inserted randomly.
We made three copies of the source code and applied three dierent types of
testing methods. Foe each testing method, the test time was xed to 36 hours based
on the test budget, size of the source code, total number of use cases, total number
of classes, total number of scenarios and total number of object-points. The rst row
of Table 4.2 shows a brief summary of LMS.
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We conducted prioritization-based testing based on our proposed use case ranking
approach on the rst copy of the source code and called it Ranked testing. We
applied coverage-based testing without any ranking information to the second copy of
the source code and called itUnranked testing, in which equal importance was given
to each use case. We conducted testing based on the operational prole designed for
the system to the third copy of the source code and called it Semi-ranked testing.
The aim of Unranked testing is to cover high percentage of source code and x
as many bugs as possible based on the assumption that fewer bugs are consistent
with higher reliability. The aim of Ranked testing is to rigorously test the parts
of the source code that implement high priority use cases based on the assumption
that the reliability will be improved in a higher rate, if high priority use cases will
be tested thoroughly. So, in Ranked testing, we give eort to a use case based on
its priority value as estimated in our proposed approach whereas, in Semi-ranked
testing, we give test eort to a use case based on its execution probability. It has
been shown by many researchers [9, 13, 87] that the user's view on the reliability of
a system is improved when, faults which occur in the most frequently used parts of
the software are almost removed. Keeping this in view, in Semi-ranked testing,
we focus test eort on the parts of the source code that are executed frequently.
Both in Ranked and Semi-ranked testing, operational prole is used for testing
and the operational prole is accurate as the system is an existing system. Hence, it
is assumed that both the testing methods (Ranked and Semi-ranked) could be able
to detect the important bugs at the early phase of testing, that are responsible for
frequent failures. After the allocated test time was over, we felt that some bugs could
not be xed due to shortage of time, in each copy of the source code. It is because,
some bugs were detected during the last stage of testing, that could not be xed in
stipulated time period. Table 7.7 shows the number of mutant bugs detected in three
testing methods.
Table 7.7: Testing results of three testing methods
TestingMethod Mutants Killed Mutants F ixed
Ranked 32 28
Unranked 34 30
Semi-ranked 28 27
Figure 7.16 shows the comparison among three dierent testing methods about
the time to detect the defects. We observed that dierent testing strategies lead
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Figure 7.16: Defect detection rate by various testing methods
to dierent testing results. Faults that were detected through Unranked testing
method was higher than the faults that were detected through the Semi-ranked test-
ing method. It is because, we iterated a lot in the frequently executed parts of
the code and gave less attention to others in this method. Though, Ranked testing
method could not detect the maximum number of defects as in Unranked testing
method, it detected the maximum number of critical defects as the severity of a
message was considered as a factor for complexity computation. It was also found
that the fault detection rate in Unranked testing method is nearly linear whereas,
in Ranked case, the fault detection rate is high during the early stage of testing.
The seeded faults detected in the Ranked testing method was higher than that of
the Semi-ranked testing method. The complexity is linearly proportional to defect
rates [99] and our approach emphasizes the complexity feature of a use case as one
input for ranking. In fact, our aim is to improve the reliability of a system. A soft-
ware testing method that is ecient in nding faults may not improve the reliability
of a system [9,13,119]. Our next job is to go for reliability assessment.
The tested source code that were obtained by three testing methods- Ranked,
Semi-ranked, Unranked- again tested for reliability assessment. Here, the assumption
is that the eect of all types of failures are same, which is practically not true. Some
failures have very negative impact on the customer and on the system. A failure
could be catastrophic or critical or major or minor [101]. Reliability of a system is
assessed by checking how many test cases are executed and out of that, how many test
cases failed. In each experiment, we run the three dierent testing results (tested
source code obtained from the three dierent testing methods) n times according
to the operational prole. The value of n varies from experiment to experiment.
The defects that caused failures were not xed and the reliability was estimated.
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We have applied two existing reliability assessment methods: (i) random testing
(ii) adoptive testing [120]. It is experimentally proved that adoptive testing for
reliability assessment is trustable than others [120]. In random testing, test cases are
selected randomly from the input domain based on operational prole whereas, in
the adoptive testing, the selection of next test case is based on the testing prole2.
For the reliability assessment, we have made the following assumptions:
1. The code is frozen.
2. A test case either passes or fails.
3. The failure of the software at the current time t is only dependent on the
supplied input at that time and is independent of previously executed inputs.
4. The operational prole for the software is fIi; pi; i=1; 2;.;m; g, where pi repre-
sents the execution probability of the input sub-domain Ii, and
mX
i=1
pi = 1:
5. Total n number of test cases are allowed to run. The activities that are per-
formed in testing a software for reliability consists of test case selection, test
case execution, test result collection and updating the estimated reliability if
required. Test case selection is guided by operational prole in random testing
and guided by testing history in adoptive testing.
Software reliability R is calculated as follows:
R =
mX
i=1
pi i (7.8)
In this equation, pi and i represent the execution probability and failure rate of i
th
sub-domain. i is computed as follows:
i =
1
ni
niX
j=1
zij (7.9)
zij represents the execution result of a test case which is selected from i
th sub-domain
for jth time. The value of zij is 1, if a failure is observed else, the value is 0. ni is the
total number of test cases selected from ith sub-domain and
Pm
i=1 ni = n. Table 7.8
2Testing prole says how to test the software while operational prole says how to use the
software [120].
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shows the reliability obtained on LMS by applying two testing methods for assessing
reliability. In the table, Rrt and Radpt represents the reliability assessed by random
testing and the reliability assessed by adoptive testing. The tested source code by
the three discussed methods: Ranked, Unranked and Semi-ranked are executed for
reliability assessment.
Result Analysis
Table 7.8 tabulates the experimental results of software reliability assessed for three
discussed methods- Ranked, Unranked and Semi-ranked- based on random testing
and adoptive testing. From Table 7.8, we observed that in adoptive testing, the vari-
ance is very less compared to random testing. From the reliability values assessed in
various experiments, we found that the code tested through Ranked method observed
the highest reliability and the code tested through Unranked method observed the
lowest reliability in both the testing methods- adoptive and random testing- for test
suites of dierent sizes.
The observed reliability is the lowest in the code tested through Unranked method.
It is because, some residual bugs were found in the frequently executed parts of the
tested code. Though, some of these failure causing bugs were detected at the time
of testing but, some of these detected bugs were not xed due to detection at the
later phase of testing. This problem though was not observed in the code tested
through Semi-Ranked method but, the reliability is not high compared to the code
tested through Ranked method. It is because, the testing was done based on only
operational prole. The complexity factor was not considered for testing. Hence,
some seeded state-based integration faults could not be detected in the semi-ranked
testing method.
Though, we have not analyzed the impact of failures on the system at the time of
reliability estimation, but it is observed that some serious-failures3 were observed in
the tested source codes through Unranked and Semi-ranked methods. It is because,
we have neither considered the Value associated with a use case nor the criticality
of messages within the SD of a use case for testing in Unranked and Semi-ranked
methods. As these two major external factors- Value and criticality of a message-
are considered for prioritizing use cases in the Ranked testing method, the faults
which may cause failures with high negative impact on the user were almost detected
3A failure is serious if it causes a heavy nancial loss to the organization or it causes a serious
damage to the system.
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and corrected at the early phase of testing through the Ranked method.
7.4 Summary
We have proposed a test eort prioritization technique at the architectural level. Our
approach is ranking the use cases of an application according to their complexity and
business value. For this, we rst developed a technique to compute the complexity of a
use case quantitatively. Our approach for complexity calculation is purely analytical.
For achieving high reliability, the degree of thoroughness with which a use case to
be tested is made proportional to its priority value. We have conducted experiments
to check the eectiveness of our approach and experimentally proved that assigning
test eorts to a use case based on its execution probability only, is not sucient for
ensuring the quality of a system. Consideration of both structural and behavioral
dependencies within a use case along with its execution probability for computing
test priority is a powerful way to improve the quality of the system.
In this chapter, we have not considered the risk associated with a use case. The
stakeholder of a software system feels that the measurement of quality of the software
system through risk is signicant than other factors such as expected number of
residual bugs or failure rate etc. Keeping this in mind, we propose a novel risk
analysis technique in the next chapter, that works at the software architecture level.
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Analyzing Risk at Architectural
Level for Testing
The approach proposed in this chapter is two fold. In the rst phase, the risk is
estimated for components, use case scenarios and the overall system. In the second
phase, risk-based testing is conducted, in which the test priority is assigned to various
elements according to their estimated risk.
The existing work on software reliability estimation [9, 14, 15, 57, 63] do not con-
sider the impact of failures observed at the execution of a software system. Due to
the availability of design models, stake holders are now getting the opportunity to
estimate the reliability quantitatively at the analysis and design stage and hence, the
risk associated with the software before its implementation.
Risk analysis is conducted in a software application to assess the damage during
use, frequency of use and to decide the probability of failure by looking at defects.
There are several types of risks such as reliability-based risk, availability-based risk,
acceptance-based risk, performance-based risk, cost-based risk, and schedule-based
risk. In the thesis, we are mainly concerned with the reliability-based risk, as our
aim is to improve the reliability of a system, within the available test resources. It
is the probability that the software product will fail in the operational environment
and the adversity of that failure.
In order to save the time and cost in the software development life cycle, there
is a requirement of an eective decision-making for allocating resources to various
high level requirements. For this, there is a need to assess quantitatively the risk
associated with high level requirements as early as possible. Researchers [81, 82, 84]
have proposed risk estimation models by gathering data at the requirement stage
and analysis stage. As the analysis and design stage is critical compared to other
stages, assessing risk at this stage is benecial to the stake holder. Detecting and
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correcting errors at this stage is less costly compared to later stages of SDLC. For
estimation of risk at an early stage, the important feature is to design a model
to predict the dynamic aspects of a system. Un-reliability at dierent states of a
component within a scenario may aect the failure rate of the scenario dierently.
If the failure probabilities of an interacting component in various states within a
scenario are well known, it is easy to analyze their eect on the system behavior.
The risk for two dierent states of a component may vary within a scenario. A fault
within a state of a component may be the reason for component failure and the failure
of a component/connector may be responsible for a system level hazard [101]. We
predict the dynamic aspects of a system and assess risk through the data collected
at the detailed design stage. We consider the risk associated with active resources.
As connectors are passive1 in nature, we have not considered any connector faults.
It is assumed that connectors are 100% reliable. Unlike the existing work [81, 82]
on risk estimation at the architectural level, we introduce the risk associated with
dierent states of a component within a scenario rather than estimating the risk for
the component as a whole. Quantifying the risk at dierent states of a component
within a scenario is an input for an eective risk estimation of the scenario.
We propose an intermediate graph called Inter-Component State Dependence
Graph (ISDG) for getting the complexity for a state of a component. ISDG shows
intra-component state transitions and inter-component state transitions within a sin-
gle graph. Once the complexity is calculated, the next step is to analyze the severity
associated with various states of a component for risk estimation.
We use the risk associated with various states of an interacting component within
a scenario to compute the risk for the whole scenario. The risk for a scenario is
estimated based on the estimated risks of the interacting components at various
states within the scenario and an existing test model called State COllaboration
TEst Model (SCOTEM) [115]. We are primarily motivated by the need to generate
a list of scenarios ranked according to their estimated risks. This ranking technique
provides a path to nd truly critical system functionalities. Assigning test eort to
various scenarios based on their estimated risks helps the tester to detect important
faults at the early phase of testing. Once the risk for various scenarios within a system
are estimated, the risk for the overall system is calculated based on two parameters:
(i) estimated risks of various scenarios within a system (ii) list of scenario transition
1Passive resources cannot generate their own behavior, but only react to the occurrence of a
stimulus, while active resources are those capable of spontaneous unprompted behavior.
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probabilities within a system.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Our proposed risk estimation
method is described in Section 8.1. The ecacy of our approach is evaluated in
Section 8.2 and the summary of the chapter is given in Section 8.3.
8.1 Risk Estimation Method
Our proposed risk analysis method rst estimates the complexity associated with
individual state of a component. Then, it iterates on a scenario and estimates the
severity associated with various states of an interacting component within the sce-
nario. Based on the complexity and severity, it estimates the risk. Our approach
estimates the risk for the scenario through the help of an existing state-based in-
tegration model called SCOTEM [115] and the estimated risks of various states of
the components within the scenario. Our approach helps to carry out a sensitivity
analysis for a scenario and generates a list of critical components that are responsible
for increasing the risk of the scenario. Finally, we estimate the overall system risk
on the basis of risks associated with scenarios and scenario transition probabilities.
For calculating the overall system risk, we use Interaction Overview Diagram (IOD)
that represents scenario specications. The procedure of our proposed methodology
is shown in Algorithm 2 and a detailed description of the procedure is explained in
subsequent sections.
Algorithm 2 Risk Analysis Procedure
1: for each component do
2: for each state do
3: estimate complexity through ISDG.
4: end for
5: end for
6: for each scenario do
7: for each active state of an interacting component do
8: assign severity.
9: compute risk.
10: end for
11: estimate scenario risk
12: identify a list of critical components within the scenario through sensitivity
analysis.
13: end for
14: rank scenarios based on their estimated risks.
15: estimate overall system risk using IOD and scenario risks.
16: identify a list of critical scenarios within the system through sensitivity analysis.
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8.1.1 Quantifying the complexity for a state of a component
In this section, we propose a method to compute the complexity associated with a
state of a component at the architectural level. In a sequence diagram, the interac-
tions among components are represented through event/action pairs. An interaction
within a sequence diagram is mapped to an event in a state chart diagram. When, an
event is invoked by a component within a scenario, it may trigger an action, which in
turn may trigger another event in another component. The event/action interaction
describes how invocation of a function in a component aects other components. For
example, in the well known case study, LMS, consider a situation when a borrower
reserves a book. First, a new object of Reservation component (New state) will be
created. The newly created Reservation object triggers a message to Borrower object
and to Book object, simultaneously. By getting the message, the Borrower object
will change its state to NonResearvable state from Active state (The business rule of
our case study says that a borrower can reserve only one book) and the Book object
will change its state to Reserved state from Issued state (Please refer Figure 7.7).
Similarly, consider another situation, when a book is returned while it is in Reserved
state. First, there will be a transition in the Book object from Reserved state to
Committed state. This transition in the Book object triggers the Reservation object
for a transition from New state to Issuable state. Hence, in this situation, a transition
in the object Reservation is now dependent on the transition of object Book, but in
the previous case, the transition in Book object (transition from Issued state to Re-
served state) was dependent on the transition in Reservation object. The individual
behavioral view of various components of LMS are already shown in Figure 7.7. The
gure shows the intra-component state transition dependencies but, it is unable to
show the inter-component state transition dependencies among components.
Yacoub et al. [70] stated that the dynamic complexity of a component is decided
based on the number of transitions of the component within a scenario. They have
considered only transitions within a component and computed complexity at the
component level. In our approach, we consider both intra-component and inter-
component state transition dependencies in a system and compute the complexity at
a lower level, for various states of a component rather than for the whole component.
For this, we propose a graph at the architectural level called Inter-Component State-
Dependence graph (ISDG), through a collection of state chart diagrams of various
components within a system. The graph shows both intra-component and inter-
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component state transitions within a single graph. ISDG shows how a state transition
in one component triggers transitions in other components. In the following section,
we draw ISDG for our case study LMS and discuss it in detail.
Inter-component State Dependence Graph (ISDG)
We use the concept of Bayesian-model [121] for generating ISDG. It consists of a
set of concurrent state machines, SM=sm1; : : : ; smn where, n is the number of
components in the system. Each state machine (smi) consists of a set of states,
S= s1,...,sm and a set of transitions T=t1,: : :,tp where, m represents the number of
states in the state machine smi and p is the number of transitions in the component
corresponding to smi. Each transition has its origin and destination. There is either
a single event or an event/action pair associated with each transition. Each event
and action corresponds to an interface of a component. When an event is generated
in one component, it may cause a change of state in another component. There is
a transition dependency between state machines smi and smj, if an action of smi
is matched with an event of smj. The ISDG of LMS is shown in Figure 8.1. There
Figure 8.1: ISDG of LMS
are two types of edges in ISDG, as shown in Figure 8.1. The solid one shows the
intra-component state transition and the dashed one shows the inter-component state
transition. Intra-component state transition can be easily understood from the state
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chart diagrams of LMS that are shown in Figure 7.7. Now, we discuss one inter-
component transition dependency of the ISDG, shown in Figure 8.1. Let us take the
state R3 of Reservation object. From R3, there are two outgoing transitions. One
is to Book object and the other one is to Borrower object. These transitions say
that, when there is a transition in the Reservation object to the state R3 from either
the state R1 or R2, it initiates two inter-component state transitions. It sends an
event to the component Borrower to change its state to U1 and sends an event to the
component Book to change its state to either B1 or B2 depending on the condition.
The arc in the two transitions to Book component states that any one transition
will occur at a time. Suppose a book is in Reserved (B4) state. A transition in the
Reservation object to Destroyed (R3) state will send an event to the Book object to
change its state to Issued (B2) state. Figure 7.7 shows various states of a component.
The transition of an object of Reservation component to Destroyed (R3) state will
cause one transition in an object of Book component to Available (B1) state if the
book is in Committed (B3) state. It will be changed to Issued (B2) state if the book
is in Reserved (B4) state. The transition in Reservation object is also responsible for
a transition in Borrower object. Borrower.U1, Book.B1 and Book.B2 are dependent
on the state Reservation.R3. This type of dependency is called cause and eect
dependency because, the behavior of Reservation component in state R3 implies the
behavior of Borrower and Book component. This type of dependency analysis helps
to understand the behavior of the system clearly. Hence, ISDG can be used by the
developers and testers during development cycle.
Let us explain through ISDG, the behavior of a system to an external event in a
given state. For example, let the initial state of LMS be ffB1.4, B2.1gfR1.1gfU1.4,
U2.3gg at time T1. An object Oi:j represents that i-th object is in j-th state. At
time T1, it is assumed that the book B1 is already issued to the borrower U1 and
it is already reserved by another borrower U2. At this point, there is a chance of
occurrence of several scenarios. Let us consider one possible scenario. Suppose the
borrower U1 returns the book. The scenario Return Item is executed. During the
execution, rst there will be a transition in object B1 from B1.4 (Reserved) to B1.3
(Committed). Due to the concurrency nature of the three state machines, Book,
Reservation and Borrower, this transition of Book causes two inter-component state
transitions simultaneously: one transition in the Reservation object R1 and the other
one in the Borrower object U1. The state of the Reservation object will be changed
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from R1.1 (New) to R1.2 (Issuable) and the state of the Borrower object will be
changed from U1.4 (NonIssuable) to U1.1 (Active). Hence, after the execution of
the scenario Return Item, the new state of LMS will be ffB1.3, B2.1gfR1.2gfU1.1,
U2.3gg. Our proposed ISDG helps to show the cause and eect dependencies among
various components of a system in a single graph. ISDG shows all possible transitions
from one state to others. For a particular message, the appropriate one can be
detected at the execution of a scenario.
Complexity computation
From the architectural analysis of a software system, we found that a transition in one
component may cause a transition in other components. Hence, the reliability of the
transition in the second component is dependent on the reliability of the transition
in the rst component. If a transition to a state Si in a component is dependent
on a number of states then, the probability of failure is high in the state Si. We
nd that the chance of getting failure is high in a state of a component, if it is
transition dependent on a number of components. Keeping this in view, we estimate
the complexity for a state of a component based on the size of its Dependent-by-
Group. Dependent-by-Group of a state Si of a component contains all possible states
of the same component (intra-component state transitions) and dierent components
(inter-component state transitions), on which Si is transition dependent. When
a failure occurs in a component at state Si, we must check each element of its
Dependent-by-Group.
The commonly occurring failures in case of inter-component state transitions are
Missing-transitions2, Incorrect-transitions3, Unspecied-event4, Unspecied-state5,
Incorrect-state of sender object6 etc [22]. As these types of inter-component state
transition faults cannot be identied in a rigorous unit testing, there is a chance
of increase in failure rate during this transition compared to intra-component state
transition. Faults occurring in intra-component state transitions such as Incorrect-
2Message mi is invoked on object Oj , which in turn should trigger changes to object Ok, instead
it does not trigger any change to object Ok.
3Message mi is invoked on object Oj , which in turn should trigger changes to object Ok from
Sx to Sy, instead it changes the state from Sx to Sz, Sy 6= Sz.
4Message mi is invoked on object Oj , which in turn triggers changes to object Ok from state Sx
to Sy, which is not specied.
5Message mi is invoked on object Oj , which in turn should trigger changes to object Ok from
state Sx to Sy, instead it changes the state to Sz, where Sz is not specied in the design.
6A message mi is to be sent from an object Oj in state Sx to another object Ok, instead the
message mi is sent from object Oj while in state Sy, where Sx 6= Sy.
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action7 and Missing-action 8 can be easily identied in a rigorous unit testing. Due
to this, we categorize an intra-component state transition as simple with weight 1
and an inter-component state transition as complex with weight 3.
First, we extract the Dependent-by-Group for each state of a component through
ISDG (in ISDG, a state is represented as a node). In ISDG, the Dependent-by-Group
for a node n contains all the adjacent nodes of n that are connected to node n by
its incoming edges. For example, the elements of the Dependent-by-Group of Bor-
rower.U1 are fBorrower.U2, Borrower.U3, Borrower.U4, Reservation.R3, Book.B1g.
So, the complexity associated with Borrower.U1 is 1+1+1+3+3=9. Table 8.1 shows
the Dependent-by-Group and the complexities associated with various states of Book
component in LMS case study. The complexity for state j of component i within a
Table 8.1: Complexity for each state of Book component
State Dependent-by-Group Complexity
B1 fB2,B3,R3g 1+1+3=5
B2 fB1,B3,B4,R3g 1+1+1+3=6
B3 fB4g 1
B4 fB2,R1g 1+3=4
system is represented as complexity(i:j). The normalized complexity is obtained by
normalizing the complexity of the state of the component with respect to the sum
of complexities of the states for all components within a system. comp(i.j) is the
normalized complexity for state j of component i. It is computed as follow:
comp(i:j) =
complexity(i:j)Pn
i=1
Pnos
j=1 complexity(i:j)
(8.1)
In Equation 8.1, n represents the total number of modal components and nos repre-
sents the total number of states in i-th component.
8.1.2 Severity analysis
In this section, we use a method based on three hazard techniques [96] to determine
the severity associated with various states of a component within a scenario. We are
using three hazard techniques: Functional Failure Analysis (FFA), Software Failure
Mode and Eect Analysis (SFMEA) and Software Fault Tree Analysis (SFTA) for
7A message mi is sent to object Ok, which in turn should change the state of Ok to Sx, instead
the state changes to Sy, where Sx 6= Sy.
8A message mi is sent to object Ok, which in turn should change the state of Ok to Sx, instead
it does not produce any action.
143
8.1 Risk Estimation Method Analyzing Risk at Architectural Level for Testing
estimating the severity associated with a state of a component within a scenario.
Hazard analysis is done at functional level (top level) through FFA [122]. It shows the
possible ways of system failures. First, we identify all possible system level hazards9.
SFMEA identies the component level failures and their eect on the system. While
FFA needs abstract functional description, detailed architectural design is required
for SFMEA. There is a requirement of cause and eect dependency for predicting
the likelihood of system failure from the likelihood of component failure [123]. SFTA
is conducted to nd how the failure of a lower level element is responsible for the
failure of an upper level element and nally, the failure of a scenario.
FFA is the rst step of severity analysis. The input to a FFA is the list of external
events that occur between external actor and the system. For this, we use System
Sequence Diagram which consists only the messages of a sequence diagram that occur
between an external actor and the system [83]. In this case, the system is treated
as a black-box. So, the internal events of a sequence diagram that occur among
interacting components are not considered. The next step of severity analysis is
SFMEA to identify component level failures. It is already discussed in our previous
chapters (Chapter 5 and 6). In this chapter, we consider SFMEA at the architectural
level instead of code level. SFMEA is done through a detailed analysis of message
types in a sequence diagram. Within a sequence diagram, we identify the data
transferred between components and the events that are interacting within a use
case.
Our severity analysis method at the architectural level consists of the following
steps:
1. Performing FFA for a use case.
2. Performing SFMEA: identifying failure modes for various interacting compo-
nents of the use case through the analysis of sequence diagram and state chart
diagrams.
3. Constructing software fault tree using FFA and SFMEA.
4. Converting the results obtained from SFTA and SFMEA into XML les and
making a comparison analysis of the resulting XML les for two reasons: (i)
to check the consistency between the software fault tree and failure modes of
9A system level hazard is associated with all possible hazards at the execution of a scenario. A
list of these possible hazards are the outcome of FFA.
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Figure 8.2: An overview of the severity analysis method
interacting components within a scenario and (ii) to identify any missing failure
that is not analyzed.
An overview of our severity analysis process is shown in Figure 8.2. To get all
possible failure modes associated with a component within a scenario, we apply bi-
directional analysis. A forward search within a scenario is applied through SFMEA
and a backward search is applied through SFTA. As SFTA and SFMEA are both
complimentary in nature, the combination of both the approaches help us to identify
any missing failures in a use case.
We have created an entire fault tree for each use case of the LMS through the
FaultCAT tool [124]. The advantage of this tool is that it allows user to draw and
edit the fault tree and calculate the probability of failure of intermediate nodes auto-
matically. It also converts the fault tree into an XML form which helps us to check
the consistency with SFTA through Java programs. Let us discuss the use case Issue
Item. The system level hazards associated with Issue Item use case are as follows:
1. Do not allow any borrower to issue book.
2. Allow the non illegible borrower to issue book.
3. Allow the non-issuable book to issue.
4. Allow a person to issue more than maximum number of books.
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The root node is \Failure to issue book" and the nodes in rst level are the four
hazards described above. The second level contains the nodes which contribute to
the hazards, etc. We have not presented the entire fault tree due to space reasons.
A piece of it with its XML form is represented in Figure 8.3. This is a subtree
showing the hazard number 4; the system is allowing a borrower to issue more than
maximum number of books. The leaf node of a software fault tree corresponds to a
method which is involved in the interaction of the scenario. Hence, the leaf nodes
are analyzed using the failure modes from SFMEA. We check whether the failures
of events that are associated with a component within a scenario contribute to the
errors of the component that lies on the bottom of the fault tree of that scenario.
Figure 8.3 shows that either an error in component SessionMgr or in component
Borrower will contribute a system level hazard in the use case Borrow Item.
(a) Fault Tree (b) Fault Tree in XML form
Figure 8.3: Fault tree with its XML form for a hazard of Issue Item use
case
Next, our job is to convert the table obtained through SFMEA into XML format
and then, go for a bidirectional analysis to check the consistency between the results
obtained through SFTA and SFMEA. Table obtained from SFMEA is converted into
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a XML le through the help of Java Excel API. The eects of SFMEA are matched
with the nodes of the fault tree obtained through SFTA. There are some failures found
in the table obtained through SFMEA, that are not exist in the fault tree obtained
through SFTA. Let us consider one case. In the table obtained through SFMEA, we
have shown a post condition failure (F1) at the time of execution of issue() command
in Reservation component. This says that after the execution of issue() command
in Reservation component, the state of the Reservation object will be deleted and
the state of the Borrower component will be transited from \NonReservable" to
\Active" state. In case of a failure F1 (post condition is not satised) of issue()
method of Reservation component, the object of Reservation component is deleted
without making any change in Borrower component. As a result, the borrower will
successfully issue a book (there is no problem in current scenario) but could not
reserve any book further. As there is no hazard associated with the execution of
Issue Item use case, the fault is missing in the fault tree obtained through SFTA.
Our methodology considers the message criticality [116] within a sequence dia-
gram, as a parameter for estimating the severity. The weight of each message is not
equal. However: (i) there might be certain messages which are critical to the sender
objects (ii) some messages (call or reply) might carry larger amounts of data or more
parameters (return values) than other messages (iii) the return values of some mes-
sages might be used frequently (or for critical decisions/computations) in the caller
object than other messages, or (4) some messages might be triggered often than other
messages [116]. The job of the designer/analyst is to estimate the weights for various
messages of a sequence diagram in an application based on the above four criteria.
The severity weight of 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, and 0.95 are assigned to Minor, Marginal,
Major, and Catastrophic severity classes respectively, as dened in [81,82].
8.1.3 Risk computation
In the section, we rst estimate the risk for a state of a component within a scenario
and then, compute the risk for the whole scenario. We combine the complexity
and severity associated with a state to compute the risk for the state. Heuristic
risk for a scenario is computed by considering two parameters (i) estimated risk of
various states of interacting components within the scenario (ii) SCOTEM [115] of
the scenario.
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Table 8.2: Estimated risk for various states of Borrower component within Issue
Item use case
Possible state Risk
NonReservable 0.053
Active 0.089
NonIssuable 0.005
Risk estimation for a state of a component
The heuristic risk, hrf i:j
x, for j-th state of i-th component within scenario Sx is
estimated as follow:
hrf i:j
x = p(i:j)x  comp(i:j) svrty(i:j)x (8.2)
In Equation 8.2, p(i:j)x and svrty(i:j)x represent the probability and the severity
associated with j-th state of i-th component within scenario Sx, respectively. The
estimated risk for various states of Borrower component within the main scenario of
Issue Item use case are shown in Table 8.2. In the table, Risk is the normalized risk.
Risk estimation for a scenario
Ali et al. [115] have proposed a state-based integration testing approach for deriv-
ing test cases for a scenario. They have proposed an intermediate test model called
SCOTEM based on state chart diagrams and collaboration diagram. Our risk esti-
mation method uses SCOTEM to estimate the risk within a scenario. An example
of SCOTEM for a scenario Sx, SCOTEMx is shown in Figure 8.4. The Null vertex
in Figure 8.4 is a dummy vertex that models an external message (e.g., message
from a user). As shown in Figure 8.4, there are four interacting components fC1,
C2, C3, C4g in scenario Sx. Each rectangular box represents a component and it
contains multiple vertices, where the rectangular vertex corresponds to an instance
of the component in a distinct abstract state, corresponding to states dened in state
charts and the vertex in ellipse shape represents the starting point, called init state.
For execution of scenario Sx, all the interacting objects those are modal will be in
some specied states. The probability of occurrence of a state in a component box
is the sum of probabilities of the paths from init node to that state.
For example in our LMS case study, for the successful execution of scenario Issue
Item(U,B), the initial state of the requested Book object B will be either in Available
state or in Reserved state and the initial state of the Borrower object U will be
either in Active state or in NonReservable state. We have drawn a SCOTEM for use
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Figure 8.4: SCOTEM for scenario Sx
case Issue Item(U,B). The sequence diagram of use case Issue Item(U, B) is already
shown in Figure 7.5.
In the sequence diagram, only three components Book, Borrower and Reservation
are modal. For the execution of messages m1-m21, there will be no change of state
of any component. So, in the sequence diagram of use case Issue Item, only the
execution of three messages m24, m27 and m30 change the state of the system.
The behavior of the modal components in the SCOTEM designed for the sequence
diagram of Issue Item use case is shown in Figure 7.8. Suppose, we consider the
message m24. When the message is received, the Borrower object is either in state
U1 or U3. We assign uniform probability to each possible state at the initial stage.
If it is in U1, then the next state will be either U1 or U4. The probability of a state
of a component within a scenario is the sum of probabilities of incoming paths from
init state to that state. During the execution of message m24, the probability of U1
is 0.5+0.25=0.75. (init!U1=0.5, U1!U1=0.5, So, init!U1!U1=0.5*0.5=0.25).
Similarly, the probability values for various states of other components are calculated.
In a scenario, the risks associated with various states of interacting components
are used as input for computing the risk for the scenario. The total number of
state paths in SCOTEMx developed for scenario Sx is determined by taking the
product of the number of transitions in each modal component [115]. The possible
transitions in various modal components of Issue Item(U1, B1) scenario are shown
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in Figure 7.8. As shown in the said gure, total number of possible transitions by
each modal component within the scenario are given in Table 8.3. Hence, the total
Table 8.3: Possible transitions by various objects within Issue Item use case
ObjectName MessageReceived Transitions#
Book issue() 2
Reserve issue() 1
Borrower issue() 4
number of state paths in the SCOTEM of Issue Item(U,B) scenario is 8. A state path
starts with the initial (Null) vertex and contains a complete message sequence of the
collaboration. Each state path in SCOTEMx shows some interactions between the
components in appropriate states. We rst estimate the risk associated with each
state path of SCOTEMx. Risk for k-th state path of SCOTEMx, (SCOTEMx)k,
is estimated as follows:
Risk(SCOTEMxk) =
nX
i=1
nsX
j=1
(hrf i:j
x) (8.3)
In Equation 8.3, n represents the number of interacting components in scenario Sx
and ns represents the number of active states of i-th component in k-th path of
SCOTEMx. For a large application, number of state paths will be very large. Hence,
it will take extra resources to calculate the risk for a scenario. To solve this problem,
we have considered n-Path Coverage criteria [115]. This coverage criterion selects a
specied number n of state paths from the SCOTEM. The value of n ranges from the
number of state paths required to achieve All-Transition Coverage10 to the maximum
number of possible test paths within an application. The n-Path Coverage subsumes
All-Transition Coverage. It rst generates test paths such that each state transition
in a modal object is followed at least once. The remaining state paths are then
selected randomly until n number of state paths are taken [115]. Then, the risk for
the whole scenario is estimated as the sum of the estimated risks of at least n number
of paths in the SCOTEM of the scenario, where n is the number of paths considered
according to n-Path Coverage criteria.
In the sequence diagram of the ongoing example Issue Item(U, B) use case, the
normalized risk of the main scenario, the successful issue of book, is estimated as
0.3972 using Equation 8.3 and Table 8.2. We have estimated the risk for the successful
scenario of each use case. The alternative scenarios of a use case are not considered.
10This criteria ensures that each state transition in a modal object is followed at least once.
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Table 8.4 shows the estimated risks for various use cases within LMS. From Table
Table 8.4: Risk estimated for various use cases of LMS
Use case Normalized risk
Add Borrower 0.003
Remove Borrower 0.037
Add Title 0.013
Remove Title 0.009
Find Title 0.005
Add Item 0.009
Remove Item 0.101
Make Reservation 0.069
Check Reservation 0.002
Remove Reservation 0.002
Search User 0.005
Issue Item 0.397
Renew Item 0.071
Return Item 0.179
Find Loan 0.005
Collect Fine 0.093
SUM 1
8.4, it is found that Issue Item use case has the highest risk. It is because, a number
of state transitions occurred within the scenario.
Estimation of risk for the overall system
We use scenario-based specications as an input for estimating the risk for the overall
system. Scenario specication is the composition of a set of scenarios possibly from
an user. For details, the reader can refer to [125, 126]. The software industry is
widely accepting the scenario specications as these are well suited for describing the
intended behavior of the application in abstract form. Rodrigues et al. [125] have
modeled scenario specications through Interaction Overview Diagram (IOD). IOD
shows the ow of control among scenarios and the starting state and the end state
of the ow which is executed by an average user. In UML 2.0, each activity node of
an IOD is a sequence diagram. IOD shows the probability of transfer of control from
a scenario to all adjacent scenarios. The transition probability PTSij between two
scenarios represents that the system will execute scenario Sj after executing scenario
Si. Rodrigues et al. [125] have done a sensitivity analysis and made it clear that the
system reliability is sensitive to (1) the component reliabilities, and (2) the scenario
transition probabilities. Based on this, we use scenario risk and scenario transition
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probabilities to estimate the risk for the overall system. We have already discussed
our proposed method above for estimating scenario risk. The information about sce-
nario transition probabilities are derived from operational prole [9] of the system.
Each path from starting point to end point in an IOD shows the probability of invo-
Figure 8.5: Interaction Overview Diagram of LMS
cation of a sequence of scenarios by an average user in the operational environment.
The risk of the overall system, Risk(Sys), is estimated as follows:
Risk(Sys) =
nopX
i=1
(Risk(pathi)) (8.4)
In Equation 8.4, nop represents number of paths in IOD of the system. We have
drawn an IOD for LMS in Figure 8.5. In LMS, there are two dierent types of users:
(i) Borrower and (ii) Librarian. According to our assumption, the use of the system
by Borrower is nine times more than Librarian. Some use cases are included in other
use cases. For example the use case Collect Fine is called at the time of execution
of the use case Return Item, if the copy is returned after the due date. Hence, the
included use cases are not explicitly shown in the IOD. We calculate the risk for
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the overall LMS using Equation 8.4, in which Table 8.4 is used as an input. The
estimated system risk for LMS is 0.632.
Our risk estimation procedure is not amenable to full automation. Construction
of ISDG is semi-automatic in our approach. Automatic construction of ISDG is a
complex activity in terms of data collection. It is hard to extract all possible state
transitions for a non-trivial system. Unfortunately, the severity analysis techniques
discussed in the paper are not fully automatic as they involve the user in analyzing the
various ways of failures of components / system and determining their eects. The
limitation of severity analysis is that SFTA may produce hundreds of combinations of
events causing system level failures in a complex system. The analyst / programmer is
concerned with what the software is used to perform, whereas SFTA forces the analyst
/ programmer to estimate the possibility of undesired events within a system and
their contribution to system failures. The eort to estimate these may be expensive
and time consuming. The skill of the analyst plays an important role for the severity
analysis process. Finally, we say that a huge investment is required in order to run
our analysis as we require data from a number of UML diagrams and conduct more
than one hazard techniques for severity analysis.
8.1.4 Complexity analysis of risk estimation approach
The complexity of our risk assessment procedure shown in Algorithm 2 is dependent
on a number of factors such as the number of scenarios, number of modal components,
number of states in a component, patterns of component interactions as modeled in
the scenario, number of possible hazards associated with the system at various levels.
All these factors are not uniform as it varies from application to application. For risk
estimation, an intermediate graph called ISDG is introduced in this paper. Now, we
analyze the time and space complexity of constructing ISDG.
To determine the space complexity, we consider the space requirement to store
the intermediate graph, ISDG. ISDG consists of n number of state machines where, n
is the number of modal components in the system. Let state machine smi consists of
mi number of states. The value of mi is usually a small nite number in a moderate
size application. Let N be the total number of states in all the state machines of
the system. So, N =
Pn
i=1(mi). Each state is represented as a node in ISDG.
The transitions in ISDG contain transition to the states of the same component and
transition to the states of other components. At the worst case, each node can have
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n-1 transitions. It is easily realized that the space requirement for ISDG with N
number of nodes (states) is O(N2).
Now, we analyze the time complexity associated with the construction of ISDG.
The procedure to construct ISDG takes as input a set of state-chart diagrams and
a legal sequence of scenarios. The possible behavior of an interacting component is
analyzed at the execution of a scenario. At the time of interaction, we check the
initial state of a component. The components should be in some specic states for
the occurrence of an interaction. We consider legal sequences of scenarios and analyze
the complexity of enumerating all inter-component state transitions of a system. The
time complexity of enumerating all possible inter-component state transitions of a
system at the design stage is NP-complete.
8.2 Experimental Validation
In this section, we have conducted two experiments to evaluate the ecacy of our
approach. The aim of the rst experiment is to cross check the estimated risk with
the actual failures observed in the system. The aim of the second experiment is to
prove that (i) our risk analysis method drives the tester to increase the fault detection
rate, (ii) our approach helps in detecting the important faults that are responsible
for severe failures. The experiments are conducted on the source code of LMS.
8.2.1 Experiment 1
We performed the following steps in this experiment to cross check the estimated risk
with the actual failures observed in the system.
1. Step-1: We applied random testing to test the software. The detected defects
were xed. We recorded the defects found in various scenarios to cross check
with the estimated risk.
2. Step-2: We generated a set of test sequences based on the operational prole
of the system and executed the tested software for each test sequence. We
assumed that the failure rate would be high for a scenario with high risk. As
our aim was to check the failure rate of a scenario, in this step, we did not
remove any detected defects that were responsible for failures. The failure rate
of each scenario was estimated within a test sequence.
3. Step-3: We calculated the average failure rate of a scenario within a system.
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The failure rate of a scenario Sj in a test sequence, Seqi, is ji. ji is computed as
follows:
ji =
1
nji
njiX
j=1
zji; (8.5)
zji represents the execution result of scenario Sj in the test sequence Seqi. The value
of zji is 1, if a failure is observed else the value is 0. nji is the total number of times
scenario Sj is executed in the i-th test sequence. The following assumptions were
taken for the experiment.
1. After the execution of a scenario, the system state may be changed. So, the
same scenario may be executed a number of times, but in dierent system states
within a given sequence.
2. A test case that is designed for a scenario either pass or fail. If a test case is
blocked, we rst, correct the code and then, consider it in our experiment.
3. The output of a selected test case at the current time is not aected by the test
results of previously executed test cases.
We executed the system 10 times for 10 test sequences of dierent length. Table
8.5 shows the estimated risk, detected defects and failure rate of various scenarios
in LMS. In this table, We have put the estimated risks of various scenarios for cross
checking the detected defects with the estimated risk. In the table, the second column
Risk is the normalized risk and fourth column FR is the normalized failure rate of
a scenario, within the system.
Discussion
In Table 8.5, we observed that a number of faults were found in majority of high
risk use cases and the failure rate was also high for those use cases. It is because,
the number of faults detected within a scenario is related to the complexity of the
scenario and complexity is an input for risk estimation. The scenarios within which
a number of inter-component state transitions have been occurred were more fault-
prone than others. From the table, we observed that the fault detection rate was high
in use cases Issue Item, Renew Item and Return Item. We also observed that the
failure rate is not linearly proportional to the estimated risk of the system, always.
We found that the failure rate is also high for some use cases with low risk. It is
because, the third assumption, the output of a selected test case at the current time
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Table 8.5: Experimental result for various use cases of LMS
Use case Risk DDC FR
Add Borrower 0.003 0 0
Remove Borrower 0.037 2 0.0001
Add Title 0.013 0 0
Remove Title 0.009 2 0.0004
Find Title 0.005 0 0
Add Item 0.009 1 0
Remove Item 0.101 3 0.0092
Make Reservation 0.069 0 0.0036
Check Reservation 0.002 0 0
Remove Reservation 0.002 0 0.0017
Search User 0.005 0 0
Issue Item 0.397 3 0.0049
Renew Item 0.071 4 0.0019
Return Item 0.179 5 0.0002
Find Loan 0.005 0 0
Collect Fine 0.093 1 0.0038
SUM 1 1
DDC:Defects Detected and Corrected; FR: Normalized Failure Rate of a scenario.
is not aected by the test results of previously executed test cases, may be a threat
to the validity of our approach. It is also observed from the experimental result that
the failure rate is low for some high risk use cases such as Return Item use case. It
is because, only failure rate is considered in this experiment, but the risk is actually
estimated as a combination of failure rate and severity of failures.
8.2.2 Experiment 2 (Comparison with related work)
We compare our objectives with the existing work on model-based risk analysis tech-
niques according to the six criteria as dened in Table 8.6. In our approach, the
smallest individual element for which the risk is assessed is the state of a class
whereas, it is a class itself in other two approaches. The other advantage of our
approach is that we have done a bi-directional analysis to check the consistency of
failure modes in various levels and also extracted any missing failure mode which
was not analyzed. We also consider the risk for the whole system on the basis of
scenario transition probabilities and risk of scenarios, whereas it is assessed by CDG
in [81] and average of risk of use cases in [82]. In Table 8.6, the approach proposed by
Goseva-Popstojanova et al. [82] is just an extended version of the approach proposed
in [81].
156
8.2 Experimental Validation Analyzing Risk at Architectural Level for Testing
Table 8.6: Comparison of our work with the existing work
CC Yacoub et al. [81] Popstojanova et al. [82] This Work
Source UML Models UML Models UML Models
Approach Bottom up Bottom up Bottom up
Smallest
individ-
ual item
for risk
analysis
Component and Con-
nector
Component and Connector State of a Component
Severity
analysis
SFMEA SFMEA SFFA, SFMEA and SFTA.
Graph
used for
assessing
scenario
risk
(Scenario risk is not
calculated)
Discrete Time Markov
Chain
SCOTEM
Graph used
for analyz-
ing system
risk
Component Depen-
dence Graph (CDG)
(Averaging use case risks) Interaction Overview Dia-
gram.
CC:Comparison Criteria
We have conducted another experiment with the aim to show that our estimated
risk and the intermediate results guide the tester in increasing the fault detection rate
and detecting important faults. In order to verify the eectiveness of our approach,
we have seeded 43 number of faults in the source code of LMS after the completion
of unit testing. The seeded faults are of integration level faults. We assume that a
rigorous unit testing has been conducted before error seeding. The various types of
faults that we were selected in our experiment are discussed below.
1. Three types of interface mutation operators [107] are seeded. These are IMO1:
Direct variable replacement operator, IMO2: Indirect variable replacement op-
erator and IMO3: Return statement operator .
2. Six types of state-based integration faults [22] were inserted such as SF1: Miss-
ing transitions, SF2: Incorrect transitions, SF3: Unspecied event, SF4: In-
correct state of the sender object, SF5: Incorrect state of the receiver object,
SF6: Message passing with incorrect/invalid value of arguments. These faults
are already discussed in above section.
Details of bugs seeded to LMS are shown in Table 8.7. We made three copies of the
source code and allocated three dierent testing approaches for testing and debugging
at the higher level. Our aim is to check which testing method is ecient in minimizing
the post-release failures and also the types of failures which have a negative impact
on both the system and the user. The test time was xed to 36 hours for each method
on the basis of the test budget, size of the source code, total number of use cases,
total number of classes, total number of scenarios and total number of object-points.
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Table 8.7: Bugs seeded to LMS
IMO1 4
IMO2 4
IMO3 5
SF1 7
SF2 8
SF3 3
SF4 4
SF5 5
SF6 3
Total 43
The rst copy was tested by our proposed approach called State-based Approach
in which the supplied use cases are sorted in a prioritized order according to our
calculated risk. The second copy was tested by an approach called component-based
Approach in which the use cases are sorted according to the risk calculated by the
approach of Goseva-Popstojanova et al. [82]. Both the approaches allocated test eort
to a use case based on its estimated risk. The third copy was tested by Randomized
Approach, in which a tester gives equal importance to each use case. For simplicity,
we have considered only the main scenario of a use case which shows the successful
execution of the use case. Our experiment was aimed at investigating the following
queries:
1. Q1: Does our approach guide the tester in improving the test eciency by
detecting more number of important faults than the related approaches?
2. Q2: Does our approach help in improving the test eciency by increasing the
fault detection capability?
3. Q3: Does our approach guide the tester in detecting certain types of faults
compared to other two approaches?
Experimental Result and Discussion
The experimental results are shown in Table 8.8. From the table, we observed that
the generated test scenarios in our approach uncovered several state-based integration
faults which could not be detected in other approaches. It is because, we have tested
the components which are responsible to change the states of other components
during run time whereas, the method proposed in [82] tested the components in
which a number of intra-component state transitions occurred during run time. The
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test priority was assigned to the components based on the number of intra-component
state transitions in [82]. Any bug related to that can be easily detected in rigorous
unit testing but, it requires extra test eort to identify the bugs related to inter-
component state transitions. As state transition concept was not used in Random
based Approach, it detected the lowest number of state-based integration faults. From
Table 8.8: Mutants killed
MO SA CA RA
IMO1 4 4 4
IMO2 4 3 3
IMO3 5 4 5
SF1 7 5 4
SF2 6 5 4
SF3 3 2 2
SF4 2 2 1
SF5 4 4 4
SF6 3 2 1
Total 38 31 28
MO:Mutation Operator; SA:State-based Approach; CA:Component based
Approach; RA: Random based Approach
the experimental result shown in Table 8.8, we answer to the above stated queries
Q2 and Q3.
1. Ans2: Yes, our proposed state-based risk analysis approach guides the tester
to improve the test eciency by increasing the fault detection capability.
2. Ans3: Yes, our proposed approach guides the tester in detecting certain types of
seeded faults compared to other two approaches. State-based integration faults
were detected through our approach as the state complexity was taken as one
input for risk estimation of a scenario, in which both intra and inter-component
state transition dependencies were considered.
To answer the rst question, we had gone for another level of testing. After the
detected faults were debugged, we run the three tested copies to test their behavior in
the operational environment. We used the same test cases for each tested copy. This
time the test cases are designed based on only operational prole. We assume that
a test case either fail or pass. This time a failed test case is not corrected, only the
action is taken to execute a blocked test case. We counted the total number of post-
release failures and the impact of those failures on the system and the user. Table 8.9
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Table 8.9: Failure observation at the time of release
TC Failstate based Failcomp based FailRandom
FCaFCrFMaFM FCaFCrFMaFM FCaFCrFMaFM
100 0 0 2 1 0 1 2 0 0 3 1 1
200 0 0 2 1 0 1 4 1 0 4 2 3
300 0 0 2 3 0 2 1 1 0 4 1 1
TC:Test Cases; FCa: Catastrophic failure; FCr: Major failure; FMa: Marginal
failure; FM : Minor failure;
shows the result of our risk-based prioritization approach. The failures shown in the
table were obtained after the completion of testing phase; at the operational environ-
ment. From Table 8.9, we observed that there is no Major type failure observed in the
copy of the source code of LMS that is tested by our proposed state-based approach,
whereas 2 and 4 numbers of Major type failures were observed in the source code of
the LMS that were tested by component-based and randomized approach, when the
number of test cases were 300. As shown in the table, Major type failures were also
found in the tested copy of component-based approach, though risk analysis was con-
ducted before testing. It is because the dynamic complexity of a component proposed
in [82] did not help the tester to detect the state-based integration faults. The exam-
ple of one such Major type failure observed in the case study LMS is described below.
Though the scenario Issue Item was executed successfully when, a borrower re-
quested to issue a book which was already reserved by him however, we observed
that the same borrower could not reserve any book further. It is because, due to a
seeded bug, the system could not change the state of the borrower to Active state
from NonReservable state, after the execution of Issue Item scenario. The severity
of this failure is assumed to be Major, as the same borrower cannot reserve any book
further.
Now we answer to query Q1. Ans1: Yes, our approach helps to improve the test e-
ciency by nding bugs that are responsible for severed failures such as Catastrophic
and Major types.
8.2.3 Applicability
Risk analysis is a part of safety engineering. Errors related to the temporal behavior
of a safety-critical system is hard to detect during testing. These errors may lead
to severe failures such as causing severe harm to the life of people or equipments or
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environment. Our risk analysis approach is mainly applicable for pre-testing analysis
of safety-critical systems such as software systems embedded in medical devices,
nuclear power station, telecoms systems and industrial robots etc. These embedded
softwares are of dierent sizes and dierent complexity. The basic principle of a
safety-critical system is to keep the system as simple as possible.
Constructing ISDG is complicated and the severity analysis process is time con-
suming for a large and complex system, but it helps to detect the important errors
at the early phase of testing and deliver the product with right quality within the
limited budget and time. Our risk analysis approach ranks the components/scenarios
within a system for testing according to their estimated risks. There are some compo-
nents/scenarios with high risk and low execution time. Though their contribution to
the overall system risk is less, more testing is needed for that items as they check the
exception handling of critical conditions. Our approach also identies the contribu-
tion of a component/scenario risk for increasing the risk of the whole scenario/system
through the sensitivity analysis.
8.3 Summary
In this chapter, we have proposed an analytical method for risk estimation of a soft-
ware system at the architectural level for testing. The approach proposed in the
chapter is two fold. In the rst phase, the risk is estmated for components, use
case scenarios and the overal system. In the second phase, risk-based testing is con-
ducted, in which the test priority is assigned to various elements according to their
estimated risk.The data collected from UML diagrams: sequence diagrams and state
chart diagrams are used for risk estimation. We have also considered the operational
prole of the system to know the transition probability between any two scenarios.
Compared to the existing work on software risk estimation, our proposed method
is a new one that considers (i) risk associated with various states of a component
rather than the whole component within a scenario (ii) additional valuable infor-
mation required for severity analysis of a component such as message criticality and
bidirectional analysis to extract possible types of failure modes within a scenario. We
have experimentally proved that, testing process is ecient when the testing team is
guided by our approach compared to the approach proposed in [82].
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Chapter 9
Conclusions and Future Direction
We have explored some test eort prioritization issues at various levels of software
development life cycle. Our proposed approaches identied the program's critical
paths in which the impact of failure is high. At the implementation level, we have
exposed the critical components that are responsible for increasing the system failure
rate. At the architectural level, we have proposed novel methods to compute the
complexity and risk associated with various high level functions within a system. As
our approaches expose the critical elements at the architectural level, the testers and
the developers are guided to produce a high quality software, within the available
test resources.
9.1 Contribution
In this section, we summarize the important contributions of our work. There are
ve important contributions: (i) Computing the inuence of a component toward
system failures (ii) Computing the criticality of a component using both internal and
external factors (iii) Improving the software quality using a multi cycle-based testing
approach (iv) Estimating the criticality of a use case at the architectural level (v)
Estimating the risk associated with various states of a component within a scenario,
the risk of a scenario and the risk of the overall system.
9.1.1 Computing the inuence of a component
We have proposed a framework to prioritize the components within a system accord-
ing to their inuence toward the system failures. For this, we introduced a metric
called Inuence Metric using forward slicing technique to compute the inuence value
of a component within a system. It shows the inuence of the component toward
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system failures. We rst constructed Extended System Dependence Graph (ESDG),
an intermediate representation of an object-oriented program. Then, we presented
an ecient algorithm called MethodInuence Algorithm to get the inuence value of
a method within a system. Our MethodInuence Algorithm marks a node of ESDG
as inuenced, when the associated dependency exists. We have shown that the space
complexity of our algorithm is O(n2), where n is the total number of nodes in the
ESDG and the time complexity is O(E), where E is the number of edges in ESDG.
Inuence Metric of a class is obtained by applying MethodInuence Algorithm to all
its methods. At the statement level, MethodInuence Algorithm shows how many
other statements are depending directly or indirectly on the output produced by a
method within a program. Test Priority (TP) is assigned to a component within the
system based on its inuence value and average execution time. We have conducted
our experiments on three case studies, LMS, SMA and ATM. We have experimen-
tally proved that decreasing the reliability of a high priority component drastically
increases the failure rate of the application, whereas it is not true in case of a low
priority component. We have shown that our approach is ecient than the existing
approach [9] on test eort prioritization.
9.1.2 Computing the criticality of a component
Prioritizing the program elements within a system based on only inuence value and
average execution time may not help to expose all the important bugs during testing.
So, we have included some important factors for exposing the critical components
within a system. We have computed the criticality of a component by adding two ex-
ternal factors: severity associated with each failure and the business value associated
with various high level functions within a system and one internal factor: structural
complexity, to our previous work. From the experimental results, we observed that
by allocating test eort to various components according to their estimated criticality
helps in decreasing the failure rate of the application as well as the chance of getting
severe failures in the operational environment.
9.1.3 Conducting multi cycle-based testing
We have proposed a multi cycle-based test eort prioritization approach, in which the
priority values of various components/scenarios change between test cycles within a
system under test. In this work, we introduced the concept of Inuence Metric
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through the dynamic slicing approach and used it as one input for prioritizing com-
ponents within a test cycle in a sequence of many test cycles. From the experimental
results, we obtained that the test cases generated through our multi cycle-based
testing approach could uncover some important bugs that could not be detected in
Musa'a approach [9]. As our approach considered the inuence value of a component
within a scenario during run time, the components providing a number of services
got high test priority. We also assigned priority to the components based on their
failure history. These factors helped to improve the reliability of the system under
test, within the available test resources. We considered the business value associated
with use case scenarios as a factor for prioritization in the third test cycle, which
helps to increase the customer certication on the tested system.
9.1.4 Estimating the criticality of a use case
Identication of critical components during the early stage of software development
enhances the decisions on test resource allocation. Test eciency and the quality
of software product can be improved, if the test priority of a component is decided
at the architectural level rather than at the implementation level. Keeping this in
view, we have proposed a novel approach to prioritize the use cases within a system
at the architectural level to guide both the tester and developer during software
development life cycle. The use cases are prioritized based on their internal criteria-
complexity and external criteria- business value. Unlike the existing approaches on
complexity estimation at the early stage, we evaluated the complexity of a use case
analytically through a collection of data at the architectural level with little or no
involvement of subjective measures from domain experts.
9.1.5 Estimating risk at the architectural level for testing
Risk assessment at the early stage of software development helps achieving high level
of condence in a system and saves the cost and time during software development life
cycle. We have proposed a novel risk analysis technique that works at the software
architecture level. The main idea is to rank the components within a scenario and
to rank the scenarios within a system according to their estimated risk. Unlike the
existing work on risk assessment at the architectural level [81,82], our work assesses
risks at a ner granularity level. The ecacy of our approach is evaluated on the
Library Management System case study.
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9.2 Future Work
We briey outline the following possible extensions to our work.
1. Prioritization-based testing covers two aspects: (i) prioritizing the program
elements for testing and (ii) prioritizing the test cases. In the present work, we
concentrated on the rst one, i.e. prioritizing the program elements for testing.
Automatic selection of test cases from a pool of test cases according to the
estimated priority of components can be taken up as a future work.
2. We have considered complexity and failure history as defect generators. The
software industry is considering a number of other factors such as change fre-
quency, impact of new technology and impact of the number of people involved,
optimization etc. Our proposed method will be eective, if these factors will
be considered with it. In future, this scope may be explored.
3. We have proposed eight factors that aect the complexity of a use case at the
architectural level. We have automated only three factors. We are planning to
automate the rest factors in our future work.
4. We have proposed risk estimation method at the architectural level. One of
the future work would be estimating the risk at the requirement phase using
requirement models in UML and semi-formal languages.
5. Our approach can be applied to industry standard projects to analyze its ef-
fectiveness.
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